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ABSTRACT 
 
PURPOSE:  The aim of the thesis was to investigate the constructs of risk and vulnerability at a 
network level for the UK food supply system. Through a deeper re-examination of data collected for 
the Chatham House project, the objectives of the thesis were to understand actors’ perceptions of 
threats within UK food networks and how these relate to the constructs of risk and vulnerability. 
 
METHOD: Using a grounded analysis approach, the research re-examined data from case studies in 
the UK dairy and wheat supply networks, from a supply chain risk management (SCRM) and supply 
chain vulnerability (SCV) perspective. While not in the tradition of a true grounded theory method, 
the study looked to support theory building through comparison of findings to key literature in the 
SCRM and SCV fields.  
FINDINGS:  The study revealed that risk, vulnerability and resilience are highly interrelated. How 
actors perceived risk, along with their willingness or capability to act, were core dynamics of SCV.  
Innovation was also identified as a major influence on resilience and adaptive capacity. At a network 
level, vulnerability can be characterised as system change. Thus the research highlights 
convergences between the fields of ecological resilience, system transition, SCV and supply chain 
resilience (SCRES) for supply networks. 
RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS:  There has been very little research into SCRM, SCV and SCRES at a 
network level. This thesis presents a conceptualisation of these constructs for the UK food supply 
network, along with their interconnections, and therefore provides a contribution to these fields. 
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS: Wider socio-economic and environmental outcomes of the UK food 
network are at risk and there needs to be more cohesive, network-based policies and approaches to 
support greater resilience. This will require a stronger lead from government and collaborative 
approaches from policy makers and supply actors. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background to the thesis 
1.1.1 Supply Chain Risk and Vulnerability 
 
Modern supply chains are facing increased risk and uncertainty, driven by the 
prevailing supply chain strategies of globalisation, outsourcing, lead-time reduction, 
reduced inventory holding and increasing integration. (Sheffi and Rice, 2005, Zsidisin 
et al., 2005). This uncertainty manifested itself in a number of high profile 
disruptions, notably the period post the 9/11 attacks and the outbreak of SARS in 
South-East Asia. As with food chains, these disruptions served to underline the inter-
connectedness of supply chains with growing appreciation of how sudden shocks 
within one area can spread to cause disruption in directly connected chains. This 
sparked an impetus for supply chain managers to mitigate for both everyday 
demand-supply co-ordination risks but also for these types of high impact, low 
probability disruption risks (Faisal et al., 2006, Zsidisin et al., 2005, Kleindorfer and 
Saad, 2005, Norrman and Jansson, 2004, Zsidisin et al., 2004). Despite this, supply 
chain risk management still remains pre-dominately focused on shock-based 
contingent risks , sourced within the immediate supply chain rather than within the 
wider supply or other interconnected networks.  
From an academic perspective, while there has been significant interest in 
SCRM in the last 10 years, the conceptualisation of systemic risks and uncertainties 
within the wider environment is under-developed.  These risk sources are often 
exogenous to the supply network but have the potential to create severe 
consequences for the competitive future of organisations (Christopher and Holweg, 
2011, Trkman and McCormack, 2009). These risks are manifested either through 
incidents of sudden shocks but also through systemic change [rate of change here is 
an issue too] which affect the economic, political and social space within which 
organisations operate.  As supply chains become more complex, there is more of an 
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imperative to understand risks from both an internal perspective (to the firm and 
network) and the external environment (Christopher and Holweg, 2011, Ritchie and 
Brindley, 2007)  To date, there have been no previous studies which have examined 
the convergence of global and local (exogenous and endogenous) factors and their 
implications for UK food supply vulnerability from either a systemic or network-
based perspective. 
Despite these growing pressures, at the time of the thesis, the concepts of 
supply risk and vulnerability were still considered to be in their infancy (Juttner, 
2005, Juttner and Maklan, 2011, Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009). Despite a 
significant increase in interest in this area, there still remains insufficient 
understanding of these concepts to date (Hohenstein et al., 2015). In particular there 
has been little research as to how these concepts apply across supply networks 
(Greening and Rutherford, 2011) and how the interplay between exogenous global 
factors and endogenous, internal structural and relational factors impacts on supply 
vulnerability. Previous studies have mirrored organisational approaches in their 
tendency to deal with more narrowly based definitions of risk, more easily 
quantifiable, focused either at single or dual organisational levels. The SCRM 
literature in general tends to be narrowly focused (not multi-disciplinary) and 
without a more holistic understanding of the dynamics across networks. While SCV is 
characterised as the interdependency and the interactions between organisations, 
there is also little research into how actors’ perception of risk impact on these 
interactions. There is also a tendency for research to be in the ‘positive’ tradition, 
focusing on strategies and actions for mitigation, rather than normative i.e. why 
supply chains may be vulnerable to disruptions (Peck, 2005). From an academic 
perspective, this signals significant gaps in this arena. 
1.1.2 Food supply chain disruptions 
 
Food supply chains have seen a rise in disruptions and the UK agri-food 
system has seen a number of well publicised crises over the last decade. These 
include the outbreak of BSE during the 1990s, the occurrence of foot and mouth 
disease in 2001 and food contamination scares (e.g. Sudan 1).  The food chain has 
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also seen wide-spread disruption from seemingly unconnected events such as the 
fuel protests strikes in 2000 (Peck, 2005), the Buncefield oil depot fire in 2005 
(Gardner, 2007) and the floods of 2007 (BBC, 2010). These crises served to underline 
that agri-food chains are vulnerable to both shock type risks, both external and 
internal ( e.g. disease, terrorism, natural disasters) but also to ‘creeping’ systemic 
crises (e.g. fuel protests) where one small event can escalate throughout the whole 
system  (Peck, 2005).   
1.1.3 Context 2006-2008 
 
The vulnerability of the food system was underlined in the period 2007-2008 
by the food price shocks which demonstrated how external, global events can flow 
through to affect the business environment in the UK. The FAO food price index 
(FFPI) reached a record 219 points in June 2008, 51% higher than seen over the 
previous year (FAO, 2008a). These price rises triggered a ‘food crisis’ in developing 
countries – an estimated extra 73-105 million people globally were catapulted into 
poverty as a direct result (World Bank, 2008). Developing countries were faced with 
civil and political unrest, culminating in a series of trade restricting or distorting 
measures such as export restrictions, reduction in food related taxes and price 
controls (World Bank, 2008). 
While increased prices had a devastating effect on developing countries, the 
price shocks also affected developed countries. In the UK, the rise in prices flowed 
through to the retail shelf; food price inflation peaked at 12.8% in August 2008 (ONS, 
2008). Consumers in the UK, as well as agri-food businesses, saw a sudden reversal in 
a 26-year trend of year on year price reductions, challenging expectations of sources 
of ever-cheaper food. Retailers, suppliers and producers alike were caught by 
surprise by the sudden price rises. The events triggered wide-spread concerns over 
the global interdependency of modern food supply chains and demonstrated the 
political and social importance of affordable food.  
Prior to 2006, the concept of UK national food security had seemed an 
anachronism. Post 2006, this had started to change with a number of government 
based discussion documents being produced (see Peck, 2006 and DEFRA, 2006). 
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However, these studies were pre-dominantly policy based with no real analysis of the 
implications for supply chains or agri-businesses. Only Peck (2006) examined specific 
impacts on the resilience of the wider food supply system. There was still 
complacency at the potential levels of threats facing the UK food system and a lack of 
understanding of the systemic nature of these threats. The spectre of a period of 
continued food inflation, rather than deflation, forced the issue of UK national food 
security back onto the political agenda; the debate over national food security for 
the UK (and for other EU countries) has only re-emerged over the last few years.  
1.1.4 The Chatham House study 
 
In late 2006, in response to rising concern over UK food security, Chatham 
House initiated a research program to examine the impact of global trends, 
particularly resource constraints, on food supply. The impetus for the work was built 
on the need to bridge the absence of systemic analysis and potential strategic and 
policy blind-spots, particularly in the face of potential threats to national food 
security. This two-year programme, entitled ‘UK food supply in the 21st Century: The 
New Dynamic’, was established to explore how combination of global factors could 
affect the UK food supply system over the next decade. The research objectives were 
to identify the strategic options open to stakeholders across the supply networks and 
highlight policy implications and gaps. To illuminate the issues, two sectors were 
chosen as exploratory cases – that of the wheat and dairy sectors. The programme 
revolved around the development of four globally-based scenarios. These explored 
the systemic inter-linkages between global factors and the range of potential 
outcomes for global food production. At the time the scenarios were developed, the 
food price crisis had fully manifested itself and actors were concerned as to whether 
price rises heralded a step change in food supply. The scenarios therefore depicted a 
range of possible outcomes in the global arena – namely, Just a Blip (that prices 
would fall back to pre-crisis levels), Food Inflation (cost pressures would see ongoing 
food inflation), Into a New Era (higher food process and scarcity would trigger a 
transformational system change) and Food in Crisis (acute prices would trigger 
shortages). To assess how these global scenarios could impact UK supply, a series of 
workshops were held with senior representatives from within the dairy and wheat 
5 
 
supply networks, and those who had wider food-based interests from both 
governmental and non-governmental sectors.  
The study formally started in late 2006, with data collection taking place 
between 2007 and early 2008, with the report published in 2009. The researcher was 
the Principal Investigator for the project and undertook a lead role in the research 
project; being responsible for the research design, much of the data collection, all of 
the analysis and overall delivery of the research objectives. The researcher was also 
responsible for the majority of the drafting of the final report which outlined the key 
research findings (see Ambler-Edwards et al., 2009). The data set gathered as part of 
this wider project forms the core of this thesis. 
1.1.5 Food system vulnerability post 2008/09 
 
Post 2008-2009, food prices started to reduce (although even now in 2015, 
they are still higher than pre-2007 levels). While the immediate shock has passed, 
the Chatham House research revealed significant issues which could continue to 
impact food supply chains in the future.  These included population growth, global 
switching to more resource intensive foods (e.g. meat), competition over land use, 
water and energy constraints and the threat of climate change (Ambler-Edwards et 
al., 2009). The raft of protectionist measures taken in light of the 2007-2008 food 
price rises, indicate that the future robustness of and access to global markets may 
not always be relied on. The increasing exposure of the UK food system to these 
global markets (particularly agriculture) has the potential to create more price shocks 
and market volatility. 
All of these factors could continue to increase uncertainty within the 
marketplace.  While this global supply serves to deliver a greater range of choice and 
availability of products to the UK market, it in turn creates increasing exposure to 
complex political, social and economic effects that have not been considered in their 
entirety. The complex nature of food supply itself, its interdependencies and 
resource-heavy usage point to increasing vulnerability from more exogenous, 
systemic sources of risk and uncertainty. These wider uncertainties and the resultant 
vulnerability of the food system will take on increasing importance, prompting 
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questions over how concepts of supply chain vulnerability will need to be framed in 
the future.  
 
1.2 Aims and objectives of the thesis 
 
While the CH report articulated the pressures faced by the UK food system, 
the research was conducted from a policy perspective rather than a supply chain 
vulnerability perspective. The study did not specifically examine the data to 
understand how global effects interacted with the inherent properties of the UK food 
supply network to create vulnerabilities (and/or the opposite, resilience). While the 
data gathered did encompass the likely actions behaviours by actors across the 
supply network, this data was not used extensively to understand how these 
interactions contributed to the vulnerability of the network. It therefore did not 
address the questions raised by the SCRM and vulnerability literature.  
From a food system perspective, there are a number of studies and reports 
which examine single-point issues that have relevancy to agri-food chains. These 
have majored on either the environmental aspects (e.g. Manning, 2008, Vasileiou 
and Morris, 2006)  or food safety risks ( e.g. Manning et al., 2007, Roth et al., 2008). 
A few studies have examined the impacts of global, external factors but these again 
are pre-dominantly single-issue in focus (e.g. Manning et al., 2007), with a heavy bias 
towards animal disease and food safety issues. However, there have been relatively 
very few studies which examined the vulnerability of the UK food system when faced 
with the impacts of the combination of globally-sourced, systemic risks.  
This PhD therefore arose from the need to bridge the gaps, both in terms of 
understanding further the systemic vulnerability of the UK food system but also in 
terms of the contribution to the body of knowledge on SCRM and vulnerability. The 
data collected during the Chatham House project was numerous and rich, 
encompassing actors’ perceptions right across the wheat and dairy supply networks, 
and other stakeholders such as consumer groups, government and NGOs (over 70 
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actors were involved in the study). The data collected also contained significant 
information on how actors might respond in light of the four scenarios, with 
potential insight into how they evaluated the potential threats and risks and their 
perceptions of likely impacts. This data therefore had the potential to support a more 
normative, grounded study of risk and vulnerability phenomena. This thesis 
therefore undertook a fresh examination and analysis of this data, taking a more 
explicit supply chain risk management perspective. The objectives for the thesis took 
guidance from the identified gaps in previous supply risk and vulnerability studies; 
principally to:- 
- undertake research which examines risk and vulnerability at a network level for 
the UK food system 
- to re-examine and provide a deeper analysis of the data collected through the 
Chatham House research project from a supply chain risk and vulnerability 
perspective 
- to understand actors’ perceptions of risks and vulnerabilities within  the UK food 
supply system 
The research questions that guided the study were as follows: 
RQ1: How do actors conceptualise risk and vulnerability within the UK food 
supply system?   
RQ2: How do the endogenous characteristics of the UK food supply system, 
in terms of its structure and dynamics, contribute to the perceived level of 
vulnerability in light of global, exogenous uncertainties? 
RQ3:   How adequate are these conceptual frameworks of vulnerability, 
resilience and adaptive capacity in light of global phenomena? 
RQ4: What are the implications for stakeholders and policy makers in their 
aims to reduce vulnerability and encourage a more robust UK food system 
RQ5: What are the implications for future research into concepts of 
vulnerability, resilience and adaptive capacity? 
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The first research question sets the scene to understand how actors perceived the 
threats and risks facing the food system (through the lens of the four CH scenarios), 
their core concerns and their potential blind-spots. The second question looks to 
address the need to understand the interplay between external threats and the 
internal, inherent characteristics of the UK food system and how these may combine 
to create vulnerability for the network. Question three supports exploratory theory 
building by comparing the existing concepts of vulnerability (from the literature) to 
the concepts that emerge from the data (Gill and Johnson, 2002). Research questions 
four and five are designed to critically evaluate the findings from the data and draw 
conclusions as to the contribution of the thesis, the potential impacts on 
stakeholders and the implications for future research in this field. 
 
1.3 Thesis Approach 
1.3.1 Level of analysis and scope 
 
As the thesis re-examined data collected from the CH study, the scope and 
level of analysis was dictated by the structure of the CH study. In this respect, the 
level of analysis was at a supply network level. While supply networks are seen as the 
highest level of analysis for SCM research (Croom et al., 2000, Harland et al., 2001), 
research is often from the perspective of a focal firm and its respective supply chain 
(Miemczyk et al., 2012). In this instance, the supply network is described as the 
entire network for a particular industrial sector, known as the industrial network 
(Hakansson and Ford, 2002, Gadde et al., 2003, Ritter et al., 2004). The examination 
of these wider connections is particularly important when examining major 
disruptions to supply chain nodes, where there is a need for firms to seek new 
connections within the wider context of the market/industrial network (Greening 
and Rutherford, 2011). 
The networks under consideration were those of the wheat and dairy 
industrial networks. The food system has two key routes through to the consumer – 
through food service or through retail. While some actors from the food service 
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industry made up a small proportion of the participants, in this instance, a decision 
was taken to focus predominately on the retail route to market, chiefly as this had 
the most political interest and acts as the front line in food provision in a food crisis.  
In addition these networks spread their tentacles into secondary support industries 
and beyond, therefore for the purpose of the study, the network was bounded to 
include only:- 
 retailers 
 general food manufacturers/processors 
 mills/bakeries/dairy processors 
 traders (predominately grain traders) 
 dairy and wheat producers 
 primary agricultural support organisations (e.g. agri-chemical suppliers) 
 
1.3.2 Research methodology 
 
The methodology for the thesis is in the case study tradition (Yin, 1994) with 
the two cases being the industrial networks of the UK wheat and dairy sectors. Case 
study methods are appropriate as exploratory devices in industrial networks where 
there is little knowledge in the field (Gill and Johnson, 2002) and are also consistent 
as a method for theory building (Bryman and Bell, 2003). While not in the tradition of 
a true grounded theory method (as theoretical sampling was not used and the data 
and analysis were not conducted simultaneously (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, Suddaby, 
2006), it took a grounded approach to the re-examination and analysis of the CH 
data. In this sense, the approach took guidance from the development of new theory 
by contrasting the daily reality and how these phenomena are interpreted by those 
who interact with them (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).  The thesis is in keeping with the 
interpretive, inductive tradition (Crotty, 2002) in developing a deeper understanding 
(‘verstehen’) of social phenomena and their interlinkage at an ‘adequate causal’ level 
(Weber, 1962). To employ a systemic approach to the analysis, a five phase approach 
was used ( as described by Yin (2010):- 
1. compiling of the data – organisation of data collected 
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2. disassembling of data – through formal coding 
3. re-assembly of the data – to assemble emerging patterns 
4. interpretation of the data – to develop meaning pertinent to the study 
5. conclude – to show the broader significance of findings and challenge current 
thinking 
Table 1.1 shows the original data collection instruments, the purpose they served in 
the CH study and how they were used in this thesis. 
Data collection Original purpose 
(Chatham House Project) 
Thesis purpose 
General interviews   
(Food system 
dynamics 2007-
2008) 
-To understand how actors 
perceived the dynamics of the 
food crisis in 2007 
-To identify core global factors 
which could create changes in 
future dynamics 
-To develop the four scenarios 
-To contextualise the dynamics of 
2007/2008 period 
Supply chain sector  
interviews (wheat 
and dairy actors) 
-To understand actors’ 
perceptions of key drivers of risk 
and vulnerability impacting their 
organisation 
• -Key responses by actors related 
to conceptions of risk of risk and 
vulnerability 
Initial scenario 
workshops 
(1 x wheat actors, 
1 x dairy actors) 
-To test scenarios for plausibility 
-To gauge initial reactions from 
actors 
• -How wheat and dairy actors  
conceptualise risk 
• -Thematic analysis to identify risk 
categories 
• -How risk categories apply to the 
different echelons of the wheat 
and dairy networks 
Main scenario 
workshops 
( 1 x wheat actors, 
1 x dairy actors) 
-To identify the potential impact 
of scenarios on UK food system 
-To understand the likely 
actions, behaviours and 
strategies of actors across the 
food system 
-To identify the core factors 
which impact on vulnerability of 
the wheat and dairy supply 
networks 
-To build a conceptual framework 
which shows how these factors 
interlink 
Table 1.1 : Data collection and its usage 
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1.3.3 Timeline of the thesis 
 
As this thesis was undertaken on a part-time basis, the literature review, the 
data analysis and synthesis and the writing process took place over a significant 
period of time with a number of hiatuses. The timeline for the thesis is shown in 
figure 1.1. The data was collected between 2007 and 2008 and the thesis looks to 
ground this in the context of the time and provide a snap shot of actors’ perceptions 
during this period. As can be seen, the main literature review took place between 
2009 and 2012 and this body of work formed the basis for the research questions 
and analysis. This was followed by an update covering developments within the fields 
of SCV and SCRES conducted in 2015, forming the latter part of the literature review 
chapter.  
The extended writing period created an opportunity within the thesis to 
evaluate how the findings stand-up in light of events and changing contexts within 
the food system over the last four to six years. The thesis therefore includes a 
chapter which summarises the main changes in the food system since 2009 and 
assesses whether the findings have stood the test of time.  
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Figure 1.1 Timeline of the thesis 
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1.4 Structure of Thesis 
This thesis is structured in ten chapters. Figure 1.2 shows how these chapters 
link together with table 1.2 summarising the purpose of each chapter.
 
Figure 1.2 : Map of the thesis 
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Chapter Title Purpose 
One Introduction -To introduce the theme and context of the thesis 
Two Literature Review  -Overview of SCM and SCRM literature up to 2012 
-Update of SCV and SCRES literature 2012-2015 
-Establishment of research gap and justification for 
research questions 
Three Methodology -Explanation of research philosophy 
-Research approach and design including how data was 
re-examined and analysed 
Four The Dynamics of the 
UK Food System  
-The context of the UK food system ( dairy and wheat 
sectors) as of 2008-2009 
-Key dynamics of period as perceived by actors 
Five Responses to the 
Chatham House 
Scenarios 
-How actors responded to the four scenarios 
-Likely effects of the scenarios on the dairy and wheat 
sectors 
Six Conceptualisations 
of risk 
-How actors perceive risk 
-Explanation of the risk categories derived from the 
data 
Seven Conceptions of 
vulnerability 
-The exogenous and endogenous factors impacting on 
actors’ perceptions of vulnerability 
- The interlinkages between factors and a conceptual 
framework of vulnerability 
Eight Conceptual 
frameworks of risk 
and vulnerability – 
towards new 
thinking? 
-An assessment as to how well frameworks and 
concepts within the SCRM literature match thesis 
findings 
Nine Framing of the 
debate and 
implications for 
actors 
-How the issues have been framed since 2008 
-An update on the wheat and dairy sectors since 2008 
-An evaluation as to how relevant the findings and 
conceptual frameworks from this research are now 
Ten Conclusions -Contribution to the field of SCRM 
-Implications for future research 
Table 2.1: Summary of chapters 
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Chapter Two is a review of the supply chain management, supply chain risk 
and vulnerability literature. It also maps out the research gap and provides 
justification for the five research questions which guided the thesis research. Chapter 
three establishes the research philosophy of the researcher. It also gives a 
description of the wider Chatham House project and how scenarios were developed 
to provide a way of conceptualising how global demand and supply dynamics could 
impact the UK food supply system. The chapter proceeds to explain how the data 
used within the thesis was collected. The research methodology for the thesis is 
explained along with how the data was re-coded and analysed afresh. The chapter 
ends by detailing how this data was used in the subsequent chapters to answer the 
five research questions. 
Chapter Four sets the context for the UK food system, using the dairy and 
wheat sectors as examples, during the 2008-2009 period (the time of the data 
collection). It presents data from interviews conducted to understand how actors, 
both from within the food system and peripheral to it, perceived the key dynamics at 
that time and where their concerns lay. Chapter Five presents the narrative of the 
four scenarios that were pivotal in collecting subsequent data as to how actors 
perceived risk and vulnerability. 
Chapter Six is concerned with the findings from the analysis as to how actors 
perceive and conceptualise risk. The chapter explores the different categories of risk 
that emerged from the empirical data and how these perceptions differed as to the 
position each actor has within the supply chain. Chapter Seven explores the 
conceptualisation of vulnerability. It presents a conceptual framework of exogenous 
and endogenous factors, emerging as core themes from the data, which impact on 
how actors view and think about vulnerability.  
Chapter Eight critically examines how adequate current conceptualisations 
are in the field of SCRM and vulnerability. It compares the findings and conceptual 
frameworks developed from the empirical data in the thesis with other conceptions 
and theories and highlights potential gaps and contradictions.  
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Chapter Nine gives an update of the dynamics post the 2008 food crisis 
period and assesses the weakness in the current framing of the issues facing the food 
system. The chapter also assesses the relevance of the findings and conceptual 
frameworks derived from the data in this thesis and how well they have stood the 
test of time since the crisis. It also evaluates the validity of the research. 
Chapter Ten presents the conclusions and summarises the contribution made 
by this thesis to the field of SCRM. It also sets out the implications for future 
research. 
1.5 Conclusions 
The thesis is concerned with the examination of risk and vulnerability in the 
UK food supply network. Through a fresh examination of data, previously collected as 
part of the Chatham House food study, it takes a grounded analytical approach to 
understand how risk and vulnerability is conceptualised by supply actors. It also looks 
to understand how global exogenous and supply network related endogenous 
factors impact on the vulnerability of the UK food system. The contribution therefore 
is to the field of supply chain risk and vulnerability.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
As the research is to explore the concepts of supply chain risk and 
vulnerability in the context of the UK food supply system, the main focus of this 
chapter is to explore current thinking in the academic fields of supply chain risk and 
vulnerability, where there are potential gaps and where this thesis fits. Due to the 
timelines involved in this thesis, the main literature review was performed in 2012 
and the majority of this chapter covers only literature up to this period. However a 
further review was conducted in 2015 to update developments in the SCV and SCRES 
fields and this is also included in this chapter.   
Both supply chain risk and vulnerability have evolved from the field of supply 
chain management (SCM). The first part of this chapter therefore explores SCM itself, 
which forms the fundamental theoretical underpinning for any study into the 
interplay between organisations and their supply structures and dynamics. The 
chapter presents a summary of pertinent points from this field, covering how this 
field has been applied within a supply network context.  
The chapter then proceeds to the core subject areas, that of risk, vulnerability 
and resilience. It first deals with the ideas of risk, and how these concepts have been 
incorporated into ideas of supply chain management. It then covers the related fields 
of supply chain vulnerability, resilience and adaptive capacity, exploring in some part 
definitions from other fields such as ecology. 
The chapter follows with a discussion on recent studies into supply risk and 
vulnerability in relation to the UK food supply system. The next section presents the 
summary of the literature review as to the developments within the SCV and SCRES 
fields post 2015. The chapter concludes with an outline of the research gap that 
drove the methodological design and purpose of the thesis. It then details the 
research questions that guided the thesis, designed to help address this gap. 
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2.2. Supply Chain Management 
2.2.1 Supply Chain management theory 
 
Supply chain management emerged as a separate entity from that of 
operations management in the early 1980s (Croom et al., 2000, Cousins et al., 2006). 
It grew out of the development of logistics, in response to ever increasing 
complexities of supply-based processes and the need to co-ordinate inter-firm 
logistic activities.  However supply chain management is considered to be a wider 
concept than just that of logistics-based activities. It was re-conceptualised during 
the early 1990s as the integration of key business processes, in addition to that of 
logistics processes. (Lambert and Cooper, 2000) :- 
Supply chain management is the integration of key business processes from end users 
through original suppliers that provides products, services and information that add 
value for customers and other stakeholders. (Global Supply Chain Forum definition – 
from Lambert and Cooper(2000). 
Supply chain management is generally accepted to be have been led by 
business practice (Lambert and Cooper, 2000) rather than through theoretical 
means.  The field therefore exhibits a strong alignment to actual SCM practice, but 
can suffer from the lack of theoretical rigour, in the development of supply chain 
specific theories (Harland et al., 2006, Burgess et al., 2006, Carter, 2011). There is 
therefore a need for development of normative and underpinning theoretical models 
(Burgess et al., 2006, Harland et al., 2006, Storey et al., 2006, Carter, 2011). However, 
the field is not without its theoretical foundations; these are based on existing 
theories from the disciplines of economics, strategic management and sociological 
disciplines (Burgess et al., 2006, Carter, 2011, Hitt, 2011). The most important of 
these are judged to be Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), the  resource based view of 
the firm (RBV) and  social exchange theory (Burgess et al., 2006, Hitt, 2011), which 
form the basis of many of the strands of supply chain management thinking and 
research.  
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SCM research has often been founded on a single discipline-based focus 
including those of  purchasing, marketing, logistics, strategy, psychology/sociology, 
finance/economics, information technology and operations management (Cousins et 
al., 2006) although there is some evidence of multi-disciplinary studies. This range 
again indicates there is a very broad conceptual understanding of what SCM 
constitutes. The fragmentation and confusion concerning the definition of supply 
chains and the terms is an oft cited criticism (Croom et al., 2000, Storey et al., 2006) - 
Stock and Boyer (2009) identified 166 SCM definitions in their examination of the 
literature.   Despite this, there is some convergence of opinion, particularly around 
the concepts of integrated supply chain management, as identified by Storey et al. 
(2006). These converging concepts are founded on the premise that the integration 
or increased co-ordination of processes and activities between actors and 
organisations within a chain (be it 2 or more echelons) will create increased 
efficiencies thus creating a level of competitive advantage (in this sense referencing 
TCE and social exchange theory).  There is an inherent belief here that the 
combination of partnerships through the chain would result in better performance in 
the management of the flow of goods through the chain (Mentzer et al., 2001). The 
underpinning theory here, based on TCE is that there is an economic rationale and 
therefore benefit, to the integration of processes across the chain (Hakansson and 
Persson, 2004). This is the concept that it is supply chains that compete, rather than 
individual companies (Christopher, 1992). 
 
2.2.2 Scope and ambition of SCM 
 
SCM has developed as both a managerial and strategic function. From the 
management perspective, the goal is to organise and manage SC processes to meet 
consumer demand (Cousins et al., 2006). Responsibilities range from the 
management of information and product flows to the management of external 
relationships with suppliers and customers across the supply chain (Lambert and 
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Cooper, 2000, Mentzer et al., 2001).  But it also encompasses decision making. At the 
top level this involves decisions on the planning of supply, what to source, what to 
make, how to meet customer demand and organise delivery channels  (Storey et al., 
2006).  
Mentzer et al. (pg.18, 2001) define SCM as ‘the systemic, strategic co-
ordination of the traditional business functions and the tactics across these business 
functions within a particular company and across businesses within the supply chain, 
for the purposes of improving the long-term performance of the individual 
companies and the supply chain as a whole’ 
There are strong interrelationships between supply chain structures, 
processes that operate across the supply chain and their strategic management (see 
figure 2.1). Supply chain management is therefore:-  
- the integration of the processes to manage flows and information  
- a set of management activities to strategically plan and structure flows 
- the management of the network structure (Lambert and Cooper, 2000).  
 
 
Figure 2.1 : Supply Chain Management Framework – from pg. 70, Lambert and 
Cooper (2000) 
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However, this conceptualisation does not recognise the important of inter-
firm relationships. This emerged as a crucial element, vital in facilitating the ability of 
firms to co-ordinate product and information flows (Handfield and Nichols, 1999). A 
more comprehensive definition of supply chain is therefore provided by Handfield 
and Nichols (1999). 
‘‘The supply chain encompasses all activities associated with the flow and 
transformation of goods from raw materials stage (extraction), through to the end 
user, as well as the associated information flows…….Supply chain management 
(SCM)is the integration of these activities through improved supply chain 
relationships to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage’’ (pg.2, Handfield and 
Nichols, 1999) 
 
Thus SCM is conceptualised as the management of inter-organisational 
relationships (Lamming et al., 2001, Barratt, 2004, Cousins et al., 2006). Better 
relationships between suppliers and customers form the heart of this 
conceptualisation, partly based on the work by Deming (1986) from Wagner et al. 
(2002) and Porter (1980). Porter (1980), in particular, emphasized the economic 
advantages that could be gained by closer inter-firm alliances. The management of 
relationships therefore lies at the heart of successful supply chain management. 
 
The theory underpinning integrated supply chains is often viewed as based on 
‘idealised schema’ (pg. 760, Storey et al., 2006). This has led to the concept of the 
end-to-end integrated view of supply chain management being considered as a 
‘philosophy’ of SCM (Lockamy and McCormack, 2004, Mentzer et al., 2001) rather 
than an actual achievable result. In practice this philosophical view of a fully 
integrated SCM remains just that; a philosophy.  In practice, there is little empirical 
research to identify examples of supply chains where there is fully integrated 
management across the full supply chain or across the wider supply network. This 
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was recognised in research by Fabbe-Costes and Jahre (2008) and Kotzab et al. 
(2011) who note that ‘there is a dearth of evidence in the relation to the extent to 
which SCM – as defined in the academic literature – is implemented or even 
understood in practice’ (2011, pg. 233)  There is therefore a level of pragmatism in 
some parts of the literature in recognising the difficulties in fully integrating 
processes. Here, the concept of integration is limited, in some cases to the alignment 
of value and strategic goals between partners rather than an integration of processes 
e.g. Stank et al. (1999), McAdam and Brown (2001). In others, the suggestion is for 
organisations to strategically pick and choose which processes and supply chain 
members should be integrated and co-ordinated (Lambert and Cooper, 2000). 
  
2.2.3 Supply networks 
 
These views of SCM are linked to perceptions about the nature of supply 
chains themselves. At the lowest level, supply chains are conceptualised as dyadic 
supplier/buyer relationships. Research focus on dyadic relationships forms a great 
part of the supply chain management literature – for example Fynes et al. (2005), 
Wagner et al. (2002) . However, there is a wider understanding of supply chains as 
the flow of goods and services through two or more organisations to 
customers/markets (Lambert and Cooper, 2000, Mentzer et al., 2001). However, the 
linear representation of the supply chain has come to be considered a little simplistic 
(Lambert and Cooper, 2000, Choi and Kim, 2008). In reality materials and information 
flow through a complex structure of organisations from initial raw materials to the 
end consumer; in effect a supply network.  
 
A supply network is defined as ‘interconnected entities whose primary 
purpose is the procurement, use and transformation of resources to provide 
packages of goods and services’ (pg. 22 Harland et al., 2001). This is therefore the set 
of organisations who directly and indirectly produce products and services to support 
specific end-consumer markets (Harland et al., 2001). Lambert and Cooper (2000) 
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differentiate between primary members  - those businesses that carry out direct 
value-adding activities  for customers and end consumers – and supporting members 
– organisations who provide resources, knowledge or assets for the primary 
members.  
In this definition, the network is viewed from the position of a focal firm – a 
single node into which flows products and information from multiple upstream 
suppliers out to downstream customers (Harland, 1996). This level of 
conceptualisation is often characterised as the highest for consideration by supply 
chain management (Croom, 2008) and most supply network research is from the 
perspective of a focal firm. However, this definition tends to neglect the 
interdependencies that operate between multiple suppliers and buyers in a supply 
network (Greening and Rutherford, 2011).  Research into industrial networks 
emerged from the industrial marketing and purchasing fields (Möller and Wilson, 
1995) and describes the complex interactions across a network embedded within a 
particular market. Often in the literature the use of supply network (focal firm) and 
industrial network (no focal firm) are used interchangeably (Miemczyk et al., 2012). 
However, the definition of the industrial network recognises the market context of 
the network and that organisations operate within a complex web of interconnected 
business relationships, some of which exist outside of the traditional supply chain 
linkages (Gadde et al., 2003, Ritter et al., 2004). This also extends to relationships 
with government, NGOs, the media and other non-business related organisations 
(Ritter et al., 2003). Figure 2.2 shows the structural differences between supply 
chains and industrial networks. 
In this sense, no one relationship can be understood without reference to the 
wider network. Each company ‘gains benefits and incurs costs from the network in 
which it is embedded and from the investments and actions of all the other 
companies involved’ (pg.134, Hakansson and Ford, 2002).  The examination of these 
wider connections is particularly vital when examining major disruptions to supply 
chain nodes, where there is a need for firms to seek new connections within the 
wider context of the industrial network (Greening and Rutherford, 2011). This level 
of analysis is also vital when examining the sustainability of practices, as the social 
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and environmental consequences of actors’ behaviours expand further and impact a 
wider set of stakeholders than those contained within the immediate supply chain 
(Miemczyk et al., 2012). The inclusion of more actors in a supply network may 
uncover additional motives such as social, environmental and ethical considerations 
that may be missed using more isolated units of analysis (Pilbeam et al., 2012). The 
Chatham House project, by its nature, examined the food system from an industrial 
network perspective – there was no focal firm but examined different organisations 
and their perceptions across different points in the wheat and dairy industries. This 
thesis, therefore interprets the terms ‘supply network’ in terms of an industrial 
network; hence any reference to supply networks implies this definition.   
 
 
Figure 2.2: Levels of supply network analysis (adapted from Miemczyk et al, 2012) 
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2.2.4 Supply networks and SCM 
 
How traditional SCM relates to the network setting, and how it needs to be 
adapted, presents an even more difficult challenge. From an industrial/supply 
network, it becomes virtually impossible for one firm to control and co-ordinate 
activities across the network in the traditional sense of SCM (Ritter et al., 2004). 
Gereffi et al. (2005) identify three key factors which impact on the extent to which 
networks can be successfully governed by lead firms :- 
- the complexity of information required to sustain a transaction, especially in 
terms of product and process specifications 
- the extent to which information can be codified and transmitted to parties 
without the need for transaction specific investment 
- the capabilities of organisations and actors in the supply network to meet the 
requirements of the transaction 
Gereffi et al (2005) identified five different types of governance, based on 
these factors. These are shown in figure 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.3 : Five global value chain governance types (Gereffi et al. (2005, pg.89) 
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More research has started to emerge with regards to supply networks – see 
Miemczyk et al. (2012), Pilbeam et al. (2012), Adenso-Diaz et al. (2012). While actors 
with greater power may have opportunities to control parts of the network, their 
span of control is limited or difficult where there are greater number of 
nodes/suppliers (Pilbeam et al., 2012).  While the concepts of integrated SCM 
management hold, in that greater efficiency and effectiveness are the desired 
outcome, there is a need to focus on greater legitimacy  and/or increasing flexibility 
(Pilbeam et al, 2012). Here, the concepts of SCM expand from managing serial 
interdependencies (direct relationships) to exploiting advantages arising from other 
interdependencies with a wider set of stakeholders across the network (Hakansson 
and Persson, 2004, Pilbeam et al., 2012). This has a subtle difference to the classic 
TCE underpinning in that, rather than developing relationships to guard against 
opportunistic behaviour and uncertainties, there are softer benefits from developing 
relationships outside of the traditional SCM model (Gadde et al, 2003). Gadde et al 
(2003) suggest therefore that while there is a need for supply chains to compete 
against competitors, there is also the need to develop complementary relationships 
(sometimes with competitors) in order to create the innovation and flexibility 
needed to survive within that particular market context. This gives rise to alternative 
mechanisms of governance, where trust and power emerge as important constructs 
along with more informal governance instruments (Pilbeam et al., 2012). 
 
2.3 Risk, Vulnerability and Resilience 
 
2.3.1 Risk definition and perceptions 
 
The thesis’ main topics are the concepts of SCRM and SCV. However it is 
useful to explore briefly the concept of risk itself. The term is an everyday concept 
but in reality its’ meaning has evolved over time (Frosdick, 1997). Risk was first 
studied as a mathematical construct in the 1600s through probabilities, a field of 
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mathematics developed by both Fermat and Pascal (Bernstein, 1996).  This 
probabilistic definition of risk was based on the values attached to all possible 
outcomes- both positive and negative – in conjunction with probability of each of 
these outcomes occurring.  This definition of risk was known as the ‘expected value’ 
definition and can be summarised simply as :- 
Risk = probability of event  x impact 
Over time this quantifiable measure of risk became the prevailing definition in 
the fields of insurance and financial risk management through the 18th and 19th 
centuries. In many cases, the term ‘risk’ became synonymous with only the negative 
outcomes principally in terms of loss of capital or bankruptcy (Beaver, 1966). This 
loss based, probabilistic view of risk has perpetuated throughout the 20th century 
forming the basis of Health and Safety, environmental and financial risk management 
systems.  
A continuing argument has raged over the validity of this mechanistic 
definition of risk, starting with the revised ‘expected utility’ definition as proposed by 
Daniel Bernouilli in 1738 (Bernstein, 1996). This definition indicated the subjective 
and context related element of risk taking; that a rational decision maker will take 
into account the ‘utility’ or benefit of the expected outcome to themselves 
personally. Further development of this argument has seen the emergence of a more 
subjective, social model of risk (The Royal Society, 1992), where risk is in effect non-
quantifiable and wholly dependent on the perceptions of the decision maker (March 
and Shapira, 1987). This reflects the conceptualisation of risk  in some management 
and psychology fields which emphasise an individual disposition to risk taking as a 
key factor in decision making (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008a). In this sense, the 
construct of risk is said to be socially constructed, and therefore contingent to 
different contexts and different actors (The Royal Society, 1992).  
A further debate which characterises this field is the difference between the 
concepts of risk and uncertainty. The terms are often confused and used 
interchangeably and there is no agreed definition for either (Miller, 1992).   In order 
to address this ambiguity, F.H. Knight, a 20th century economist, defined risk as a sub-
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set of uncertainty, in effect the ‘known’ portion – ‘It will appear that a measurable 
uncertainty, or “risk” proper … is so far different from an un-measurable one that it is 
not in effect an  uncertainty at all.’ (p38,Knight, 1921) Knight went on to define 
uncertainty as the ‘divergence of actual conditions from those that have been 
expected’ (p38) introducing the idea that risk is effectively the variance from 
predicted outcomes. Interestingly, he associated this variance with the potential 
generation of profit. This view was echoed in part by Porter (1985)  who indicated 
that competitive advantage can be gained through the better understanding and 
management of key uncertainties and their effect on industry structure and 
dependencies.  This also reflects the concept of portfolio management, utilised 
within the financial management and investment field, which emphasises the need 
to balance risk with reward (Rao and Goldsby, 2009, Markowitz, 1962). 
A number of recent developments have led to a widening of the concept of 
risk to encompass more uncertainty.  In particular, the conception of the ‘uncertainty 
principle’, first muted at the United Nations conference on environmental protection 
in 1992 (ILGRA, 2002), has re-opened the debate on the need to manage uncertainty. 
This principle was designed to create an impetus to take action independent of 
scientific uncertainty about the nature of the extent of risk and was initially used to 
generate the incentive to take action to prevent environmental damage. This placed 
the onus on the innovator or creator of potential risk to consider and assess the 
nature of the risk in the context of scientific uncertainty. This principle, which now 
underpins both European environmental and Health and Safety legislation, removed 
the ‘ignorance factor’ as an excuse for not managing unknown risks.   
2.3.2 Risks in Supply Chains 
 
There is a significant body of literature that is concerned with risk 
management from a business and managerial perspective (Khan and Burnes, 2007, 
Manuj and Mentzer, 2008a, Christopher et al., 2011). In addition, the concept of 
supply risk has a history of study in terms of buyer behaviour and supplier selection 
(Khan and Burnes, 2007) and most notably can be linked to the work by Williamson 
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on TCE and uncertainty avoidance in supplier contracting (Khan and Burnes, 2007, 
Williamson, 2008).   
However, the field of supply chain risk management  itself is considered to be 
in its infancy (Sodhi et al., 2012) although it has started to receive increase interest 
from academics (Rao and Goldsby, 2009, Colicchia and Strozzi, 2012). Literature in 
the field started to expand in the early 2000s and has seen a significant upswing from 
2005 onwards (Tang and Musa, 2011, Colicchia and Strozzi, 2012). Interest in this 
area has been led predominately by practitioner concern (Sodhi et al., 2012) over the 
rise of supply chain risks.  Modern supply chains have seen an increase in 
uncertainty, driven by the prevailing supply chain strategies of globalisation, 
outsourcing, lead-time reduction, reduced inventory holding and increasing 
integration (Sheffi and Rice, 2005, Zsidisin et al., 2005, Sodhi et al., 2012). This 
uncertainty has manifested itself in a number of high profile disruptions, such as 
9/11, SARS and hurricane Katrina (Chopra and Sodhi, 2004, Manuj and Mentzer, 
2008a).   The increase in these phenomena, coined ‘black swan’ events (Taleb, 2008), 
have underlined the need to consider low probability and potentially unknown risks 
that could have catastrophic effects. 
However, in addition, less wide-spread and contained events have had 
detrimental impacts on the performance of firms and their supply chains. A famous 
example of this is the fire at a single source supplier to Ericsson which caused 
immediate supply disruption and had a catastrophic effect on their market share 
(Norrman and Jansson, 2004). These events have served to underline the increasing 
complexity of modern supply chains (Colicchia and Strozzi, 2012, Sodhi et al., 2012) 
particularly those that stretch across the globe, their interconnections  and growing 
exposure to externally generated uncertainty. This has sparked a growing impetus 
for supply chains to consider both demand-supply co-ordination risks and disruption 
risk management (Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005)and also to identify and mitigate 
against future potentially high impact, but low probability uncertainties and 
disruptions (Norrman and Jansson, 2004, Zsidisin et al., 2004, Zsidisin et al., 2005, 
Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005, Faisal et al., 2006) 
30 
 
 
Despite this increase of activity in the field of Supply Chain Risk management 
(SCRM), definitions and interpretations of both risk and SCRM are diverse and 
plentiful (Tang and Musa, 2011, Sodhi et al., 2012). However, from a risk perspective, 
the literature can be broadly split into those that view risk as a loss (e.g. Manuj and 
Mentzer, 2008a, Tang and Musa, 2011) or risk as a variance (e.g. Rao and Goldsby, 
2009, Colicchia and Strozzi, 2012). Tang and Musa (2011) categorically state that risk 
is associated only with the negative outcomes and impacts. Losses are often 
conceptualised in terms of financial, performance or efficiency related outcomes. 
This includes losses of customer service levels, product quality and time (Towill, 
2005, Christopher and Lee, 2004).  
There is a small body of literature that conceptualises risk as variability in 
expected outcomes. For example,  Zsidisin et al. (2005) define risk as ‘ variability in 
outcomes or results’ (p3403). Rao and Goldsby (2009) turn to a financial definition of 
risk and identify two key elements to assessing whether risk is present – in that it is 
the exposure to an event and the uncertainty of possible outcomes (from Holton, 
2004 in  Rao and Goldsby, 2009). This is echoed in Juttner’s definition, that risk is the 
variation in distribution of possible supply chain outcomes, likelihoods and their 
subjective values (Juttner, 2005). However, the predominant definition of risk still 
remains that of loss. This perhaps reflects the business impetus, and managerial 
tendency to focus on mitigating negative outcomes (Khan and Burnes, 2007, Rao and 
Goldsby, 2009).  
Both Kleindorfer and Saad (2005) and Tang (2006) define two categories of 
risk:- 
 operational risks 
 disruption risks.  
 
Operational risk is risk associated with uncertainty in the co-ordination of supply-
demand while disruption based risk is event driven through crises or disasters (Tang, 
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2006).  Sodhi et al. (2012) identify a schism in the field of SCRM between the 
different dimensions and a large proportion of the supply chain risk literature focuses 
on operational risk only. Often, the conceptualisation of risk is limited to losses as a 
result of poor co-ordination of normal supply-demand activities. In some cases, the 
concept of risk and uncertainty have been incorporated into existing concepts of 
supply chain management, such as mitigation strategies and issues concerning 
bullwhip effects (Towill, 2005, Hung and Ryu, 2008), supplier performance and 
selection (e.g. Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003) , inventory management and increased 
supply chain co-ordination (Christopher and Lee, 2004, Towill, 2005, Beasley et al., 
2006).  
Growth in the SCRM field has seen an expansion of the literature that is 
dedicated to the phenomena of disruption risk (Sodhi et al., 2012), reflecting the 
increase in well publicised disruption events (discussed earlier). In fact there are 
many that believe that SCRM should only be concerned with disruptive events (Sodhi 
et al., 2012, Colicchia and Strozzi, 2012). Disruptive events are usually conceptualised 
using a quantitative measurement of risk; that of probability of occurrence x impact 
or loss (Sheffi and Rice, 2005). Current practice within companies has shown a 
prevalence towards dealing with known risks which have high probability of 
occurrence as practitioners tend not to consider unexpected ( and therefore lower 
probability) events (Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005, Chopra and Sodhi, 2004).  While 
there is growth in research into disruption risk, there is also an acknowledged gap of 
empirical research in these low probability, event based risks (Sodhi et al., 2012).  
There is also a tendency within both the literature and in practice to consider 
the consequences and outcomes of risk rather than its cause (Zsidisin et al., 2005). 
Peck (2006a) and Trkman and McCormack (2009) are particularly critical of these 
approaches, citing that these are only able to counter known, specific threat based 
risks and often ignore sources of uncertainty. To address this, a number of authors 
have defined risk in terms of the sources of uncertainty, rather than dealing in 
specific outcomes (Christopher and Peck, 2004, Juttner, 2005, Manuj and Mentzer, 
2008a). Risk sources are defined as ‘variables which cannot be predicted with any 
certainty and from which disruptions can emerge’ (p. 122, Juttner, 2005). Common 
32 
 
categories of risk sources are shown in table 2.1. While there are some differences 
between the categorization of sources, what is common is differentiation of risk 
which arises from both internal demand and supply activities and the external 
political, social and economic environment. This extension of the supply chain vision 
to incorporate the external environment is key as these frameworks allow for the 
better understanding of the nature of externally generated and potentially 
uncontrollable risks (Wu et al., 2006).  
 
Authors Risk Sources 
Christopher and Peck 
(2004), Juttner (2005) 
Process, Control Mechanisms,  Demand, 
Supply, Environment,  
Manuj and Mentzer 
(2008a) 
Supply, operational, demand, security, macro, 
policy, competitive, resource 
Ritchie and Brindley (2007) External environment, industry specific, 
supply chain configuration, partner specific, 
node specific 
Rao and Goldsby (2009) Environmental, Industry, Organizational, 
Problem specific risk, Decision maker risk 
Table 2.1 : Categories of uncertainty/risk sources 
Ritchie and Brindley (2007) categorise sources as being either endogenous 
(internal to the supply chain) or exogenous (external to the supply chain). 
Endogenous risks here are both supply chain and industry specific and highly 
contingent on the supply chain structure, performance and governance. Rao and 
Goldsby (2009) make the point that risk can largely manifest itself as endogenous to 
organisations as they potentially have some capability to manage negative elements 
of this risk. This is their definition of problem specific risk – risks which arise from 
how organisations strategically manage risks. However, this raises a question over 
the capability of organisations to firstly identify risk, particularly where there are 
significant uncertainties, and whether they are in fact able to control any impacts. 
Less controllable risks, and therefore less avoidable, are those which arise from 
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wider macro-economic and political factors; categorized as exogenous by Ritchie and 
Brindley (2007).   
This categorisation is built on by Trkman and McCormack (2009) who also use 
this concept of exogenous and endogenous risk/uncertainty.  Here, they also define 
endogenous risk as being contingent on the supply chain itself, although they 
conceptualise uncertainty in this instance as either from a market or technological 
turbulence perspective. Exogenous risks here are further split into those which are 
discrete, one off events, or continuous i.e. ongoing turbulence (Trkman and 
McCormack, 2009). The idea of turbulence is an important construct. Trkman and 
McCormack define turbulent conditions as ’characterised by frequent and 
unpredictable market/and or technological changes within an industry which 
accentuate risk and create an inability to forecast accurately’ (pg. 250, Trkman and 
McCormack, 2009). This introduces a more complex conceptualisation of supply-
demand/operational risk; that supply chain risk management should consider how to 
manage exposure to uncertainty from both a demand and technological perspective. 
Christopher and Holweg (2011) also emphasise the need for supply chains to 
recognise risks from operating within a more turbulent environment. They postulate 
that there has been a steady increase in the level of volatility in the operating 
environment since 2008 and that we have now entered an ‘era of turbulence’ 
(Christopher and Holweg, 2011).  This again points to an increase in uncertainty in 
‘normal’ supply chain operations, rather than risk sources being solely from discrete 
disruptive events.  However, Christopher and Holweg (2011) also point out potential 
opportunities associated with this increase in uncertainty.  
2.3.3 Supply chain risk management 
 
As with definitions of risk, definitions of SCRM are varied; table 2.2 shows the 
most prominent definitions used across the literature. There is some convergence, 
however, that SCRM should be part of a broader framework that incorporates both 
operational and disruption based risks (Christopher and Peck, 2004, Trkman and 
McCormack, 2009) that is concerned with identification, assessment and mitigation 
of risks (Sodhi et al., 2012) .  
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Authors SCRM definitions 
Christopher et al. (2003) The identification of potential sources of risk and 
implementation of appropriate strategies through a 
co-ordinated approach among supply chain 
members, to reduce supply chain vulnerability 
Norrman and Jansson 
(2004) 
.. to collaborate with partners in a supply chain, 
apply risk management process tools to deal with 
risks and uncertainties caused by, or impacting on, 
logistics related activities or resources 
Juttner (2005) Identification and management of risks for the 
supply chain, through a co-ordinated approach 
amongst supply chain members, to reduce supply 
chain vulnerability as a whole 
Tang (2006) The management of supply chain risk through co-
ordination or collaboration among supply chain 
partners so as to ensure profitability and continuity 
Manuj and Mentzer 
(2008b) 
..distribution of performance outcomes of interest 
expressed in terms of loss, probability, speed of 
event, speed of losses, the time taken for detection 
of events and frequency 
Neige et al. (2009) .. identification, assessment, analysis and treatment 
of vulnerability and risk in supply chains 
Table 2.2: Definitions of SCRM 
The process of risk identification, assessment and mitigation is the most 
common underpinning of SCRM (Chopra and Sodhi, 2004, Sodhi et al., 2012).  Much 
of the literature therefore conforms to this framework, with the majority focused on 
the identification and assessment of risk and how well these processes are conceived 
and implemented within supply chains (Blos et al., 2009, e.g. Kern et al., 2012, 
Lavastre et al., 2012).  There is a sub-set of literature that deals solely with one 
specific category of risk such as product quality and safety (e.g. Tse et al., 2011, 
Marucheck et al., 2011), information risks (e.g. Mohd Nishat et al., 2007) or financial 
risk (e.g. Blome and Schoenherr, 2011). There is a significant number of papers and 
research which looks to use quantitative models and mathematical reasoning to 
either identify risk, assess its likely impact on supply chains and/or optimise 
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contracting decisions based on lowest risk (e.g. Wu et al., 2006, Shi et al., 2011, 
Lockamy and McCormack, 2012).  Conceptualisations of risk here vary in terms of the 
type of risk dealt with (e.g. as to whether it is operational risk, disruption risk or 
both). However the common factor among much of this literature is that risk is 
quantifiable, measurable and therefore, by inference, is inherently knowable.  
This is however not the case, given the unknowable aspect of risk. Peck 
(2005) also identifies the systemic nature of supply chains, this being failures and 
risks associated with the emergent properties of the system when taken as a whole; 
the combination of exogenous and endogenous factors. Peck also highlights how this 
systemic risk can lead to ‘creeping crises’, using the examples of the Foot and Mouth 
and fuel strike crises in the UK which both demonstrated how a small variance within 
the chain quickly ripples through to all other connected areas (Peck, 2005). Cheng 
and Booi (2008) build on Peck’s research and identify three levels of risk impact:- 
- Level 1 Entire network: risks which exist at a network level which 
threaten the viability of the entire network  
- Level 2 Sub-network : risks which are contained at a branch of the 
network which carries out self-contained activities 
- Level 3 Individual node : risks which affect one specific organisation 
 
The interconnected nature of the supply network, however, could see risks at 
levels 3 and 2 escalate to the entire network if not contained. There is therefore a 
need for organisations to have visibility of, not just their own internal risks, but those 
risks and uncertainties that lie at the outer reaches of their supply chain and wider 
network. Harland et al. (2003) developed a tool to aid organisations to assess risk 
across their network. This tool recognised the need to identify and map the structure 
of their network, in order to help identify sources of risk and then build collaborative 
frameworks to develop and implement a cross-organisational strategy. However, 
their research identified the complexities in measuring risk at a network level, and 
the limitations for organisations to develop strategic options at this level. Since then 
there has been only a few studies to further the capability of risk identification, using 
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modelling techniques to overcome the problems of complexity and interconnections 
of risks (see Lockamy and McCormack, 2012). 
 However,  there still remains a gap in research to help develop frameworks 
for organisations to identify risks (Rao and Goldsby, 2009), particularly at a supply 
chain and supply network level (Khan and Burnes, 2007).  There are also gaps in 
empirical research to identify the effectiveness of supply chain risk management 
processes (Khan and Burnes, 2007).  As thinking in the field has developed, this 
understanding of a more complex construction of sources of risk and uncertainty has 
led to the development of the concepts of supply chain vulnerability and resilience. 
That is, rather than focusing on the absolute prediction of disruptive events or risk 
outcomes and specific mitigation strategies, to focus instead on either the exposure 
of the supply chain to risk or uncertainty and its inherent resilience to mitigate 
against any adverse outcomes. 
2.3.4 Supply chain vulnerability 
 
The terms supply chain vulnerability and resilience are therefore directly 
associated with supply chain risk management and could in effect be considered sub-
sets of the SCRM process. Managing supply chain vulnerability and resilience is in 
effect managing risk within the supply chain. However, from an academic 
perspective, these constructs remain largely under researched (Juttner, 2005, 
Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009, Juttner and Maklan, 2011). The question is how 
does vulnerability differ from risk?  
Table 2.3 shows important definitions of SCV. Christopher and Peck (2004) 
straightforwardly use the dictionary based definition of vulnerability as being ‘likely 
to be lost or damaged’. One of the first conceptualisations of vulnerability was by 
Svensson (2002), through empirical research in the automotive industry. His 
definition of vulnerability is ‘a condition that affects a firm’s goal accomplishment 
dependent upon the occurrence of negative consequences of disturbance’ (pg.112, 
2002). This is virtually indistinguishable from that of supply chain risk, based on the 
occurrence and negative consequence of any disturbances.  However, he also 
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conceptualises vulnerability in terms of dependencies. These are defined as ‘ a link, a 
tie, or a bond between one company in relation to another’ (pg. 730 Svensson, 2004) 
and describes three levels of dependencies :- 
- time – e.g. product lifecycles, timeliness of product flows 
- functional – business activities and flows of goods 
- relational – relationships between supply chain actors 
 
Here, the higher the level of dependency between organisations equates to a 
higher level of vulnerability. This level of vulnerability is also dependent on the level 
of indirect dependencies, both horizontal and vertical across the network and 
whether or not firms have visibility of these dependencies (Svensson, 2004). His 
concepts were subsequently developed by Juttner (2005) who also conceptualises 
vulnerability as the interdependency and interaction between organisations within a 
supply chain or network. Juttner (2005), however, defines vulnerability as ‘an 
exposure to serious disturbance arising from supply chain risks and affecting the 
supply chain’s ability to effectively serve the end customer market’ (p. 124, Juttner 
2005). Christopher and Peck (2004) also agree that it is the exposure to various risks 
sources, both internally and externally to the supply chain that specifically 
characterise vulnerability. The higher the exposure to these sources, then the higher 
the vulnerability of the supply chain under study (Juttner and Maklan, 2011). 
Vulnerability therefore differs from risk in that it is not just the likelihood of the risk 
occurring but the level of exposure which dictates the potential outcome. 
Authors Definition of SCV 
Svensson 
(2002) 
.. a condition that affects a firm’s goal accomplishment 
dependent upon the occurrence of negative consequences of 
disturbance 
Christoper and 
Peck (2004) 
An exposure to serious disturbance arising from risks within 
the supply chain as well as risks external to the supply chain 
Rao and 
Goldsby 
(2009) 
‘ exposure to an event and the uncertainty of possible 
outcomes’ 
38 
 
Juttner 
(2005)/Juttner 
and Maklan 
(2011) 
an exposure to serious disturbance arising from supply chain 
risks and affecting the supply chain’s ability to effectively 
serve the end customer market 
Table 2.3: Definitions of Supply Chain Vulnerability 
Peck (2005), in contrast to much research in this area, uses a qualitative, 
inductive approach to conceptualise vulnerability within the defence/military sector.  
Her research expanded the concept of vulnerability to the supply network (vertical 
and horizontal structures), building on the concept of risk sources. Her findings 
reveal a more complex, systemic view of vulnerability with an inter-play of risk 
sources, dependencies and drivers at multiple layers of the supply network:- 
Level 1 :  value stream/ product, process and information flow 
Level 2 :  asset and infrastructure dependencies  
Level 3 :  organisations and inter-organisation networks 
Level 4 :  the external environment.  
(from Peck, 2005) 
 
Figure 2.4 : Interdependencies of a supply system (pg. 218, Peck, 2005) 
39 
 
 
The relationship between these levels is shown in figure 2.4. Uncertainties, 
and therefore risk can be sourced at each of these levels, with a complex interplay of 
effects transmitted through the network. This is a more systemic, network 
conceptualisation of risk and vulnerability and implies that the impact of risk sources 
is dependent on the exposure and therefore vulnerability of the particular supply 
network under study.  
 
Wagner and Bode (2006) concur with this view, in that supply chain 
vulnerability is a function of certain characteristics of the supply network. However, 
they identified that there is a lack of understanding around the mechanisms and 
conditions that drive vulnerability. From the existing literature, they were able to 
identify four drivers of vulnerability:- 
- customer dependence – reliance on single or few customers for volume 
- supplier dependence – reliance on single or few suppliers for volume 
- supplier concentration – small supply base or at the extreme single sourcing 
- global sourcing – global supply lines 
 
This indicates therefore that vulnerability is a function of supply chain 
characteristics. These, though, Wagner and Bode admit, do not fully explain all of the 
factors at work.  
This view is confirmed by Ritchie and Brindley (2007). Although they deal 
more with the concept of SCRM, they see the exposure to risk as a function of 
exogenous factors (e.g. the external environment) and endogenous factors such as 
supply chain configuration and managerial decision making. Levels of vulnerability 
are therefore contingent on the network structure and operational factors, the 
industry within which the network operates along with external environmental, 
social and political factors. The concepts of inherent ‘structural’ vulnerability, as to 
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how supply networks react in light of external stressors, would seem to be under-
researched.   
 
2.3.5 Supply Chain Resilience 
 
Resilience, as a term, is often used interchangeably with vulnerability and risk 
within the literature. However, as with vulnerability, this concept is fairly unexplored 
in its own right (Ponis and Koronis, 2012). The concept of supply chain resilience is in 
response to the acceptance that not all risk can be avoided or controlled  (Peck, 
2006b). Resilience, in the context of supply chain risk, has been characterised as a 
mitigation strategy, either through building in redundancy or flexibility (see Sheffi 
and Rice, 2005).  
 
However, this definition has evolved, as table 2.4 shows. Christopher and 
Peck (2004) define SCR as ‘the ability of the system to return to its original state or to 
a new, more desirable state after being disturbed’. It is therefore not just the 
opposite of vulnerability; it also encompasses ideas regarding the capability of the 
system to respond to uncontrollable, predictable risks. The idea of ‘flexibility’ as a 
strategy for resilience is common thread throughout the resilience literature (Sodhi 
et al., 2012). Christopher and Holweg (2011)  refer to the need for ‘structural 
flexibility’ to be built into the supply chain. Structural flexibility is defined as the 
ability of a supply chain or network to adapt to fundamental changes in the business 
environment. This suggests a more strategic approach to resilience, through the 
adoption of flexible processes and structures rather than the more classical risk 
management approach to put in place mitigation plans in light of disruptions. 
 
Authors Definition of resilience 
Christoper and  The ability of the system to return to its original state or 
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Peck (2004) to a new, more desirable state after being disturbed 
(Ponomarov 
and Holcomb, 
2009) 
Adaptive capability of the supply chain to prepare for 
unexpected events, respond to disruptions and recover 
from them by maintaining continuity of operations at 
the desired level of consecutiveness and control over 
structure and function 
Juttner and 
Maklan (2011) 
..means to respond and recover at the same or better 
state of operations and this includes system renewal 
(Ponis and 
Koronis, 2012) 
The ability to proactively plan and design the supply 
chain network for anticipating unexpected disruptive 
(negative) events, respond adaptively to disruptions 
while maintaining control over structure and function 
and transcending to a post-event robust state of 
operations, if possible, more favourable than the one 
prior to the event, thus gaining competitive advantage 
Table 2.4: Definitions of resilience 
 
It can be seen that the concepts of supply chain risk, vulnerability and 
resilience are highly interconnected. Christopher and Peck (2004), Peck (2006b) and 
Juttner and Maklan (2011) have looked to reconcile the relationships between the 
different concepts; that organisations and supply chains need to consider the drivers 
and consequences of both.   Juttner and Maklan (2011) emphasise the systemic 
interrelationships between the concepts (figure 2.5). Here SCRM actions help to 
reduce the probability of exposure, hence the vulnerability, while any actions taken 
to reduce the impact of any risk increases the latent resilience.  
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Figure 2.5 : Relationship between supply chain Risk management, SCR amd 
SCV.(pg.249, Juttner and Maklan 2011). 
 
Juttner and Maklan (2011) specifically link resilience to four related capabilities of 
supply chains, namely :- 
- flexibility – ability to adapt to or absorb disruption 
- velocity – pace or adaptation or pace of response 
- visibility – transparency/availability of information on supply chain operations 
and events 
- collaboration – willingness of parties to share risk-related information 
 
Resilience and vulnerability have long been the focus of other academic 
disciplines. Ponomarov and Holcomb (2009) borrow definitions of resilience from 
other disciplines – ecological, psychological, organizational and economic  - to 
develop a more encompassing, multi-disciplinary definition of resilience (see table 
2.4). Vulnerability and resilience, in the field of ecology, are much more developed 
phenomena. As there are parallels between supply chain systems and ecological 
ones (Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009, Ponis and Koronis, 2012), using concepts from 
this field could therefore support and create a deeper understanding of vulnerability 
and resilience for supply networks.  
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Ecological systems are complex systems – that is they are self-organizing and 
have high degrees of interdependence with interactions between structure and 
process over time (Gunderson, 2000, Allen and Holling, 2010). In reality, supply 
chains and networks are also complex and highly interconnected so can be defined in 
the same vein as complex adaptive systems (Colicchia and Strozzi, 2012). In the field 
of ecology, there are two mainstream definitions of resilience; that of engineering vs 
ecological resilience (Gunderson, 2000). For engineering resilience, the system has 
one single equilibrium state and its resilience is characterised as the time and 
distance it takes to return to this steady state post a disruption(Gunderson, 2000). 
Ecological resilience on the other hand acknowledges that there are multiple ‘steady 
states’ and resilience is the magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before 
the system has to change its structure. This then suggests that resilient structures 
can have multiple forms.  
Within complex systems, ecologists define four stages of adaptation, in effect 
how systems evolve over time (Allen and Holling, 2010). These four lifecycle stages 
are :- 
- exploitative – rapid growth 
- conservation – accumulation of material and energy, mature phase 
- creative destruction – release of accumulated ecological capital 
- re-organization – low levels of stability as system shifts states  
 
Resilience within each of these levels is dependent on three main elements (Fraser et 
al., 2005) 
  -    the level of wealth or accumulation of capital  
 -     novelty and innovation and the resultant level of diversity 
 -     level of connectivity 
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High levels of wealth accumulation and connectivity with low instances of 
novelty or innovation equate to a higher level of vulnerability. Within the exploitative 
phase, resilience is high as there are significant levels of innovation and diversity, but 
the system becomes increasing more fragile as it moves through the conservation 
phase. In this state, the system is stable but brittle in that it is unable to cope with 
even small levels of disturbances (Gunderson, 2000). This is due to the high levels of 
capital and interconnectivity. Small scale changes can travel quickly through over-
connected systems, creating catastrophic results (Allen and Holling, 2010). This 
echoes the type of creeping crisis as defined by Peck (2005). Within these systems, 
any accumulated capital is locked in and becomes unavailable to support adaptive 
capacity. It is novelty and innovation that create adaptive capacity, creating the 
environment for experimentation of different structures and processes. It is through 
this process of experimentation that existing structures are destroyed, releasing 
capital and allowing a re-organisation of the system. If economies of scale are at 
work within a  system, then the larger scale organisations potentially stifle smaller 
scale enterprises, potentially dampening innovation (Allen and Holling, 2010, Taleb, 
2008). This runs contrary to the commonly held belief that a lack of volatility equates 
to a stable system; in effect volatility is in itself not an indicator of risk. The more 
volatile a system is, the more resilient it is, as it potentially has well developed 
adaptive mechanisms (Taleb, 2008).  
 
Concepts of ‘adaptive capacity’ and the conceptualisation of the supply chain 
as an adaptive complex system have therefore started to filter through into supply 
chain vulnerability and risk research (Colicchia and Strozzi, 2012).  Adaptive capacity 
is  a function of resilience and is defined by  Carpenter et al (2001) (from Ponis and 
Koronis, 2012) as:- 
 
- the amount of change a system can cope with without having to change form or 
function 
- the degree to which a system can organize itself without disorganization 
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- degree to which a system develops capacity to learn to adapt to disturbances 
 
This capacity – i.e. the speed of response and how well a supply chain can 
recover – can therefore be seen as a combination of the structural and operational 
capabilities of the supply chain and how well actors within the system learn and 
develop strategies. This suggests that vulnerability is therefore related to the level of 
exposure, the residual resilience contingent to the environment within which supply 
chains operate and how they are structured and co-ordinated but also how quickly 
they can learn, adapt and innovate (Ritchie and Brindley, 2007, Ponomarov and 
Holcomb, 2009, Juttner and Maklan, 2011). 
Conceptualising vulnerability and resilience at a whole system level – in this 
case the food system – gives rise to different perspectives. Firstly, ecological 
definitions of resilience indicate that the food system has more inherent 
vulnerability, through its high level of connectivity and concentration in economies of 
scale (Fraser et al., 2005). Secondly, it suggests a tension between adaptive capacity - 
the capability of the system to return to its status quo post-disruptive events  - 
versus pressures for transformation to different sets of structures and operations. 
Systemic vulnerability could therefore be related to how well the system is able to 
cope with change. In their rather long definition of SCR, Ponis and Koronis (2012) 
highlight that competitive advantage can be gained by resilient supply chains; their 
ability to adapt the system post-disruption leading potentially to a higher level of 
performance. Disruption which prompts change can therefore be seen as an 
opportunity and a process of creative destruction ultimately could result in a better 
arrangement of capital and material flows. However, the question is, if the level of 
disruption triggers significant system change, would this be judged as undesirable? 
This creates complexity for the conceptualisation of vulnerability – here system 
threats which could trigger change could ultimately result in positive outcomes. The 
question at a system level, is how well this transition between different states is 
managed – i.e. a controlled transition vs a sudden shock based transition. 
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2.3.6 System transition and its relation to vulnerability 
 
The field of system transition is a separate area of research in its own right. 
Definitions and concepts in this field help to characterise the systemic interaction of 
external threats and internal structures and behaviours which could combine to 
trigger transition. Food supply systems, as with other supply networks, can be 
defined in terms of socio-technical regimes. These are described as ‘semi-coherent 
set of rules carried by different social groups’ (Geels, 2002) and a ‘pattern of  
artefacts, institutions, rules and norms assembled and maintained to perform 
economic and social activities’ (Smith et al, 2005).  System change, i.e. transition 
from one regime to a new one, is based on a function of the agency of regime 
members, the resources needed for the change to be enacted, and the co-ordination 
of responses and actions (Smith et al., 2005) In this model, landscape pressures 
(including global factors such as climate change, population growth) are in effect 
disruptions that can trigger system-based transitions (figure 2.6). 
  
 
 
Figure 2.6: Model of technological transition (pg. 1263, Geels, 2002) 
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Smith et al (2005) identify two processes which can enact regime change:- 
1. Shifting selection pressures on the regime [landscape pressures] 
2. The co-ordination of resources available inside and outside the regime to 
adapt to these pressures 
(pg. 1494, Smith et al, 2004) 
 
Selection pressures therefore present threats and risks, while the co-
ordination efforts are a function of the system and therefore represent its resilience. 
Transitions can often be crisis-led or initiated by ‘disruptive-innovation’ where social 
change is often an unintended by-product (Christensen et al., 2006). There are also 
strong forces of inertia, driven by investment in status quo power structures and 
institutions which prevent adoption of system-changing or ‘catalytic’ innovation 
(Christensen et al., 2006). Smith et al. (2004) argue that it is not just the existence of 
selection pressures that is important, but it is also how these pressures are 
articulated; whether there is coherence or dissonance in understanding and whether 
they are expressed in a way which enables a response by the current regime. 
Whether the members of the current regime accept the need for change, and the 
scale and shape of change is therefore a key determiner as to whether any managed 
transition is enacted.  
This gives rise to a number of important points in conceptualising 
vulnerability at a system level. Firstly, vulnerability here is a function of exposure to 
threats which could trigger system change, while resilience becomes the ability to 
manage this transition successfully. Secondly, the visibility of these threats will be 
coloured by the perception of actors within the current regime; a common 
understanding of risk and the need to act is needed at this system level in order for 
actors to respond. Thirdly, the inherent structures and behaviours of a system will 
act to try to retain status quo in the face of threats creating in itself a level of 
vulnerability. 
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2.4 Risk and Vulnerability in food supply chains 
 
While academically, post 2006, there has been increased interest in supply 
chain vulnerability and related fields, there has been surprisingly little academic 
focus specifically on risk and vulnerability in food supply chains. Previous studies in 
understanding risk in food supply chains have tended to be single issue focused, 
majoring on the environmental aspects (e.g. Vasileiou and Morris, 2006, Manning, 
2008) or food safety aspects (e.g. Roth et al., 2008).  
van der Vorst and Beulens (2002) use case studies in chilled salad, fresh 
vegetable and cheese chains to explore sources of uncertainties. They identify 
specific characteristics unique to the food sector which increase uncertainty; that of 
perishable food stuffs, variability and seasonality in demand (driven in part by 
weather conditions) along with high variability in supply of produce due to harvest, 
yield and weather unpredictability. 
Vlajic et al. (2012) examine a meat supply chain in order to develop a 
framework to assess robustness. They identified a comprehensive set of factors, both 
externally and internally which were potential sources of vulnerability for the focal 
firm (a meat processing and packaging plant). Here, for the firm, risk was framed in 
terms of potential impacts on operating costs and ultimately profit. While there were 
a number of internal controllable sources of vulnerability (e.g. quality control 
procedures on the production line), the research pointed to inherent vulnerabilities 
specific to meat supply chains and the environment they operate in – namely market 
price fluctuations, variability in the availability and quality of raw materials plus 
biological factors such as animal disease.  
One study of note which examined the network as whole was a report, 
commissioned by the UK government, into the health of contingency planning across 
the system. This was in response to concerns over the impact of the foot and mouth 
crisis. Peck (2006b) examined the contingency capability of multiple retailers, 
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processing and manufacturing firms across the food supply network. The report 
highlighted how retailers tended to pass risk down the chain, by relying on their 
suppliers to deal with any disruption. Despite this, there were signs that the need for 
contingency planning and risk management has grained traction within the network.  
However, the report concluded that there is a tendency for actors to focus on 
internal risk factors, in their immediate control, and to ignore factors which exist in 
the wider network and environment. Since this there has been very little academic 
research into risk, vulnerability or resilience within UK food supply chains (as of 
2012). 
2.5 Academic research post 2012 
 
The field of SCRM and vulnerability has moved on since 2012. There has been 
a widespread acceptance of the need to move away from risk measurement and 
threat based tools and approaches, recognising the inherent difficulties of predicting 
specific threats and outcomes in complex environments with high levels of 
uncertainty (Pettit et al., 2013, Fiksel et al., 2015, Scholten et al., 2014). There is also 
a groundswell of acceptance that these risks often cannot be avoided or mitigated 
against. Consequently, there has been a significant rise in research focusing on the 
concepts of resilience and robustness. For example, 49 peer reviewed papers have 
been published post December 2012 which specifically address the concepts of 
supply chain resilience or robustness. Direct research into the construct of SC 
vulnerability, however has fallen; a search revealed just 4 papers of which 2 had 
direct relevance to this research -  Vlajic et al. (2013) and Chowdhury and Quaddus 
(2015). Here, as with other research into resilience, vulnerability has become 
subordinate to the construct of resilience.  
Authors Conceptual 
focus 
 
 
Conceptual 
framing 
Level of 
analysis 
Methods/ 
nature of 
study 
Main findings 
(Pettit et al., 
2013) 
Resilience  
 
 
Resilience as 
a function of 
both 
vulnerabilities 
and 
capabilities 
Supply 
chain/focal 
firm 
Survey 
 
-   development of a 
SCRES measurement tool 
-  linkages between 
vulnerability factors and 
capability factors 
-  provisional evidence for 
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linkage between increased 
resilience and improved 
supply chain performance 
(Fiksel et 
al., 2015) 
Resilience Resilience as 
a function of 
both 
vulnerabilities 
and 
capabilities 
Supply 
chain/Focal 
firm 
Discussion/
Managerial 
implications 
 
As above including 
-Vulnerabilities are hard to 
avoid 
-the need for organisations 
to balance and match 
capabilities to 
vulnerabilities 
(Vilko et al., 
2014) 
Uncertainties As 
environment 
dependent or 
decision 
maker 
dependent 
Supply chain Literature 
review and 
conceptual 
model 
building 
 
-conceptual separation of 
risk and uncertainty 
-typology of uncertainties 
(Scholten et 
al., 2014) 
Resilience Resilience as 
proactive and 
reactive 
Supply chain Case study 
 
-integrated framework of 
antecedents for resilience 
and disaster management 
processes 
(Scholten 
and 
Schilder, 
2015) 
Resilience Resilience as 
proactive and 
reactive 
Supply chain Case study 
 
-collaboration as an 
antecedent of resilience 
-mutual dependence 
between parties can 
increase resilience 
(Hohenstein 
et al., 2015) 
Resilience Resilience as 
proactive and 
reactive 
Supply chain Systematic 
literature 
review 
 
Four phases of SCRES  
-readiness, response, 
recover and growth 
-Common proactive and 
reactive strategies 
-3 measures – customer 
service, market share and 
financial performance 
(Durach et 
al., 2015) 
Robustness Robustness as 
proactive 
approach to 
enable the 
supply chain 
to resist or 
avoid change 
Supply chain Systematic 
literature 
review 
 
-2 dimensions of 
robustness: Resistance and 
avoidance 
-Robustness as a intra and 
inter-organizational 
construct 
-8 antecedents of 
robustness 
(Chopra and 
Sodhi, 
2014) 
Resilience Resilience as 
the ability to 
withstand 
disruptive risk 
Supply 
network 
Supply 
network 
modelling 
-Strategies to balance 
supply efficiency with 
resilience 
   -Segmentation  
   -Re-configuration 
-Advocate over-estimation 
of risk 
-Longer term cost benefits 
of resilience vs short term 
impact on efficiency 
 
(Wieland 
and 
Wallenburg, 
2013) 
Resilience Resilience as 
a higher order 
construct 
consisting of 
agility  
(reactive) and 
robustness  
(proactive) 
Supply chain Survey -2 relational competences 
 : Communication, co-
operation and integration 
-Communication and co-
operation as both 
antecedents to resilience 
-Integration does not 
necessarily lead to an 
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increase in resilience 
(Brandon-
Jones et al., 
2014) 
Resilience 
and 
robustness 
Resilience – 
system which 
returns to 
normal after 
an accepted 
period of time 
Robustness – 
able to 
maintain 
function in 
light of 
internal or 
external 
disturbances 
Supply chain Survey -Resource based view of 
resilience and robustness 
-Both as performance 
outcomes 
-Linkages between 
resources, capability and 
outcomes 
-Robustness is a separate 
construct from that of 
resilience 
-Visibility is an antecedent 
of both  
(Kim et al., 
2015) 
Network 
resilience 
Network 
resilience as 
ability of 
network to 
withstand 
disruptions at 
node or arc  
(connection) 
level 
Supply 
network 
Modelling -Resilience is a structural 
property of a supply 
network 
-Function of nodes and 
connections 
-Redundancy doesn’t 
necessarily lead to overall 
resilience and could lead to 
sub-optimal resilience if 
overall network structure is 
not considered 
(Vlajic et 
al., 2013) 
Robustness 
and 
vulnerability 
Robustness is 
the desired 
property of 
the supply 
chain that 
delivers 
reliable 
performance 
Vulnerability 
is a function 
of specific 
disturbances, 
their 
frequency and 
length of time 
Supply chain Model/asses
sment tool 
and case 
study 
-Development of 
vulnerability measurement 
tool 
 
-Impact of disturbances are 
related to specific 
characteristics of the 
supply chain 
(Johnson et 
al., 2013) 
Resilience Resilience as 
adaptive 
capacity, 
ability to 
absorb shocks 
and to adjust 
to new 
connections 
Supply chain Case study -3 element of social capital 
   - Structural 
   - Cognitive 
   - Relational 
 
-All could impact 
positively on capabilities 
to improve resilience 
(Leat and 
Revoredo-
Giha, 2013) 
Resilience Resilience as 
a function of 
capability and 
vulnerability 
plus the 
ability of a 
system to 
return to its 
original state 
Supply chain Case study -The need to balance 
capabilities relative to 
specific, sector 
vulnerabilities 
 
-Collaboration linked to 
reduction in vulnerability 
(Chowdhury 
and 
Resilience 
and 
Resilience as 
capability of 
Supply chain Case studies -4 key vulnerabilities of 
Bangladeshi RMG 
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Quaddus, 
2015) 
vulnerability supply chain 
to respond to 
disruptions 
and recover 
from them. 
Function of 
capability and 
vulnerability 
industry 
 
-Core capabilities for 
mitigation 
Table 9.1: Summary of key articles in the field of SCRES (2012-2015) 
Resilience, therefore, has become the dominant concept. Table 9.1 
summarises the key papers. There still remains ambiguity in the field and Hohenstein 
et al. (2015) state that SCRES is still lacking in a consistent conceptual understanding. 
However, there is convergence emerging from recent literature as resilience being:- 
- A combination of proactive and reactive strategies 
- Ability of the system to withstand disturbance and return to its normal state 
after a period of time  
While Fiksel et al. (2015) define resilience as ’the capacity of an enterprise to 
survive, adapt and grow in the face of turbulent change’ (pg.82), the concept of 
adaptation and the ability of a system to deliver improved performance  (as per 
Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009) seems to have been lost in many cases. There has 
been, therefore, a surge in interest in the concept of robustness and the ability of a 
supply chain to withstand disturbance without interruption or change. Even here 
though, there is some disagreement as to the differences between robustness and 
resilience. Durach et al. (2015) make a distinction between the two concepts; 
robustness being proactive strategies to ensure the system can return to its previous 
state post disruption, while resilience is defined by them as being both proactive and 
reactive. Here resilience is a higher order construct consisting of agility and 
robustness (Wieland and Wallenburg, 2013). However, Brandon-Jones et al. (2014) 
disagree and see robustness as a separate construct as the ability of the system to 
withstand disruption without any interruptions to performance. 
Much of the research post 2012 therefore looks to clarify these two 
constructs and to determine the dimension or antecedents of resilience or 
robustness e.g. Durach et al. (2015), Hohenstein et al. (2015). There has been 
significant research into the linkage between human capital and relational aspects, 
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including collaboration (Johnson et al., 2013, Wieland and Wallenburg, 2013, 
Scholten and Schilder, 2015). Johnson et al. (2013) in particular draw attention to the 
cognitive processes of actors as a contributor to resilience. Here it is the importance 
of having shared common goals and codes which allows alignment of actions 
supporting resilience.   
Brandon-Jones et al. (2014) present a framework which uses a resource based 
view of the firm (in that resources are linked to capabilities and to outcomes) to 
develop a conceptual model of resilience and robustness, Here they directly link 
resilience and robustness (as they differentiate between the two) to performance 
outcomes. This linkage is reinforced by Vlajic et al. (2013), Chopra and Sodhi (2014).  
Most significantly, for this thesis, is the disconnection of vulnerability from 
resilience. While the move away from threat based approaches and the 
measurement of risk supports the arguments presented in this chapter, there is a 
danger that the disconnection of resilience from vulnerability, and hence risk, results 
in misaligned strategies. While there is increasing evidence that general capabilities 
such as visibility (Brandon-Jones et al., 2014), and collaboration (Scholten and 
Schilder, 2015) can improve resilience, divorcing capabilities from specific 
vulnerabilities could lead to a false sense of security. In this regard, the researcher 
agrees with the research of Pettit et al (2013) whose findings identified direct 
linkages between vulnerability factors and capabilities. Here they advocate a 
‘balance of resilience’ which matches the costs of developing capabilities with the 
increasing exposure to risk, vulnerability. Excessive levels of capabilities could lead to 
an erosion of profits, but not recognising key vulnerabilities leads to an increased 
exposure to risk (Pettit et al., 2013). Further evidence to support the need to 
reconnect vulnerability and risk to resilience is given by Chopra and Sodhi (2014). 
They cite the tendency for actors to underestimate the probability and impact of 
disruptions as making it easier to ignore risks and not put in place mitigation 
strategies. They advocate therefore for actors to over-estimate likelihoods, therefore 
triggering mitigation actions, which they argue would lead to reduced costs in the 
longer run.  
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There still remains a significant gap in research into the concepts of 
vulnerability and resilience at a network level. Only one major research paper, post 
2012, was focused at the network level. Here, Kim et al. (2015) model how network 
structure impacts resilience (as a function of the number of nodes and their 
interconnections). They define resilience at a network level as being ‘an attribute of 
the network to withstand disruptions that may be triggered at the node or arc 
[connection] level’. This, however, is a narrow definition of resilience that focuses 
only on structural aspects.  
While it is important that academics look to clearly define constructs, and 
their antecedents and outcomes, at a theoretical level, it is also important to 
remember that supply chain management, ultimately, is operationally driven. How 
actors respond to and think about vulnerabilities and the actual practices in 
operation therefore must be considered as an important part of furthering 
knowledge in this field. Narrowing of research studies into isolated attributes of 
vulnerability and resilience may further knowledge on the direct linkages but at the 
risk of excluding other potential factors. This links therefore to the advice of Peck 
(2005) that ‘valuative’ frameworks with multiple perspectives are also a vital part of 
the research landscape. This thesis has looked to meet this need in part. 
 
2.6 Research gaps 
 
In essence the supply chain literature is founded on the basis of how 
organisations look to manage market, technological and operational uncertainties. 
Often supply chains are conceived as dyadic relationships with little conception of 
supply systems as wider networks. These supply chains are characterised in terms of 
flows of product or services and information between organisations. In reality, 
modern supply chain are more interconnected than ever and therefore, globally, are 
more exposed to crisis led events and more complex combinations of uncertainties, 
many of which elude quantification. In particular ‘black swan’ events are in the main 
unpredictable, and possibly unknowable a priori (Taleb, 2008).  The wider supply 
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network is often not considered and exogenous factors which drive uncertainties are 
often seen as outside the scope of supply chain management. While the supply chain 
risk literature has sought to expand supply chain management to consider risk 
management, much of this remains at an abstract level. The majority of research is 
focused on ‘measurable’ risk, with the aim to quantify and predict probabilities of 
outcomes.  In addition, this research often deals with the effects of discrete risk 
sources, there is insufficient understanding as to how multiple sources of risk and 
uncertainty combine, particularly how exogenous drivers act on endogenous factors 
within the supply network itself. There are gaps in research on the systemic nature of 
risk and vulnerability and the potential for small disturbances to cascade through the 
supply network.  
There is very little research into how the structure and dynamic behaviour of 
a supply system contributes to its relative vulnerability and how capable different 
supply system states are of withstanding effects from uncertain events before their 
structure is changed or disrupted. There is therefore a need to develop a more 
holistic understanding of the interaction of risk factors, both exogenous and 
endogenous to the supply network and how these contribute to vulnerability or 
resilience.   Using concepts of ecological definitions of resilience and vulnerability 
could help to support this. Studying these concepts, in effect the reverse of 
predicting precise risk sources/events, could give a more comprehensive 
understanding of the extent of the impact on supply chains when faced with the 
inevitable unknown disruptions that will present in the future. These concepts are, in 
reality, still in formation, and there is a need to develop normative models which 
help to synthesise the characteristics and dynamics of supply chains which impact on 
vulnerability or improve resilience. 
  
There is no doubt the UK food system faces multiple challenges in the future 
including uncertainties in terms of climate change, competing land use, energy 
availability and price, availability of imports, bio-security and the need to consider 
wider social and ecological concerns (e.g. health, bio-diversity). While there is 
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research which focuses on the impact of each of these risks, most of this is focused 
on single issues (e.g. climate change) rather than examining the interplay between 
the different risks. In addition, there is very little research which takes a supply 
network view, therefore ignoring the interconnected nature of the system. In this 
respect there is little understanding of the interaction of the combination of effects 
on the food system as a whole, from farming through to retail and how the 
perception of actors impacts on strategies and exhibited behaviours in response to 
risks. From a practitioner perspective, this type of research would help to highlight 
potential breakpoints within the system and where improved mitigation strategies 
are required.  From a policy perspective, this type of research is needed to 
understand how robust the UK system is as a whole, in light of global risk and 
uncertainties, and where policy intervention could be effective in developing 
adaptive capacity and innovation to support a more resilient network.  
 
2.7 Research Questions 
 
This gave rise to a set of five research questions which guided the focus of the 
thesis. These are:- 
RQ1: How do actors conceptualise risk and vulnerability within the UK food supply 
system?   
RQ2: How do the endogenous characteristics of the UK food supply system, in terms 
of its structure and dynamics, contribute to the perceived level of vulnerability in light 
of global, exogenous uncertainties? 
 
RQ3:   How adequate are these conceptual frameworks of vulnerability, resilience and 
adaptive capacity in light of global phenomena? 
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RQ4: What are the implications for stakeholders and policy makers in their aims to 
reduce vulnerability and encourage a more robust UK food system? 
 
RQ5: What are the implications for future research into concepts of vulnerability, 
resilience and adaptive capacity? 
 
Drawing on advice from Smith et al (2004), Peck (2005) and March and 
Shapira (1987) that risk and vulnerability are both subjective and how they are 
perceived will determine behaviours and strategies, the first research question looks 
to establish how actors in the food system perceive risk and vulnerability. The second 
research question is then designed to address the literature gap in identifying the 
exogenous and endogenous factors which are perceived by actors as important to 
the construct of vulnerability in the UK food system. This question is focused on how 
these factors interlink and their potential systemic influence on vulnerability. Both 
these questions are designed to focus the interrogation of the Chatham House data, 
mining it for actors’ understanding of threats that impact their organisations and 
supply chains along with factors they judge to be important for either vulnerability or 
resilience. The principle objective of these is to further the body of research in 
understanding the interrelationships between risk sources, the inherent properties 
of supply network and the environment in which they operate and how these 
characteristics combine to influence vulnerability. Research question three looks to 
understand how the thesis findings fit into current academic thinking on risk and 
vulnerability and how well existing conceptual frameworks explain the phenomena 
under examination. The comparison of findings to existing research supports the 
process of theory building (Gill and Johnson, 2002). Research question four examines 
how these findings impact on stakeholders within the food system while research 
question five explores the contribution of this thesis to the body of knowledge on 
supply chain vulnerability. These therefore discuss the relevance of the research and 
explicitly determine the academic contribution of the thesis to the field of supply 
chain vulnerability. 
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3.0 Chapter Three – Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction to Methodology Chapter 
 
This chapter explains the methodological approach that guided the 
researcher through the thesis and the analytical process followed to interpret the 
data.  The thesis is unusual in its’ structure, in that the data collection was 
undertaken in advance of the main thesis and for a related, but in effect, different 
purpose.  The Chatham House study involved a broader examination of the data 
collected to understand the policy implications for the UK food system. It did not 
perform an in-depth analysis of the data and therefore was unable to build theory. In 
this sense the data remained untapped. This was recognised by the project team at 
the time and it was understood that more analysis was needed in order to 
understand better the contexts of risk and vulnerability. This thesis therefore re-
examines the data, taking a deeper, more analytical approach in order to build 
theory in relation to risk and vulnerability in the UK food supply network. This 
allowed the development of an original and distinctive contribution for the thesis. 
This chapter therefore looks to tell both the story of the CH project, the basis for the 
data, but also the approach taken throughout this thesis.  
In a sense, both projects start from the same philosophical stance. As the 
researcher was responsible for the design of the CH methodology and for this thesis, 
it stands that the discussion around the research philosophy reflects both studies. 
This philosophy was re-examined at the start of the thesis, to check that the 
underpinning for the CH study was indeed valid for this thesis. The chapter therefore 
starts by explaining the central philosophy which underpinned the researcher’s 
approach in both studies, it being the same, despite the slight difference in research 
purposes.   
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In turn, it explains the epistemology and methodology underpinning the 
Chatham House study. This is important to understand and justify as this formed the 
basis for the data used in the thesis study and informed the researcher’s approach 
and thinking in designing the data analysis framework for the thesis.  In a traditional 
PhD, this section would justify the choice of methodology and show a clear line of 
sight between this choice, the data collection and the validity of the findings.  In this 
instance, this section explains in some detail the methodology and approach for the 
CH study as a proxy for the justification of validity for the thesis. As the researcher 
was responsible for the CH overall research design and the development of the data 
collection instruments this was felt to be appropriate. The next section explains the 
research structure for the CH study, the methods and data instruments used to 
collect the data. This section also discusses the theoretical underpinning of the 
scenarios, which formed a core element of the CH study. From the thesis 
perspective, a large portion of the data collection revolved around actors’ responses 
to these scenarios so it also felt important to explain their usage.   
The second part of the chapter deals solely with the approach taken by the 
researcher for this thesis. As the thesis re-examined data already previously collected 
as part of the Chatham House project, this section explains the analytical stance 
along with the procedures undertaken in order to address the specific research 
questions posed as part of this study.   
 
3.2 Research Philosophy and theoretical perspective 
 
3.2.1 Research philosophy 
 
The philosophical underpinning of research projects has an important bearing 
on the research design and ultimately on the quality of the research outcomes 
(Easterby-Smith et al, 2002).  The five elements which contribute to research 
philosophy and design are outlined in figure 3.1. Ontology is described as the ‘study 
of being’ (pg 10, Crotty, 2003), in other words the nature of reality. Epistemology is 
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the ‘theory of knowledge’ (pg 3, Crotty, 2003) in effect how knowledge is formed. 
Both these philosophical perspectives inform the theoretical stance taken by the 
research – the set of assumptions that provide the context for the research (Crotty, 
2003) which in turn inform the methodology and the methods chosen – the strategy 
and tools for data collection and analysis.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Five elements of research design. Adapted from pg 4, Cr otty, 
1998 
  
Generally, there is a lack of consistency between the use of terms and 
associated perspectives, particularly between ontological, epistemological and 
theoretical perspectives. Epistemological and ontological definitions often differ and 
are used interchangeably.  The following discussion recognises this and deals with 
both the ontological and related epistemological stance taken by the researcher for 
both the CH study and this thesis.  
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From an ontological perspective, realism is defined by Bhaskar (1989) as 
being where ‘ultimate objects of scientific inquiry exist and act (for the most part) 
quite independently of scientists and their activity’ (pg.12, 1989). This perspective 
recognises that objects, including in some part social phenomena, exist outside of 
the mind (Crotty, 2003). This perspective would therefore recognise the existence of 
the concepts of supply vulnerability and risk, therefore indicating that these fields 
can be studied.   A sub-set of the ontological perspective of realism, that of critical 
realism, which makes a conscious compromise between the two extreme positions 
(Sayer, 2000). This position recognises the existence of social conditions 
independently of the observer but recognises that concepts are in effect constructed 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2002).  
Positivism, an epistemological concept, is the belief that objective methods 
can be used to inquire about the social world, which exists outside of the human 
consciousness (Easterby Smith et al., 2002). Positivist-based epistemologies and 
research designs are deductive in nature and ‘entail the development of a conceptual 
and theoretical structure prior to its testing through empirical observation’ (pg34, 
Gill and Johnson, 2002).  This position can be considered consistent with the 
ontology of realism.  90% of management research is judged to belong within the 
positivist tradition (Meredith et al., 1989) and positivistic methods are the prevailing 
approach within the field of supply chain management (Burgess and Singh, 2006). 
There has been a tendency for empirical studies of supply chain risk and 
vulnerabilities to take this approach (Peck, 2005), although recent years have seen 
more case studies, albeit with mixes of qualitative and quantitative methods (Sodhi 
et al., 2012).  Positivist studies in supply risk have tended to measure the level of 
variability to desired supply chain performance as a key indicator of risk.  Criticism of 
this approach is founded on reductionist tendencies, common to positivist 
approaches, which fail to comprehend the complexities inherent in multi-layer 
supply chain systems (Peck, 2005). 
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The assumptions underlying positivist research designs rest on the belief that 
the environment within which the supply chain operates is ‘static’ and therefore 
exhibits  predictable system behaviour  (Peck, 2005, Pilbeam et al., 2012) . However, 
Demchak (1996) argues that this approach can overlook a number of key 
organisational and wider environmental issues. Nohria (1992) takes the view that ‘all 
organizations are in important respects social networks and need to be addressed as 
such’ (p.4, 1992). This proposes a more social and relational-based concept of the 
supply network, with focus on the interrelationships both intra and inter-
organisations. This chimes with the social constructionist epistemology, which holds 
the premise that meaningful reality is contingent on human practices (Crotty, 2003). 
While the researcher recognises her own natural bias towards a positivistic 
position, the dynamic, socially contingent views of supply networks are judged to be 
more consistent with the researcher’s perspective of supply chain networks. This is 
also consistent with the IMP definition of industrial networks, in that ‘firms operate 
in the context of interconnected business relationship’ and that ’these relationships 
affect the nature and the outcome of firms’ actions’ (pg. 357, Gadde et al., 2003).  
The research also takes the stance on risk and vulnerability, from a social science 
perspective. This is guided by the Royal Society publication on risk (1992), in that risk 
is largely a culturally determined phenomena. This stance is therefore more 
consistent with a constructionist epistemology.  This is largely based on the 
perception of stakeholders within the supply system, focusing on how these risks and 
vulnerabilities are conceived.  While the risks posed to the supply chain could 
ultimately result in real consequences, the behaviours and strategies employed by 
supply chains to counter future risks and vulnerabilities are based on perceptions of 
how these risks could play out in the future, their likelihood and potential impacts.   
Any deductive-based design was also judged problematic. As the theory and 
concepts of supply chain vulnerability are in their infancy, it is difficult to build a 
priori theories (Gill and Johnson, 2002). In addition, the future element of the 
research and the level of uncertainty inherent in the conceptualisation of forces 
exogenous to the system under study make objective measurement, in the 
positivistic sense, difficult.  All these factors suggest that, despite some natural bias, 
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a positivistic approach, from an epistemological perspective, would not have been 
appropriate.    
3.2.2 Theoretical perspective 
 
At face value, the epistemological approach of social constructionism was 
seen as a more consistent philosophy with both the CH study and the thesis. This 
stance recognises that while research attempts to define the nature of reality, there 
is always an inherent cultural lens applied to the way in which we view the world. 
While some definitions of social constructionism are based on the absence of pre-
existing reality (Easterby-Smith et al, 2002), others judge this stance to be completely 
compatible with the ontology of realism; in that the ideas or concepts are real, and 
not solely confined to the mind (Crotty, 2003).  This difference reflects the broad 
spectrum of definitions used to describe social constructionism (see figure 3.2); this 
ambiguity and lack of clarity creates a level of confusion over the exact 
epistemological positioning of constructivism.   Constructionism is often portrayed as 
solely idiographic, viewed as creating a subjective explanation of meaning (Gill and 
Johnson, 2002; Easterby-Smith et al, 2002). However, the researcher rejects this 
definition. While it is in essence a more ‘interpretive approach’ than positivism, 
Crotty (2002), by contrast, argues that social constructionism implies that meaning is 
generated through the interaction between object and subject, rather than meaning 
being subjected on the object under study (Crotty, 2002).  In addition, Crotty (2002) 
subscribes to the original concept of interpretism (or Verstehen) as meant by Weber 
(1962), in that constructionism looks not just for subjective meanings 
(understanding)  but also to ascribe some appropriate causal explanation. This 
definition can be said therefore to have some synergy with the relativist 
epistemological dimension as defined by Easterby-Smith et al (2002). It can be said 
therefore that the epistemological and theoretical approach of the CH study and the 
thesis sit within the social constructionism spectrum, but with synergies with the 
relativist position (as shown in figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3.2: Research position (compiled by author from sources shown) 
 
 
3.3 Epistemology and Methodology (Chatham House study) 
 
3.3.1 Epistemology 
 
Criticism of constructionist, interpretivist methods has focused on a tendency 
to be unstructured, perceived to be lacking in rigour. However, it is argued that this 
type of research can still be subject to rigour and structure in the collection and 
analysis of data (Strauss, 1987, Easterby-Smith et al., 2002) without compromising its 
interpretive nature.   Inductive-based theory is often said to be ‘grounded’ in data 
and experience. This gave rise to the development of grounded theory, a 
comparative method to conceptualise and build theories directly from the collection 
and analysis of data, contingent to the area under study (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) 
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which also gave structure and rigour to the research and analysis process. The 
definition of grounded theory is ‘ the actual production of meanings and concepts 
used by social actors in real settings’ (pg. 457, Gephart, 2004). In this way the theory 
emerges from the data itself, based on how well it describes or fits into conceptual 
categories as proposed by the researcher (Suddaby, 2006). Grounded theory has 
come to be associated with a strict set of procedures but at its heart lie two key 
principles. The first is constant comparison, where data is collected and analysed at 
the same time. The second is theoretical sampling, where decisions about the next 
set of data to be collected is determined by the emergent theory from the analysis 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967, Suddaby, 2006). The comparative nature of the research, 
and the intertwining of theory generation and testing across different cases (in a 
sense both inductive and deductive) is therefore designed to facilitate the creation of 
causal models(Gill and Johnson, 2002).  
A research design is defined as a ‘framework for the collection of data’ (pg. 
32, Bryman and Bell, 2003) while research methods are the techniques and tools 
used to collect data (Bryman and Bell, 2003).  The researcher, for the Chatham House 
study, made the decision not to use classic grounded theory as the primary method. 
Originally, this decision was taken primarily owing to constricted timescales and lack 
of resources; this meant that data analysis could not be undertaken at the same time 
as the data collection. This consequently made a systemic process of theoretical 
sampling difficult. While looking to avoid ‘methodological slurring’, Suddaby (2006) 
emphasises that grounded theory is in essence pragmatic, recognising the messy 
reality of research and the need for researchers’ intuition and ‘ feel’ to guide the 
process (Suddaby, 2006). The researcher , guided by this, took a pragmatic approach 
and while the process did not follow a classic, established procedure of grounded 
theory (as proposed by Strauss and Corbin, 1998), a grounded approach was used to 
analyse and interpret the data (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). In this way, while the 
analysis and data collection were not simultaneous, the products of the research 
were shaped from the data rather than from a priori deduced frameworks (Charmaz, 
1983).   
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This was recognised as a risk, both to the CH study but also to this thesis. This 
was due to the danger that the research could be accused of ‘analytical interruptus’ 
(Gill and Johnson, 2002), where findings are not lifted to a higher conceptual level. 
This is the criticism levelled at  ‘thick’ phenomenological descriptions often when the 
process of theoretical sampling to choose further cases is not followed (Gill and 
Johnson, 2002). However, Weber (1970), argued that the process of  description or ‘ 
verstehen’, can provide an interpretation of events as ‘causally adequate’ by creating 
an interpretive understanding of ‘social action’ where past experience can give guide 
to future actions. Crotty also argues that this creates not just understanding but also 
a method of explaining (Crotty, 2002) In this way a hypothetical explanation of the 
phenomenon can be created, which gives an understanding of some level of 
causality, therefore avoiding analytical interruptus. Weber (1970) therefore 
advocates the use of the ‘ideal type’ as a guide for researchers to develop conceptual 
or mental constructs to illuminate what is ‘possible and adequate’. However, the 
researcher also recognises the limitations to the research in terms of theory building. 
While the findings will live at a higher conceptual level, the lack of testing in further 
conditions will limit their generalisability. This, however, is a common occurrence 
with inductively generated research as Eisenhardt (1989) pointed out – in that it can 
be testable and empirically valid but will lack the attributes of ‘grand theory’, 
therefore remaining at a modest, idiosyncratic level. (Eisenhardt, 1989)   The 
researcher has taken guidance from this advice. 
3.3.2 Research Quality Criteria 
 
The question of research quality criteria is an important one, particularly for 
constructionist, grounded approaches to avoid criticisms of validity and lack of rigour 
(Kaufman and Denk, 2011). Traditionally, for positivist studies, the criteria used for 
assessment is based on four categories – that of internal validity, reliability, 
objectivity and external validity (Bryman and Bell, 2003, Kaufman and Denk, 2011). 
However, many authors see these categories as problematic for more qualitative, 
constructionist research as they suggest the existence of one objective reality and 
echo the emphasis of positivist research on demonstrating clear cause and effect 
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(Bryman and Bell, 2003, Easterby-Smith et al., 2002, Kaufman and Denk, 2011). Some 
authors have adapted the definitions of the criteria to fit better the goals of 
constructionist research (see Easter-by-Smith, 2002 or Kirk and Miller, 1986), while 
some have developed new frameworks. One such framework is that developed by 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) who proposed using credibility, dependability, 
confirmability and transferability as more appropriate indicators of quality for this 
type of research. The researcher has taken guidance from both approaches, using a 
merged framework as the basis for the assessment of research quality (table 3.1). 
Criteria Definition Source 
Internal validity/ 
Credibility 
-Whether the study gains access 
to the experiences of those in the 
research setting  
-The quality of theoretical 
reasoning, based on how well 
data supports findings 
-A clear line of sight between 
data and theoretical findings 
Easterby-Smith et al. 
(2002) 
 
Yin (1994);Bryman and 
Bell (2003) 
 
External 
validity/Transferability 
and Generalisability 
-Whether the constructs 
developed apply in other settings 
Easterby-Smith et al. 
(2002) 
Kaufman and Denk 
(2011) 
Reliability/ 
Dependability 
-The level of transparency in data 
collection methods 
-The repeatability of the study 
 
Easterby –Smith et al. 
(2002) 
Auerbach and 
Silverstein (2003) 
Objectivity/ 
Confirmability 
-Whether the results are 
trustworthy and reflect the 
experiences of those involved in 
the study 
- The level to which the subjective 
values of the researcher have 
been imposed on data 
interpretation 
Bryman and Bell 
(2003) 
Kaufman and Denk 
(2011) 
Table 3.1. Research Quality Criteria 
3.3.3 Research methodology for CH study 
 
The original CH study was therefore built around a case study approach.  Case 
studies, when predominately using qualitative methods, are considered to be more 
aligned to inductive-based, theory building research (Eisenhardt, 1989, Yin, 1994, 
69 
 
Bryman and Bell, 2003). Case studies are concerned with an in-depth examination of 
the complexities of the area under study (Stake, 1995). The revelatory form of case 
study is distinguished by the focus on identifying the unique features of the case, 
based on an idiographic approach (Bryman and Bell, 2003).  Case based research is 
therefore normally targeted at either an individual, organisational or supply chain 
level. However there are examples within a more comparative design framework 
where the unit of analysis lies at an industry level (Peck, 2005).  Inter-organisation 
networks are described as complex and overlapping webs (Nohria, 1992). These 
webs are often invisible when viewed from the stand-point of a single organisation 
and that to understand them, there is a need to analyse the system or network as a 
whole (Nohria, 1992).  To gain a better understanding of the food networks’ 
interdependencies and complexities, the most appropriate unit of analysis for the CH 
project was judged to be at an overall industry level.  
Comparative designs use identical methods to compare and contrast two or 
more cases (Bryman and Bell, 2003). The strength of this particular approach  is the 
ability to compare views and practices across more than one case (Bryman and Bell, 
2003). This form of design is also consistent with inductive form of theory building 
(Easterby-Smith et al, 2002).  
 
3.3.4 Case study selection 
 
The UK food system is a large area of study and to limit this, it was decided to 
focus on the retail element of the system i.e. supply chains with routes to market 
through retail organisation as opposed to food service. The retail sector equates to 
57% of the total supply of food (in revenue terms, DEFRA, 2014) and therefore 
constitutes the larger mechanism by which food is bought and consumed. It is also 
here, in the direct purchasing of food stuffs that availability and affordability of food 
i.e. food security, is concentrated. The two cases chosen for the CH project were the 
UK dairy and wheat retail supply systems. The two industries are complimentary and 
have some interconnectivity – through the supply of wheat based feed for cattle. 
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However, the dairy and wheat industries have inherent differences (table 3.2), 
significant to aid comparison between the sectors and to provide some level of 
generalisability to the results (although within the limits of the research design). 
 
Dairy Wheat 
Livestock based Arable based 
Trade imbalance  UK virtually self-sufficient 
No payment support until 
recent CAP reform 
Historical payment 
support since WWII 
Integrated supply chains  Transactional supply 
chains 
Supply contacts – fixed 
prices 
Market trading 
Family ownership Rise of contract farming 
Traditionally small-scale 
with some intensification 
High levels of 
intensification 
Table 3.2: Differences between dairy and wheat supply systems (compiled by author) 
Previous studies of vulnerability have tended to examine cases that were 
either horizontal (e.g. industry sector) or vertical (specific supplier-customer 
relationships) in nature. In common with Peck (2005), limiting the research to just 
vertical or horizontal perspectives could potentially exclude vital insights, considering 
the premise of the research to examine the wider, systemic context of risk and 
vulnerability. The CH design therefore incorporated data collection from multiple 
organisations within the UK wheat and dairy supply networks. In this sense, the unit 
of analysis was the retail supply/industrial network through which wheat or dairy 
products are delivered. However, it is recognised that the network is made up of 
supply echelons. There will be a need throughout the research to combine different 
levels of analysis, principally because the levels of risk and vulnerability may be 
perceived or experienced differently by different groups of actors (Bryman and Bell, 
2003). However, in order to limit the scope of the study (to consider wider support 
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networks would have made the study too unwieldy) the network was limited to key 
groups of actors defined below 
- Retailers 
- Food Manufacturers 
- Primary and secondary processors  
- Producers 
- Input/farm support organisations 
- Actors peripheral to the network but have an interest or impact on it such as 
academics, scientists, government officials and NGOS 
 
From the relativist perspective as described by (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002), 
the issue of external validity is more concerned with the ‘issues of whether the 
research procedures can provide an accurate representation of reality’ (pg. 53 
Easterby-Smith et al., 2002) and whether sufficient perspectives have been included. 
This was the premise used in the selection and number of perspectives chosen. The 
question of research access is always a key determinant of the research process 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2002) and therefore the participant selection was 
predominately determined by those agreeable to take part. The project, being 
sponsored by Chatham House and UK governments, did create greater leverage for 
access than through Cardiff University alone; this therefore facilitated the number 
and quality of participants. By using this data, the PhD thesis was able to capitalise 
on the access granted through the larger project. 
Participants were selected in advance to represent a broad spectrum of 
opinion across the whole supply system - private, public and non-governmental 
(NGO) sector perspectives; small to large organisations; external and internal to the 
supply system itself.  Target participants were senior representatives of the 
organisation, preferably from a strategic or supply chain orientation.  To collate a 
sufficiently broad representation of the supply system, a wide variety of 
organisations were asked to participate. This included a number of competing 
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organisations which generated some concerns over the handling of both competitive 
and confidentiality issues. 
  The actual profile of participants for each of the data collection instruments 
is shown in table 3.3. As can be seen, the actual spread of participants was not as 
diverse as originally planned, with some significant gaps in representation from the 
dairy farming sector. However 13 actors from farming organisations, including 4 who 
have direct involvement in dairy farming were participants. Overall, 82 actors were 
involved in the research (the totals shown in the table come to 101 but 19 actors 
attended multiple events or were part of the original interviews) 
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Area of representation 
General 
Interviews 
Supply 
interviews 
All 
workshops TOTAL 
Direct supply 
system 
Dairy farmers   2 1 3 
Wheat farmers   1 5 6 
Farming industry bodies 4 3 6 13 
Agricultural inputs organisations 3   2 5 
Dairy processors   3 4 7 
Wheat milling 1   2 3 
Wheat – baking     1 1 
Wheat processing industry bodies   1 3 4 
Grain trading     1 1 
Brand manufacturers     7 7 
Food manufacturing industry 
bodies     1 1 
Retailers 1 1 3 5 
Retail industry bodies 2   3 5 
Food service 1   0 1 
Support 
industries 
Logistics and transport 
organisation 1   0 1 
Waste/packaging services 1   3 4 
Bio-fuels industry 1   1 2 
Government 
Devolved/regional government     3 3 
UK government 1   2 3 
EU government 1   2 3 
Other 
NGO - environmental/animal 
welfare 2   3 5 
Academics - 
food/agrcultural/environmental 3   4 7 
Scientists 1   3 4 
Financial/insurance sector 2   2 4 
Agricultural colleges     3 3 
Totals 25 11 65 101 
Table 3.3 List of project participants 
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3.4 Chatham House project design and methods 
 
3.4.1 CH study design 
 
Qualitative methods were the chosen as the core data collection 
instruments. This family of instruments are strongly aligned with inductive-based 
approaches(Bryman and Bell, 2003), enabling the richness of data required in order 
to contribute to the development of theory (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002).  Strengths 
of these approaches also include flexibility and ability to explore wider and more 
complex phenomena. Qualitative approaches are often criticised as ‘unstructured’, 
with low levels of reliability, i.e. the ability to replicate the data or draw the same 
conclusions (Bryman and Bell, 2003), although from a constructionist perspective, 
the level of transparency in data collection methods and analysis to facilitate 
external scrutiny is more pertinent in the discussion of reliability (Easterby-Smith et 
al, 2002). To counter concerns over replicability, semi-structured forms of data 
collection (e.g. interviews/workshops) were employed. 
The research was designed in four phases (table 3.4) and a schematic of the design is 
shown in figure 3.3. 
Phase Description Aims 
1 Exploratory 
Phase 
To gain initial insight into the concept of supply 
vulnerability within the chosen supply systems 
2 
 
Scenario 
development 
To identify key global factors and develop narratives of 
their possible future effects on global food supply 
3 Data 
collection 
To collate perspectives and reactions from the chosen 
supply systems 
4 Data analysis To understand future policy implications for the UK food 
system  
To identify the potential implications for supply chain 
management 
Table 3.4: Research Phases for CH project 
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Figure 3.3:  Schematic of Chatham House study research design 
 
3.4.2 Phase 1: Exploratory phase 
 
This phase was designed to scope the area under study. It entailed a 
literature review which encompassed an overview of the academic literature on risk 
and vulnerability and previous research on food systems and food security. It also 
involved a number of exploratory interviews with actors across the food system. 
These were unstructured conversations aimed to help frame the issues facing the 
sector. These were not included as part of the thesis data, as there was already 
judged enough data to support findings and in part these interviews repeated much 
of the subsequent data collected in phase 2, scenario development. 
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3.4.3 Phase 2: Scenario Development 
 
The central purpose of the Chatham House study was to investigate future 
key global trends, their interdependence and potential influence on the UK food 
supply system. The inherent problem with dealing with the future is that, by its 
nature, it is uncertain and therefore to a large extent unknowable. However, there 
are a number of methodologies which support the amassing of knowledge and 
judgements for future-based research including Delphi methods and scenarios.  
Delphi studies deal with ‘informed judgements’ , using a structured process to 
combine the knowledge, ideas and subjective views of a panel of experts in order to 
support better decision making (Adler and Ziglio, 1996). It was developed in the 
1950s and 60s by the RAND corporation, used primarily as a forecasting method to 
assess the direction of possible future trends (Adler and Ziglio, 1996). It is a useful 
approach when faced with a complex problem, with high levels of uncertainty on the 
present and future condition under study and where analytical techniques would not 
lend themselves (Linstone and Turoff, 1975, Adler and Ziglio, 1996). It is also judged 
an appropriate method to support exploratory theory building related to future 
trends (Meredith et al., 1989, Akkermans et al., 2003, Melnyk et al., 2009). It has also 
been used within the SCM field to explore trends such as the future use of ERP 
(Akkermans et al., 2003), future SCM trends (Ogden et al., 2005, Giunipero et al., 
2012) and barriers to sustainable SCM implementation (Melnyk et al., 2009).  
However, one of the main drawbacks associated with the methodology is its 
tendency to treat each component as an independent variable (Adler and Ziglio, 
1996). In contrast to the collation of expert information on the likely trajectory of 
individual trends and predictive forecasts of the future, the Chatham House project 
looked to understand the possible range and combinations of global trends and 
uncertainties. It especially focused on challenging any underlying assumptions within 
the food network as to how future trends could play out (thus taking advice from 
Taleb (2007) in that actors have an inherent propensity to think the future will look 
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like the present). For this reason, a Delphi study was ruled out based on this specific 
concern; that it could narrow focus to a few, more certain trends and therefore limit 
the exploration of uncertainties and trends judged less likely by supply network 
actors.   
In contrast, scenarios, labelled ‘prospective planning scenarios’ (King, 1975) 
look to detail the possible consequences of current strategies and behaviours while 
developing alternative strategies and plans to cope with a range of potential 
different future circumstances. These types of scenarios differ from future forecasts; 
they are not intended to be predictive but to ‘illuminate the major forces driving the 
system, their interrelationships and the critical uncertainties’ (pg. 146, Wack, 1985).   
Scenarios were initially developed during World War II as a tool for military 
planning. During the 1960s, Herman Kahn started to use scenarios in business 
prognostication (Schwartz, 1998). However, most famously, scenarios were adopted 
by Royal Dutch Shell group in the 1970s, developed by Pierre Wack, as part of their 
strategy planning process. The Shell style of scenarios were developed to deal with 
the wider external environment to the organisation (Wack, 1985) to help decision 
makers better understand the forces that drive the business and the potential 
uncertainties that could create ‘surprises’ and therefore changes in the operating 
environment. Wack developed a number of scenarios which challenged the 
commonly held premise then that the oil price would remain stable over the 
following decade (Schwarz, 1998). Shell were able to use the scenarios to develop a 
number of coping strategies which pre-empted the potential for oil price variability 
and so enabled them to be better prepared for the oil price shock in 1973-74.  
Shell continued to develop the use of scenarios throughout the 70s and 80s, 
used primarily as a key tool for medium-term analysis, embedded within their 
strategic planning process (Wack, 1985). Their aim is not to create an accurate 
forecast of the future but to help inform better decision-making based on a range of 
possible future outcomes (Schwarz, 1998). Part of the process is to tap into current 
management concerns about the future, while identifying where key uncertainties lie 
in the wider context that have the potential to change the current trajectory of 
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trends and expectations. Scenarios in this context are presented as narratives (Wack, 
1985, Schwartz, 1998),  reflecting the current perceptions of ‘world views’ held by 
managers but then using stories to explore how different futures may develop 
(Schwarz, 1998).  It is for these reasons that scenarios were selected as an 
appropriate approach for the CH study, over and above Delphi methods. 
As the methodology evolved out of business practice, as yet there is little 
academic treatment of its effectiveness. It has had only limited use so far within the 
SCM field - rare examples of use of these types of scenarios as the underpinning 
methodology to examine future conditions pertinent to SCM are Mazzarino (2012) 
and Heiko and Inga-Lena (2013).  It is the complex nature of the future plus the 
inherent unreliability of predictive forecasts that scenarios look to counter and are 
therefore seen primarily as business tools to help manage uncertainty (King, 1975). 
However, in this regard the process of developing scenarios, through the exploration 
of management perceptions and meanings, has synergy with the social 
constructivism tradition (Crotty, 2003). In particular, the traditional theoretical 
perspective of phenomenology asks the researcher to look beyond pre-conceived 
notions of the world and to ‘call into question our whole culture, our manner of 
seeing the world and being in the world in the way we learned it growing up’ (Wolff, 
1984 in Crotty, 2003).  This form of critical enquiry is closely aligned with the 
philosophy underpinning the Shell scenario development, that of challenging senior 
management perceptions and world-views. This methodology therefore provided a 
way of organising and gathering thoughts and perspectives on how global trends 
would interact in the future, plus creating the necessary stimulus for actors to 
strategically think through the potential implications for future UK supply systems.  
The scenario development phase consisted of three main strands of work :- 
1. General interviews: semi-structured interviews with experts/stakeholders 
associated with the wider food supply network 
2. the examination of secondary sources to identify key global factors and 
trends 
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3. the development of four scenario narratives (from data from strands 1 and 
2) 
 
Strands 2 and 3 were a significant part of the wider Chatham House project, 
and the majority of work in each was undertaken by other researchers within the 
research team.   However in strand 1, the general interviews were the source of 
primary data for the scenario development. These interviews were conducted 
principally by the author with actors across the food network. They were designed to 
understand how actors viewed the global food crisis and their thoughts for the future 
direction of the food system. The interview template is shown in Appendix A and a 
summary of the finalised scenarios is shown in figure 3.4. 
 
 
Figure  3.4: Overview of the four scenarios 
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3.4.4 Phase 3: Main data collection phase 
 
The data collection phase was split into two sections :- 
- A: Supply chain sector interviews with actors directly involved in dairy or wheat 
supply chains 
- B: Workshops with dairy/wheat supply networks actors to explore behaviours 
and actions in response to the scenarios 
 
The semi-structured interviews were designed and conducted solely by the 
author. The author also designed the scenario workshops but was aided in data 
collection by other researchers (due to the number of participants). 
 
A:Supply chain sector interviews 
To understand specifically how supply chain actors saw risks and vulnerability 
in the food system, semi-structured interviews were used (the schedule is shown in 
Appendix B). The eleven interviews were designed to elicit the different groups of 
actors’ (principally farmers, processors, traders/wholesalers and retailer) 
perceptions from within the supply chain. The interviews took place during the food 
crisis period of 2007-2008 so answers were coloured by this context. However, many 
of the questions focused on actors’ main focuses and concerns, any risks they faced 
generally, and the courses of action and strategies they were likely to employ. The 
interviewees were not exposed to the scenarios so the responses reflect the status 
quo as they perceived it. 
 
B:Scenario workshops 
 
A series of workshops were built around the scenarios as part of the data 
collection strategy. The workshops were designed to elicit perceptions and reactions 
81 
 
from actors as to the potential impacts of global factors on UK supply systems. 
Workshops, described as ‘loosely steered conversations’ (pg.5 105, Easterby-Smith et 
al, 2002), are useful in exploratory based work. Their strength lies in the ability to 
generate a wide variety of views, along with dynamic discussion and responses to 
explore and develop concepts and ideas (Saunders et al., 2003).  Managers and 
decision makers often look for evidence to support their own world view (Wack, 
1985;Easterby-Smith et al, 2002) which leads to short term, narrow strategic 
thinking. The use of scenarios here looked to challenges these views, as a ‘concept of 
dynamic rather than of static planning’ (pg.38, King 1975). Criticisms of workshops 
have focused on their potentially unstructured nature and the need for strong and 
effective facilitation (Easterby-Smith et al, 2002). In addition, social or peer pressures 
are a concern when dealing with a collective group.  
There were two sets of workshops (repeated for wheat and dairy sectors). 
The first sets of workshops (known as the initial workshops) were used to test the 
development of the scenarios and gave initial feedback as to how actors responded 
to the different narratives. A structured set of questions were used to guide 
participants in their response (shown in Appendix C). Feedback from these 
workshops was then used to adjust the scenarios. The second sets of workshops 
were more intensive in nature, being spread over two days (four days in total, 2 for 
wheat, 2 for dairy). These were known as the core workshops. 
To counteract problems with steering the core workshops, an outline 
structure was developed, based on a set of pre-determined questions and tasks. To 
aid with data collection and to create some standardisation to allow comparison 
between the groups, each group were asked to complete pre-drawn templates 
(Appendix D).  The templates were principally designed to answer the original set of 
research questions for the Chatham House project. Workshop participants were 
asked to consider, as part of the task, any potential breakpoints, policy or strategy 
failures and general concerns.  
The questions were designed to draw out responses to each of the four 
scenarios in turn and were framed as follows:-   
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Q1 - What are the likely implications of the global scenarios on the UK supply 
system? 
o draw a timeline of potential events and changes over the 10 year time 
horizon  
o identify any trends which will be significant 
o identify how key economic, social, technical, environmental and political 
factors circumstances may be affected over the timescales 
 
Q2 - identify the likely reactions, responses and behaviours by sector/supply chain 
echelon to each of the scenarios 
o strategies, market focus, objectives and priorities 
o how products, process, assets and relationships may change 
 
To help to counteract concerns over confidentiality, each participant was 
asked to sign a confidentiality agreement, the workshop being run under ‘Chatham 
House’ rules. However it was recognised that participants would still be circumspect 
when revealing specific company-relevant data so questions and tasks were kept 
either at an industry or sector level.  To help counteract concerns over peer pressure 
and to facilitate the collection of richer data, participants were divided into a number 
of groups. For question 1, groups were allocated randomly, for question 2, groups 
were arranged by sector (e.g. farming sector, processing sector etc.). Time 
constraints meant that each group could only consider 2 of the 4 scenarios, although 
where possible at least 2 groups were asked to consider the same scenarios to allow 
comparison.  
Outputs from each of the group were recorded in two formats; the 
completed templates as recorded by the groups themselves and notes taken of their 
general discussions. Plenary discussions were also recorded in note form. 
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3.4.5 Phase 4: Analysis 
 
This phase saw the analysis of the data. This analysis was conducted at a 
broader level, designed only to elicit policy concerns. The findings indicated that the 
UK food system would need to combine four potentially conflicting goals – those of 
resilience, sustainability, competitiveness and the ability to meet consumer 
expectations (see figure 3.5). This led to policy recommendations including the need 
to establish a cross-sector consortium to develop a vision for UK food supply, how to 
meet its skills and resource needs and how to develop joined up cross-government 
policies to meet the diverse needs of food supply.  However, this was the point at 
which the project was judged complete with the final report delivered to 
stakeholders. No in-depth analysis of the data was undertaken and therefore there 
was no scope, within this project to develop theory with regards to risk and 
vulnerability in the food system. 
 
Figure 3.5: Key findings from the Chatham House project 
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3.5 Approach for thesis 
 
This thesis therefore provided the opportunity to undertake the conceptual 
work that was not possible as part of the Chatham House study. The data was 
extremely rich in its nature and had only been narrowly examined in the CH study, 
focusing on the policy implications of the changes in global dynamics. In a sense the 
CH study did not take a fully academic approach in that there was no linkage of 
findings to academic literature or development of theory.  There was therefore the 
opportunity for a more in-depth, focused examination of the data. Secondly, the data 
collected had, in many cases, specific relevance to the field of supply chain 
vulnerability. The supply chain network interviews in particular asked direct 
questions as to actors’ views on key vulnerabilities for their organisations and 
sectors. The other sources of primary data, especially from the scenario workshops, 
by their nature implicitly revealed how actors perceived threats. However, this data 
was not explicitly examined in the CH study and thus had been left untapped. Thirdly, 
the majority of the primary data had been collected by the author and therefore it 
was felt that there would be sufficient ‘ring-fencing’ of the data in terms of original 
contribution and separation from the CH project. 
 
3.5.1 Primary data usage 
 
The three main sources of primary data for the thesis were taken from the 
following sources:- 
- general interviews 
- supply chain network specific interviews 
- outputs from the series of scenario workshops 
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It is difficult to separate out how the data sets were used in the analysis – 
ultimately all of the data contributed to the conceptual frameworks developed as 
part of this thesis. However, broadly speaking, table 3.5 shows how specific data sets 
were used.  The general interviews were used specifically to set the context of the 
time (the period 2007-2008). The supply chain sector interviews’ original purpose 
was to elicit views from actors on the key threats facing their own particular 
organisation and sectors; therefore the data here was in the same vein for the thesis. 
However, the data was also used to understand how different aspects of risk affected 
different echelons of the supply network. The sets of workshops gave the richest 
data set and form the basis of the core analysis for the thesis.  
 
Data collection Original purpose 
(Chatham House Project 
Thesis purpose 
General 
interviews   
(Food system 
dynamics 2007-
2008) 
-To understand how actors perceived 
the dynamics of the food crisis in 2007 
-To identify core global factors which 
could create changes in future dynamics 
-To develop the four scenarios 
-To contextualise the dynamics of 
2007/2008 period 
Supply chain 
sector  
interviews 
(wheat and 
dairy actors) 
-To understand actors’ perceptions of 
key drivers of risk and vulnerability 
impacting their organisation 
-To understand actors’ perceptions 
of key drivers of risk and 
vulnerability impacting their 
organisation 
-How wheat and dairy actors  
conceptualise risk 
-How risk categories apply to the 
different echelons of the wheat 
and dairy networks 
Initial scenario 
workshops 
(1 x wheat 
actors, 1 x dairy 
actors) 
-To test scenarios for plausibility 
-To gauge initial reactions from actors 
-Thematic analysis to identify risk 
categories 
-To identify the core factors which 
impact on vulnerability of the 
wheat and dairy supply networks 
-To build a conceptual framework 
which shows how these factors 
86 
 
Core scenario 
workshops 
( 1 x wheat 
actors, 1 x dairy 
actors) 
-To identify the potential impact of 
scenarios on UK food system 
-To understand the likely actions, 
behaviours and strategies actors across 
the food system 
interlink 
Table 3.5: Data usage in CH project and thesis 
3.5.2 Analytical approach 
 
In keeping with the research philosophy and structure, a grounded approach 
was used to guide the analysis. This describes the process of the systematic analysis 
of the data, without externally imposed structures, to tease out themes, concepts 
and patterns (Easterby-Smith et al, 2002). The analysis was conducted using a 
framework proposed by Yin (2010) and is shown in figure 3.6. The analysis stage 
undertook a five step process as follows :- 
1 – compilation of data 
2 – disassembling of data 
3 – reassembling of data 
4 – interpreting the data 
5 - conclusions 
 
This process was chosen as it exhibited the necessary rigour to demonstrate 
an empirical link to the theoretical reasoning (Crotty, 2002) and to support the 
development of a level of theory abstraction (Suddaby, 2006). It also allowed a 
degree of transparency for other researchers to follow. From a constructionist 
perspective, validity comes from the transparency of the interpretation of  data  and 
the ability of other researchers to follow the process undertaken (Auerbach and 
Silverstein, 2003, Bryman and Bell, 2003). Table 3.7 (shown at the end of the section) 
indicates how the data was used in each chapter, the guiding research question, the 
phase of the research framework and the level of analysis utilised. 
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Figure 3.6 : Diagram of analytical approach- adapted from pg. 186, Yin (2010) 
 
1. Compilation of data 
 
This phase is the act of organising the primary data  in preparation for coding. 
The software package nVivo was used to compile the data sources. The data sources 
comprised of interview transcripts by actor (from the general and supply specific 
interviews) and the written outputs from the scenario workshops. These outputs 
took the form of notes from discussions in plenary session, notes from discussions in 
the various groupings and the completed templates (as shown in appendix D).  This 
resulted in 77 different separate documents or sources, with a total of 58,765 words 
that required analysis before coding. This indicates the size of the data and the 
coding task faced by the researcher. Each source was classified (using nVivo source 
classifications) as either being generated from the general interviews, the supply 
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chain specific interviews or from the scenario workshops. Where possible, sources 
from the scenario workshop were also classified as to the specific scenarios they 
related to (e.g. Into a New Era). The sources were also coded to two specific nodes – 
either wheat or dairy – and then nodes related to specific supply chain echelons 
(referred as supply actors) and or groups of actors more peripheral to the food 
system (referred to as peripheral actors) as shown in table 3.6. Classifying the 
sources in this way enabled analysis by scenario, by types of actor and/or by the 
wheat and dairy sectors. 
 
Type Classificiation 
Agri-input and farm support 
organisation 
Supply 
Dairy Producer Supply 
Dairy processor Supply 
Wheat producer Supply 
Wheat processor Supply 
Wheat trader Supply 
Manufacturer ( usually brand) Supply 
Retailer Supply 
Consumer group Peripheral 
Academic/scientist Peripheral 
Government Peripheral 
NGO Peripheral 
3.6 Classification of groups of actors 
 
2. Disassembling of the data 
 
This is the process of breaking the data down into codes to develop 
overarching themes. Here the process used the documented system of open coding, 
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common to grounded analysis (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, Easterby-Smith et al., 
2002). The aim of open coding is to create concepts that fit the data by scrutinising 
the source materials (Strauss, 1987). Here open coding was used to generate two 
levels of code:- 
Level 1 : intial codes from first examination of the data 
Level 2 : category development from a re-examination of level 1 codes 
 
Guideance given by Strauss (1987) was followed here to generate level one 
codes. He advises four elements to the approach :- 
1. Ask the data a set of questions, specifically what study are these data 
pertinent to 
2. Analyze the data in minute detail 
3. Use theorectical memos to allow the researcher to move to an analytical 
realm 
4. Do not assume the analytical relevance of any face value facts unless they 
have earned their place in the codes 
 
(Adapated from pg 45,(Strauss, 1987) 
 
The first pass coding took a considerable amount of time, due to the amount 
of data involved. In the first pass of coding, 268 individual codes were identified. A 
second pass at coding, looking to combine core themes, gave rise to 170 level 1 
codes with 37 theoretical memos (giving an indication of potential level 2 codes). 
These level 1 codes are shown in Appendix E.  
Emerging from the data were three sets of core themes:-  
o Trends within the food system as observed by actors 
o Specific threats and risks affecting the food system 
o The factors which impacted on the ability of the food system to respond 
to threats 
90 
 
 
While the first set of codes were useful in setting the scene (they were partly 
used to inform the context in Chapter Four), the further two sets of codes specifically 
revealed how actors perceived risks and the factors that could impact the 
vulnerability of the food system in the future. By re-examining the level one codes 
and the theoretical memos generated as part of the coding process, these two sets 
of themes were developed as level 2 codes. These level two codes emerged as both 
concepts of risk and/or vulnerability. A set of codes could be directly linked to risk 
and these are explored in Chapter Five. A set of 35 further level two codes emerged 
with potential significance for risk and vulnerability. These are shown in Appendix F. 
 
3. Re-assembling the data 
 
This stage is concerned with the development of core categories and the 
emerging patterns and linkages between these categories. Core categories are those 
which are central to the investigation, appear frequently in the data, can be easily 
related to other categories and have implications for a more general theory (Strauss, 
1987). The aim here was to develop level 2 codes into core category codes to aid the 
development of theoretical concepts. Yin advises the researcher to ‘play with the 
data’ (2010) to understand the emerging patterns and how these relate to the 
overall concepts and research questions. The researcher took this advice in two 
ways. Firstly, a series of matrix analyses, generated from nVivo were undertaken. 
These included a comparison of:- 
 
- Level 1/2 codes vs data collection instrument ( e.g. how the codes relate to the 
specific data collection events) 
- Level 1/2 codes vs each of the scenarios 
- Level 1/2 codes vs type of actor ( using the source classifications shown above) 
- Level 1/2 codes vs wheat or dairy sector actors 
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Secondly, as key codes emerged, these were transferred onto post-it notes 
and a large map was constructed (using brown paper) to start to understand how 
these codes interrelated with each other. A picture of the map is shown in appendix 
H. The process used here was axial coding. Axial coding is a well-defined method to 
develop level three codes/core categories (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002) . It involves 
the examination of each emerging core category in relation to each other to 
determine its centrality to the overall research themes ((Strauss, 1987). Here then 
level 2 codes were refined and developed into core categories. Once the core 
categories had been identified, a process of selective coding was used. This process 
involved the re-examination of the original data to check and balance the 
interpretation of the concept – as advised by (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002) and 
(Strauss, 1987) and re-coding data, to create more of an evidential trail, to the core 
categories.  In this manner the core categories were refined and developed (these 
are shown in Appendix G). This revealed a complex web of categories which needed 
further organisation to facilitate the next phase, that of interpretation. Categories 
were therefore grouped in sets, based on whether they related to types of risk, 
either exogenous or endogenous factors, which impacted on the vulnerability of the 
food system as discussed in Chapter Seven. 
 
 
4. Interpretation 
 
This phase is concerned with the development of theory from the core 
categories, in essence ascribing meaning to the findings (Yin, 2010). This in turn then 
allows the researcher to rise above the detailed analysis and identify stories and 
themes at a higher level of abstraction (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). Here the 
linkages between categories were explored further, developing a conceptual 
framework of the factors which could influence vulnerability (this is shown and 
explained in Chapter Seven).  
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Eisenhardt (1989) advocated the building of theory from cases through the 
synthesising of previous work and reviewing their strengths, weaknesses and 
applicability. This can also be achieved through the comparison of case data to 
previous theories and models in the literature (Gill and Johnson, 2002). The author 
followed this advice and this process involved a comparison of the theories and 
conceptual frameworks developed to those reviewed as part of the literature review. 
These findings are presented in Chapter Eight. 
 
For inductive, case study based research, the quality of the research is based 
on how well the data supports the theoretical arguments that are presented (Bryman 
and Bell, 2003, Yin, 1994). It is recognised here that the interpretation presented in 
this thesis is only one way among others (Auerbach and Silverstein, 2003).  In 
addition, dependability (or reliability) here comes from the support of this 
interpretation so that other researchers can follow it. However interpretation 
requires the researcher to move from a representation of the actors’ logic to one 
which imposes their own external logic – in effect an ontological oscillation in 
imposing  an objectivist stance (Gill and Johnson, 2002). This relates to the research 
quality criteria of confirmability (see table 3.1). This, objective stance, however, is an 
inevitability of the nature of research,  the role of a detached observer is, in effect, 
illusory (Chubin and Restivo, 1983). This can be countered by both a level of 
reflexivity on the part of the researcher but also in identifying the practical 
ramifications of the research and the opportunities to test findings in the real world 
(Gill and Johnson, 2002).  A large part of the analysis therefore was based on a 
reflexive piece. This was in two parts. Due to the timescales involved in the thesis 
with data collected in the period 2007-2008, an assessment was taken as to how the 
landscape in the food system has changed since then and whether the findings from 
this thesis still had relevance. The reflection also involved thinking through the 
potential ramifications of the findings for stakeholders and how they could have an 
impact in 2015. The discussion presented in Chapter Nine is the output of this 
process. 
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5. Conclude 
Here, Yin (2010) advises the researcher to reflect on the broader implications 
of the study, particularly in challenging existing ways of thinking and research. The 
concluding chapter to this thesis therefore presents the overall contribution of this 
thesis, its limitations and the implications for future research. 
3.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has set out the methodological stance of the thesis, borne out of 
the original CH project. It explains the methods used for data collection for the CH 
project and how this data was examined afresh for this thesis. It explains the 
grounded analytic approach taken by the thesis. Table 3.7 summarises how the data 
sources were used, and in which chapter. It also shows the level of analysis 
associated with each chapter. 
Chapter Data 
Sources 
Used How? RQ Research 
Framework 
Level of 
analysis 
4 -General 
interviews 
-To contextualise the dynamics of 
2007/2008 period 
- 1.Compilation Quotes from 
transcripts 
5 -Initial 
scenario 
workshops 
-Main 
scenario 
workshops 
-By scenario, key responses by actors 
related to conceptions of risk and 
vulnerability 
- 1.Compilation 
 
Quotes from 
transcripts 
6 -Supply 
chain 
interviews 
-All 
scenario 
workshops 
-How wheat and dairy actors  
conceptualise risk 
-Thematic analysis to identify risk 
categories 
-How risk categories apply to the 
different echelons of the wheat and 
dairy networks 
RQ 
1 
2.Disassembly 
3.Reassembly 
Level 1 and 
2 codes 
Core 
categories 
for risk 
7 All data 
combined 
-To identify the core factors which 
impact on vulnerability of the wheat 
and dairy supply networks 
-To build a conceptual framework 
which shows how these factors 
interlink 
RQ 
2 
2.Disassembly 
3.Reassembly 
4.Interpretation 
Level 1 and 
2 codes 
Core 
categories 
for 
vulnerability 
Theoretical 
concepts 
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8 All data 
combined 
-To compare theoretical concepts to 
existing literature 
RQ 
3 
4.Interpretation Core 
categories 
Theorectical 
concepts 
9 All data 
combined 
-To bring dynamics of the food 
system up to date 
-To reflect on impact and relevance 
of research 
RQ 
4/5 
4.Interpretation Theory 
building 
10  -To outline contribution of the 
research 
RQ  
5 
5.Conclude  
Table 3.7 : Chapters and data usage/research framework 
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Chapter Four: The dynamics of the UK Food System (2007-2008) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The data for the thesis was collected during the period 2007-2008. This 
chapter aims to set the context for that period, in terms of the global dynamic and 
the UK context, for the food system and specifically the wheat and dairy networks. In 
addition, a set of 20 interviews were conducted as part of the CH project, designed 
to support the construction of the four scenarios. For this thesis, however, they 
helped to understand what actors thought were the key dynamics in the global and 
UK food supply systems at that time.  The actors here were a mix of those directly 
involved in the supply network and those more periphery to the food system. Their 
mix of comments therefore gave a good overview of the concerns regarding the food 
system at that time. 
The first half of this chapter presents a short summary of the global context in 
2008, focusing on longer term concerns that came to the fore at the time of the 
crisis. NB. For a more in-depth examination of the global food demand and supply 
factors see Ambler-Edwards et al. (2009). The chapter then gives a short overview of 
the UK retail, dairy and wheat sectors. The second section of this chapter presents 
the key findings from the 20 interviews, focusing on core themes and trends that 
emerged in relation to the global context.  
4.2 Global food crisis in 2008 
4.2.1 Global context 
 
The food price crisis was in full flow at the time of the data collection for the 
CH project. Prices started to rise from early 2006 but by August 2007, the FAO Food 
Price index was 47% higher in comparison and 60% higher in August 2008 (FAO, 
2008b). This was driven by rises in the prices of key global commodities. Between 
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August 2007 and August 2008 the price of US hard wheat rose by 120% and the price 
of whole milk powder by 69%.  
Short term factors were partially responsible for the 2007/2008 price rises, 
including historically low levels of global cereal stocks, low harvest yields due to poor 
weather conditions, coupled with high oil prices, coincided with record increases in 
global demand (Ambler-Edwards et al., 2009). However, the wide ranging impacts of 
the sharp price rises drew attention to structural, longer run changes affecting global 
food demand and supply. Debates started to coalesce around a number of key 
uncertainties and risks such as population growth, land competition, resources 
constraints and climate change. 
Global demand for food is growing, driven by population growth. In 2008, the 
potential effects of this became more widely understood. The global population is 
forecast to reach 9 billion by 2050, and in 2008, the World Bank had predicted that 
food production will need to double in the corresponding period(World Bank, 2008). 
Concern then was growing over the capability of global agriculture to keep pace. 
Annual global per capita grain production was in decline, falling from its peak of 342 
kilograms in 1984 to 302 kilograms in 2006, and the previous seven years had seen 
total world grain production fall short of global demand (Brown, 2008). 
A number of uncertainties surrounding the capability of agriculture to 
respond become more clearly articulated. Reports at the time suggested that only 
22.7% of the earth’s available arable land, 10.1 billion hectares, was suitable for rain-
fed agriculture (FAO & IIASA, 2007). The bulk of this is already being utilized and 
much of the remaining land is of low quality with significant problems of soil 
degradation. Water was and is a more serious concern. Fresh water constitutes only 
2.5% of the total water available (Clarke and King, 2004). Overall usage stands today 
at 54% of this supply (of which 70% is used directly for agriculture); if per capita 
consumption rises across the globe at the rate seen within developed countries, this 
could increase to 90% by 2025 (UN Population Fund, 2001). Global economic growth, 
along with food production, has been highly dependent on the supply of fossil fuels, 
especially oil. While demand has soared over the last three decades, supply has 
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struggled to keep pace (Evans, 2009) and the high oil prices in 2007/2008 sparked 
concern over future supplies and the possibility of an oil-supply crunch (IEA, 2008, 
Stevens, 2008). On top of this, the Stern report (Stern, 2006) had been published in 
2006, warning that climate change could be ‘the greatest and widest-ranging market 
failure ever seen’ (pg.i, Stern, 2006) . Rising temperatures and levels of CO2 are 
expected to see global agricultural output decline by 16% (Von Braun, 2008). At the 
time, many thought prices would fall back from their peak but opinions were being 
voiced that these factors signalled a structural change which would keep prices 
higher in the long term (FAO, 2008a).  
4.2.2 UK and policy context 
 
Higher prices fed through to the UK and food price inflation peaked at 12.8% 
in August, 2008 (ONS, 2008). This sparked a re-interest in the production of food in 
the UK and food security in general (see The Daily Telegraph, 2008). This was 
translated through to government who published a number of food security reports 
(DEFRA, 2006, DEFRA, 2008b). In 2008, the Cabinet Office undertook an extensive 
review of food and related policies in the ‘Food Matters’ report (Cabinet Office, 
2008). The report re-emphasized the importance of food and food production and 
highlighted a number of challenges for the UK food system. This marked a change in 
the position of government in recognising the need to pro-actively manage food 
production. 
Major reforms to CAP payments were also underway. In 2005, payments had 
been decoupled from production volume and instead, were based on land area 
farmed. In 2008 a heath-check was underway and other changes were being 
proposed including agreements to reduce cereal set-aside, abolish dairy quotas and 
reduce price interventions (Atkin and Fane, 2008). This signified major change for 
both the dairy and wheat sectors.  
4.3 Supply chain context 
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4.3.1 Retail sector 
 
Total consumer expenditure on food and drink in the UK was £174bn (DEFRA, 
2010b). The UK agri-food sector contributed 7.1% of GVA in 2008, with the size of the 
retail sector valued at £22bn (DEFRA, 2010b). The UK retail sector is highly 
concentrated and in 2007, the four major retailers controlled around 75% of sales 
(TNS, 2007). While total food sales are split evenly with the food service sector 
(DEFRA, 2010b), retailers exert a skewed influence over the farming and processing 
bases, with around 75% of all products processed in the UK destined for the retail 
supply chain (DEFRA, 2009a). The problems associated with the power imbalance 
have been well documented (see White, 2000, Hingley, 2005, Fearne et al., 2005). As 
of 2008, retailers continued to exert cost pressures down the supply chain, with only 
around  36% of retail price going to UK producers (DEFRA, 2009a).  
4.3.2 Dairy sector 
 
The UK dairy industry contributed £1,384M of GVA to the UK economy in 
2008 (DEFRA, 2010b). This equated to the production of 13.3bn litres of milk (DEFRA, 
2008a). Liquid milk makes up 47% of the market, with cheese, yogurts, desserts and 
milk powders the rest (DEFRA, 2008a). The overall structure of the sector is shown in 
figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1 :  UK dairy supply network (complied by author from DEFRA, 2008d, DEFRA, 
2010b) 
The industry has seen significant trends in concentration. Concerns were 
ongoing over the exodus of dairy producers from the industry, 21% had left since 
2005 (AHDB, 2015).However, milk production overall continued to increase due to 
higher yields, adding to concerns over the intensification of the industry (Burley, 
2008). 
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Figure 4.2 UK dairy producer numbers (AHDB, 2015) 
 
The UK dairy industry had experienced high levels of change and instability in 
the preceding decade.  In 1994, the Milk Marketing Board was the sole purchaser 
and supplier of milk. However, after de-regulation, the supply of milk fragmented 
between either milk producer co-operatives or through direct supply contracts to 
processors (Franks, 2001).  In 2008, producers were split evenly between supply 
contracts for milk co-operatives and processors (DEFRA, 2008d). However, the 
processing sector was highly concentrated with only four companies responsible, at 
that time, for 60% of milk production (Dairy Crest, Wiseman, Arla and Glanbia).  
Relationships within the milk supply chain had a history of being fractious and 
a government report highlighted an ingrained culture of adversarialism and blame 
(EFRA, 2009). The main clashes have been over perceived unfair farm-gates prices. 
However, in 2008, farm-gate prices were benefiting from global price rises and the 
average farm-gate price stood at 25.9ppl, 25% higher than in 2007 (DEFRA, 2008a). 
This concern had prompted some retailers to create more integrated supply 
chains for liquid milk with producers on single-retailer supply contracts (Stevenson, 
2004). However, there was still a concern that prices were not enough to cover costs 
of production (The Grocer, 2008). 
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4.3.3 Wheat sector 
 
Wheat processing is the largest food manufacturing sector in the UK. The 
production of bread, biscuits and cakes contributed £3.8bn to UK’s GVA in 2008 
(DEFRA, 2010b).  2008 saw a rise in planted wheat area, up by 14% from 2007 
(DEFRA, 2008a). This corresponded to significant rises in global wheat prices, as 
wheat prices rose in the UK by almost 100% to 2006 prices (DEFRA, 2008a) – figure 
4.3. 
There were 26,000 holdings registered as cereal farms in 2008 (DEFRA, 
2008a). Between 1984 and 2007, the area planted with wheat in the UK fell by 6.3% 
(DEFRA, 2008a). However, ongoing improvements in yields have ensured that UK 
remains a net exporter (FAOSTAT, 2008), and 14% of wheat was exported in 
2008(DEFRA, 2008a). 
 
 
Figure 4.3 UK wheat price/tonne trends (compiled bu author from DEFRA, 2008c) 
 
 
In 2007, government set out a policy for the development of a bio-fuels 
industry in the UK, to support sustainable future energy needs (EAC, 2007). This 
triggered a flurry of optimism in the farming base that a new market would emerge, 
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creating higher demand for wheat supply, and therefore higher prices. However, 
concern was also raised over how sustainable bio-fuels actually were and whether 
this market would exacerbate competition for land(EAC, 2007)  
 
The structure of the industry is shown in figure 4.4. In 2008, 51% of wheat 
was used for the production of animal feed, 41% was milled for flour, of which 58% 
was used for bread making purposes (DEFRA, 2008a). As can be seen, this supply 
network is more disconnected than that of the dairy network. Grain traders act as 
the core purchasers of wheat, rather than direct purchases by mills or feed 
processing plants. Wheat is a globally traded commodity, trading therefore 
underpins the behaviours and mechanics at the upstream end of the network. 
Further downstream, there are complex flows between primary processing (e.g. 
flour) and secondary processing ( e.g. bread-making). 
 
Figure 4.4; UK wheat supply network (compiled by author from DEFRA, 2008a, 
NABIM, 2008) 
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In 2008, the UK had 59 mills, run by 31 companies of which, the two largest 
companies accounted for approximately 50% of production in the UK. The baking 
sector is also highly concentrated with three organisations accounting for almost 
30% of the market. Here these organisations enjoy brand dominance in the market 
(The Federation of Bakers, 2008) where 70% of bread produced is sold into the major 
retail outlets (DEFRA, 2010b). 
 
4.4 General Interview and Actors’ responses 
 
4.4.1 Response to global situation  
 
As was expected, actors were predominately concerned with the events of 
2007 and the circumstances affecting the spike in food prices. The interviews 
revealed actors did generally understand how global events were contributing to the 
inflationary effects seen in 2007/2008.  While there was some difference in opinion 
as to whether longer term factors were at play in the 2007/2008 crisis, a number of 
these factors were seen by actors as significant trends for future global food supply. 
These were:-  
 the availability of land 
 competition for land between food, feed and fuel 
 climate change and increasing weather variability 
 the availability of water 
 the availability of energy 
 
Many actors predicted a greater proportion of land given over to agricultural 
production as a result of the higher price rises. This then brought conflicts over the 
usage of land, soil quality and the problem of degradation and the competition 
between feed, fuel and food sources. 
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Energy, and the arguments as to whether globally peak oil production had 
been reached were voiced, but actors were more concerned about inflationary 
effects causing a rise in energy prices and therefore input prices. Actors recognised 
that it may be water that could be the bigger constraint, both globally and in the UK.  
‘We haven’t started to think of water as a scarce resource but water could be 
a key problem – sooner or later population could expand above water 
resources.’ Member of UK Levy board  
50 % of participants expressed concerns that global factors could spell a 
longer term structural change to supply and demand dynamics; a new normality as it 
were. 
‘It is this same globalised environment that is now moving us towards a new 
paradigm, and at a much faster rate than expected.  We are leaving the age 
of plentiful resources and moving towards one in which there is much greater 
awareness of the scarcity of resources’  Retail industry representative 
 
Others were cautious as to whether the 2008 price rises really did indeed 
spell the tipping point, but did express concern that over the longer term, the food 
system was facing significant change. All but one believed that global food prices, 
although falling back from their peak in 2008, would remain high, which in itself 
signals a significant shift in the market. Concern was also raised about the possibility 
of longer term price volatility impacting the UK market. 
 
‘There is likely to be a protracted period of inflation in food prices.  There is a 
consensus in the food industry that price rises are expected over the next 3 
years and likely to be an upward trend in prices over the longer run’  Food 
system analyst 
‘Volatility has become the norm; we have torn up planning assumptions that 
seemed safe only two years ago.’ Agri-food input supplier 
105 
 
 
 
4.4.2 Globalisation 
 
One theme of note in actors’ responses was increasing globalisation. In 
common with other industries, the food system in the UK has been subject to the 
trend of globalisation. In 2008, 41% of all food consumed in the UK was imported, 
underlining the increasing dependence on the global market.(DEFRA, 2010b) 
‘Over recent decades, globalisation has resulted in a much broader and more 
complex competitive arena.  Business is done at a higher tempo and places 
greater demands on organisations’ (and individuals’) responsiveness and 
adaptability.’ Retail industry representative 
 
The rise in multi-nationals and the reduction in trade barriers have led to an 
expansion of companies supplying to global markets. Multi-nationals, supplying 
regional areas (e.g. the  EU), dominate the industry while national smaller companies 
have suffered. 
‘The effects of globalisation have meant that products and materials are 
shifted around the world –location and nationally don’t really matter 
anymore.’ Public health and nutrition expert 
 
 
Increased inter-linkages to the global market sparked a dichotomy of 
perspectives, the global market was both seen as an opportunity for UK expansion 
but also as a threat – threats from imports were mentioned in particular by supply 
chain actors. Greater exposure to global markets as a result of the dismantling of CAP 
subsidies linked to production also created concern for some supply chain specific 
actors, potentially generating more price volatility.  
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‘UK is exposed to the global price and is vulnerable to global issues’  Retail 
industry expert 
 
‘From an era of UK/EU CAP-inspired protection, we are now in a global market 
where there are no interventions, no mechanisms for controlling prices’. 
Feed/Grain agent 
 
One specific area of concern, was that of the dependency on imported 
feedstuffs for livestock.  In 2008, 60% of all soya fed to livestock in the UK was 
imported (Ambler-Edwards et al., 2009) and sources in South America, at the time, 
were increasingly switching to GM crops, restricting sources (as the GM types are not 
authorised by the EU).  
 
‘the EU feed industry is only 22% self-sufficient, relying on soya from 
Argentina and Brazil to make up shortfalls in the supply of protein to Europe’s 
livestock.  Temporary bans on imports from those sources as a result of 
asynchronous authorisation [for GM] could create real problems for EU 
livestock production.’  Cereal industry association representative 
 
4.4.3 Environmental sustainability and government intervention 
 
Many actors expressed concern over the impact of agricultural on the 
environment. This was expressed predominately as the impact of carbon emissions 
and there was recognition among many that more needed to be done. However, a 
few actors, very strongly, expressed their belief that the food system is 
fundamentally unsustainable in its current form. Here, increasing intensification and 
industrialisation were seen as major drivers of an unsustainable system. This view 
was not reflected by more mainstream supply actors.  
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‘The pressure of higher meat demand will create the need for more 
homogeneous meat; the pressure will be to increase industrialised meat 
production which has environmental consequences.’ Public health expert 
‘There is a big push for industrialisation in production techniques (e.g. in 
Africa).This is driving an increased use of fertiliser and an increase in the use 
of seed varieties that are suited to the market rather than suited to local 
conditions (leading to smaller number of seed varieties in use). This narrowing 
of bio-diversity can also be seen with livestock e.g. breeds of cow world-wide 
are very narrow’ Environmental activist 
‘For example concentrated animal feed has resulted in a separation of animals 
from the land. There is a lot of feed going into a small land space; this is 
equating to a lot more methane, nitrous oxide, ammonia and water pollution’ 
Research institute representative 
 
4.4.4 Role of government 
 
Linked to concerns over environmental sustainability, some advocated a more 
pro-active strategy from UK government. Actors highlighted the conflict between 
private, commercial concerns and the need for greater action on sustainability and 
health issues. Intervention by government to help mitigate power imbalances in the 
food supply chain was also suggested to support better sharing of profits. 
‘The private sector ‘does’ sustainability with the consumer in mind. When 
something resonates with the consumer then that’s fine (e.g. carbon) but 
when it doesn’t there is a big gap. The private sector is doing some good but 
there are major gaps. For example, in the trading relationships, promoting 
justice and fairness for primary producers and for labour.’ Research institute 
representative 
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‘The government don’t have enough control within the industry and they are 
in effect pushing food onto the consumers which is unsustainable both from 
an environmental and health perspective’ NGO representative 
Many mainstream actors were very sceptical of increased government 
intervention. In fact, many argued against it, believing a more free-market approach, 
with less regulation, would support a more competitive industry. 
‘There is too much politics in agriculture……..I’m very sceptical about 
interference in the economic cycle. CAP reform [i.e. less intervention] has not 
meant that we have run out of food etc.’ Cereals industry representative 
Many actors saw the EU and UK position on GM as untenable, and a potential 
contributor to further pressures on food supplies. There were calls for government to 
act to support more approvals of the application of GM technology. 
 
‘In the UK some have spent the last  10 years trying to alter the public mindset 
that has been allowed to develop around GM; from now on, with no such 
action having been taken, we should expect clear and appreciable shortages 
in the supply of commodity crops, in particular animal feed to the UK market.‘ 
Agricultural supplies expert 
4.4.5 Key trends in the market 
 
The rise of a more demanding consumer, with higher expectations was a 
strong theme running through the interviews. UK consumers now expect a wide 
range of choice, with food products that fulfil multiple criteria from product quality, 
the method of production (e.g. organics)  through to fair trade – this has been coined 
‘values-based purchasing’.  
 
‘Growth in consumer expectations…..  consumers want their food supplier to 
deliver everything: differentiated products (GM, non-GM, organic. Local etc), 
right quality, right price, meeting environmental standards, good ethical 
practices, taking care of consumer health.’ Retail industry representative 
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‘In the largely conflict-free developed world, the supply of plentiful, safe food 
has been taken for granted and our focus has shifted instead to values - issues 
affecting environment, health, animal welfare’ Retailer 
Concerns over the link between food consumption and health were also 
prominent here. Actors pointed to the growing trend of obesity as a core issue for 
the UK.  For some actors this linked to further evidence of unsustainable behaviours 
in the food system, especially the conflict between the need to keep food prices low 
versus commercial interests. 
 
‘Obesity is the number one public health issue. How to tackle dietary change is 
going to be the key question’. NGO representative 
 
‘There needs to be recognition that cheap, highly promoted, highly 
industralised food is a problem. It is in the government’s interest that food is 
cheap and this has been the policy for 100’s of years. Industrialised food 
production enables this policy but this effectively externalises the cost’ Public 
Health expert 
 
 
4.4.6 Trends in the supply network 
 
CAP reform, the switch to single payments and the removal of price 
intervention mechanisms was recognised as being one of the biggest changes to 
producers and the food market. This has driven many producers to become more 
market orientated and was seen as a driver for lower volumes to have been 
produced post reform (2004), particularly in the dairy sector (due to lower overall 
prices for milk).  
‘The move away from direct subsidies [has been the biggest change]. Cereal 
market has not adapted yet but will need to quickly. Wheat producer 
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For the wheat sector, the emergence of bio-fuels also created some 
uncertainty in the market. On one hand, bio-fuels were seen as providing a new 
market outlet for wheat and therefore having a positive effect on prices; in that it 
had the potential to absorb any over-production at a farming level (rather than 
having to export wheat at lower prices). 
‘[Bio-fuels]The grain market has not had any new market for a long time. Bio-
fuels could create a ‘demand shock’ Wheat producer  
 
A significant trend over the last few years has been the consolidation of 
processing firms and the trend toward larger farms.  These are responses to the need 
to increase efficiencies and maintain profit margins within the sectors. Many general 
and supply chain actors saw the inevitability of the continuation of these trends in 
response to price and margin pressures 
‘Manufacturing will become the business of even fewer and bigger (global) 
companies.  More mergers will divide the market between the big players and 
a relatively few, small, niche-led businesses.  There won’t be much in 
between’. Grain market trader 
Associated with this was considerable debate about whether ‘local’ 
constituted a more economically and, potentially, environmentally effective 
structure versus the trend towards globalisation.  Some actors believed that local 
sourcing had traction, particularly with a growing consumer interest in the 
providence of food.  
‘Simple supply economics also suggest an increased retail focus on locally 
produced foods that combine (positive) local identity with fewer “food miles”’ 
Dairy industry association representative 
 
This counter-trend to globalisation saw actors picture a potential blending of 
the small and large. The larger scale organisations here were expected to get bigger, 
centred around the assumptions that economies of scale (i.e. global, larger 
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concentrated structures) bring greater efficiencies. This would leave space for niche, 
smaller scale systems at a local level. 
 ‘The UK’s food system will become divided, in effect, into two areas - local 
and global. The concept of national food supply will become irrelevant. ‘Agri-
input industry expert 
 
‘There could be increasing tension between the centralised/volume based 
concept of production and a strengthening consumer preference for food with 
a clear local or regional provenance’ Retail industry representative 
 
The UK retailers exert significant power across the system. However, some 
actors saw the potential for this power imbalance to switch around in light of any 
potential global scarcity or increasing global prices. 
‘The question is, with supply/demand becoming tight and moving from a 
buyers market to a sellers market, how will these positions be re-evaluated?  
E.g. the retailers have been able to ‘beat up’ the producers in an over-supply 
market….. but any change towards tighter supply could mean that this 
becomes more difficult’. Energy market expert 
 
‘The true foundation of negotiating strength is scarcity.  As commodities 
become scarcer, even the biggest buyers will need to compete intensely to 
secure supplier‘. Retail industry representative 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has set the context for the period 2007-2008 when the data 
collection for the CH project took place. It has highlighted the key dynamics of that 
period, those relating to the global situation and an overarching view of the dairy 
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and wheat supply networks. It has also given an overview of the key concerns and 
trends that occupied the mind of actors during this period. This chapter has shown 
that this was a pivotal moment in the UK food system, as actors became more aware 
of the convergence of factors which could present significant vulnerability for the 
network. Chapters Five, Six and Seven explore this in more depth, while Chapter Nine 
provides an update of the responses by policymakers and supply actors since this 
period. 
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5.0 Chapter Five: Responses to the Chatham House Scenarios 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to present the outcomes from the scenario 
workshops, in order to start the exploration of the key themes related to risk and 
vulnerability. The scenario workshops were a central part of the CH study and so 
produced a significant amount of data. These workshops encouraged actors to think 
more widely about the food system as a whole and to explore how threats could play 
out in the future. The scenarios provided an opportunity to test their reactions and 
thoughts when exposed to different combinations of external threats and shocks and 
therefore were helpful in revealing where actors saw areas of vulnerability. The scale 
and types of threat differed across the scenarios – from Just a Blip to Food in Crisis – 
therefore providing a unique way of exposing actors to different stimuli in order to 
test their responses. 
The workshops were also designed to give rise to thinking about possible 
courses of actions that would be taken by each echelon of the supply chain, also 
giving rise to insights into how actors’ perceived the severity of threats, and revealing 
the range of potential behaviours across the supply system . The differing responses 
to the separate scenarios allowed different perspectives to be  voiced; this was also 
true with responses to one particular scenario where views could differ between 
different groups, even when responding to the same set of circumstances. The 
questions posed in the workshops were designed to understand the behaviours and 
impacts on actors in the wider food system, including government and consumers. 
This allowed a more holistic, systemic understanding of the dynamics and core 
interdependencies. The differing perceptions are therefore presented here in this 
chapter, forming an important part of the thesis in the understanding of the 
complexities surrounding actors’ perceptions of risks. 
In order to preserve the complexity and ambiguity of the base data, this 
chapter presents the actual responses to each of the scenarios in turn. This formed 
114 
 
part of the data compilation phase (as explained in the methodology chapter) and 
quotes are presented here as they were given verbatim from the workshops, without 
analysis or coding applied. Validity in this case is concerned with the ‘quality of 
theoretical reasoning’ (Bryman and Bell, 2003).   It was felt important to present this 
data before proceeding to a higher level of analysis, to show a clear line of sight 
between the data, the analysis and the subsequent conceptual findings.  
As actors were grouped together at the workshops, data was captured at a 
group rather than at an individual level. In addition, due to restrictions and 
sensitivities expressed by actors over competition laws, it was agreed that no direct 
quotes by individuals were recorded. In this section therefore any quotes given are 
those offered by groups of actors. However, each quote is attributed to the supply 
chain echelon that each group belonged to. 
 
5.2 Scenario 1: Just a Blip 
 
High food prices prove to be a temporary blip and soon return to the long-term trend-
line.  There is a possibility, however, that if food prices fall back sharply, financial 
speculation in commodities will operate in reverse and lead to exaggerated food price 
volatility.  High food prices trigger a major investment in increased production. Over a two- to 
three-year period, marginal land and spare capacity are brought back into production, double-
cropping is more widely adopted and food production surges.  
In spite of climate change fears, the weather proves remarkably favourable. There are almost 
no major crop losses affecting feed or food and sustained rainfall in Australia breaks the long-
running drought, bringing harvests back to normal levels.  
Geopolitical stability in oil-producing regions is seen as improving following the 2008 US 
election, and oil supply concerns ease. As a result of receding global fears and a jump in 
energy efficiency investment, the oil price returns to levels around $65 per barrel or below. 
Food input costs decline.  
The reduced oil price undercuts the economic competitiveness of crop-based bio-fuels, and 
ethical pressure from NGOs builds. Bio-fuel production falls, freeing up food production 
capacity.  
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The combination of a strong supply response and favourable conditions moves food into 
overproduction and prices fall. Financial speculation, which had been a significant factor in 
driving up prices, then shifts sharply causing the food price to plunge further, ending up well 
below the previous long-run trend-line. 
Farmers reel from the dramatic collapse of food prices. This paves the way for volatility 
around the trend-line in the years that follow.   
Figure 5.1 : Just a Blip narrative (Ambler-Edwards et al., 2009) 
5.2.1 Responses to Just A Blip 
 
This scenario was met with some scepticism and thought to be an unlikely 
outcome by many of the supply chain actors. This underlined the beliefs expressed in 
the interviews that the food price rises in 2008 spelled the end to a period of food 
deflation and that food prices were likely to remain high. Instead, many actors placed 
their own interpretation on the scenario, envisaging a period of increased price 
volatility, rather than a return to pre-2008 prices, creating a series of blips as prices 
rise sharply and fall again. 
‘There would be increased awareness and concern about the implications of 
future possible blips ‘ Wheat supply actors 
There were a few voices that dissented with the scenario of increased price 
volatility and believed that the food price hikes at the time, would indeed decrease 
back to pre-2008 levels. This indicates the level of heterogeneity of the overall group. 
However, in the main, supply actors judged this scenario, one of volatility, as 
an uncomfortable and dangerous position, where the prospect of continued price 
volatility would create many difficulties in sustaining profitability. The uncertainty 
would affect producers in particular, making it very difficult for longer term planning 
and investment. 
‘A blip scenario is bad news because farmers like stability – it’s hard to make 
long term decisions’ Dairy supply actors 
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A blip therefore presented one of the worst situations for food supply actors. 
One where there was no stability, higher prices could not be counted on to forge 
better margins, limiting the level of capital available and the willingness to invest. 
‘A blip would lead to continued low profitability and lack of investment in new 
technology and limited long term efficiency gains. Less investment leads to 
poorer techniques and storage of grain’ Wheat supply actors 
From a consumer perspective this scenario offers some relief, in that prices 
fall back to their pre-2008 levels, although, according to actors’ perception of the 
scenario, there would be continued price spikes. Even in periods where prices were 
high, it was felt that the retailers would look to protect the consumer and not pass 
on price increases. This would cause issues for some in the supply chain who would 
have to absorb any input price increases, thus impacting their profitability.  
‘There could be problems in passing cost increases down the supply chain. 
Retailers are reluctant to increase prices. Big manufacturers may be able to 
pass on prices to retailers but not the smaller manufacturers.’ Dairy 
processors 
This scenario was thought particularly challenging for dairy farmers, with 
even more pressure on profit margins and no room for capital investment.  It was 
expected that there would be a continuation of the contraction of the industry. 
‘Farmers will get out of a volatile industry. They may not invest or invest and 
then get caught out [with drops in prices]. There will be a loss of critical mass 
with a steady decline’. Dairy supply actors 
The wheat sector would not be immune, potentially having difficulty in 
maintaining profits. Production could see a retreat to the most fertile areas of the UK 
(predominately the east of the country) with little extra planting. 
Some actors saw increased price volatility as a driver for more collaboration 
across chains with processors entering into longer term contracts with suppliers in 
order to stabilise and agree fixed term prices. However there was strong dissent 
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from some wheat actors who thought high price spikes would mean more 
opportunistic profit taking by farmers and therefore a reluctance to enter into longer 
term, fixed price contracts. 
‘Blips act against long term supply chain agreements because farmers go for 
short term gains’ Wheat supply actors 
However, despite more pressure on margins, some actors felt that processors 
and manufacturers would not look to change their current strategies or trajectories.  
‘..there will be little impact on  manufacturing ,it will be business as usual’  
Agri-input and producer interest actors 
Interestingly, actors saw this as a positive re-enforcement for current 
government policy and the preference for limited or minimal intervention. This 
scenario therefore reinforced faith in markets and therefore their ability to keep 
food prices low through both UK and global competition, with no need for 
interference or increased intervention from government in the form of direct 
farming subsidies (e.g. CAP).  
‘… restriction of  public expenditure in agri-food because of the belief that the 
market can cope.’ Dairy supply actors 
‘Government will let the market sort it out (there is a variable response across 
the market) and hope for the best. The assumption is that food imports will 
keep inflation in check’ Wheat supply actors 
However, actors felt that continued confidence in lower food prices created 
an opening for the government to be opportunistic in light of these prices and use 
fiscal measures to address wider policy concerns such as sustainability and 
specifically health concerns. 
 
‘Government will see an opportunity to take liberties with taxation on 
foodstuffs. There could be taxation on fats and sugars to reduce health bill’. 
Dairy supply actors 
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5.2.3 Just a Blip Summary 
 
The rejection of the original narrative of Just a Blip by a great many actors ( in 
that many did not believe that prices would fall back to pre-2008 levels) indicates 
that, at the time, many believed that the dynamics of the  global food system had 
changed the landscape for UK food supply.  While not seen as likely, it was perceived 
by supply actors as a positive scenario for government in that it vindicates the 
underlying position of faith in markets (as adopted by  Labour at that time, but also 
by subsequent Governments to date) and their preferred policy positions of lower 
interventions in food production and supply. It also ensures that food bills are kept at 
an affordable level, thus circumventing potential social and welfare issues. Price 
volatility however was the number one concern for actors, and the inherent 
pressures this could put on profit margins. As this scenario reflected a situation not 
that different to the one before the food crisis in 2008, one of reducing prices and 
low investment in agri-food, actors were familiar with the risk and threats that this 
presented. In this sense, the risks identified here were known and well understood. It 
could be argued therefore that these risks could be extrapolated as their daily 
concerns affecting their own organisation and situations. 
5.3 Scenario 2: Food Inflation 
 
Food prices stay high for a protracted period. They contribute significantly to inflation, 
but the economy adapts and the existing food system copes.  Demand for food continues 
to grow in step with increases in world population.  Higher meat consumption in Asia and 
further bad weather and climate-related crop losses ensure that demand persistently outpaces 
production growth, albeit by a narrow margin.  
Oil prices stabilize at around $90–100 per barrel, high enough to maintain the push for bio-
fuels, and high gas prices and capacity constraints keep fertilizer costs high. The imperative to 
increase food production leads to widespread deployment of new technologies; these include 
a range of bio-technologies, and methods for improving the efficiency of water consumption 
and nitrogen application. Continuing efforts are made to reduce food waste in the system. 
Improvements in practices push up production but come at a price, with input costs rising 
overall. Production struggles to keep pace with demand and global grain stocks are not 
rebuilt.  
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Following the investments in new food production technology, the widely feared fundamental 
limit to global food production is avoided or at least delayed. The structure of the global food 
production system remains largely unchanged, but the new intensification adds to 
environmental pressures. 
In Europe, even as the supply of non-GM crops shrinks worldwide, consumers continue to 
resist imports of GM food and feed. EU policy requires reduced use of fertilizers and 
pesticides for environmental reasons, further adding to feed price pressure by constraining 
local output.  
Persistently high food prices contribute to the woes of a recession that hits developed 
countries along with high energy prices. High food prices add to pressure for wage increases 
in emerging markets, where expenditure on food represents a relatively large percentage of 
average income; this translates into higher export prices and contributes to inflation in 
developed markets.  
The world is ultimately judged to be experiencing a 15-year ‘long-wave’ upswing in commodity 
prices. The sustained high food prices, combined with the difficult economic conditions, cause 
a rise in the proportion of personal income spent on food, ending the previous long-run 
downward trend.  
Figure 5.2 Food Inflation narrative (Ambler-Edwards et al., 2009) 
5.3.1 Responses to Food Inflation 
 
In this scenario, actors expressed significant concern over the impact on the 
consumer and their ongoing ability to afford food stuffs. From the supply chain 
actors’ perspective, their concerns were based on the squeeze on consumer 
spending power. While Food Inflation offered an opportunity for higher profits, it 
was recognised that this came with a social impact on the consumer, particularly 
those in lower income groups.  The idea of a more polarized society, split between 
those who could afford higher value food and those who can’t, becomes more 
marked in this scenario as social inequalities become more exacerbated.  
‘socio-economic divide will widen and there will be a need to manage the 
problems which arise from a more fractured and polarized society. The poor 
suffer most – and as poverty is correlated with obesity so health is likely to 
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suffer too’ (comments made during the plenary session at the Dairy 
workshop) 
Price here for many consumers becomes the overriding purchasing criteria 
and this was thought to be at the expense of health and environmental values and 
concerns. Some favoured more intervention from government – in policies such as 
free school meals, food vouchers etc.   
‘.. need for greater social provision, free school meals etc’  Dairy supply chain 
actors 
There was also recognition that the widening of the divide between rich and 
poor had potential consequences for increased social dis-order including food riots. 
Actors saw a potential pinch point where continued price pressures, along with 
spates of panic buying, could tip this scenario into a crisis. The rise of black market 
trading also causes some concern particularly over food standards and associated 
food safety. 
‘[national government] .. will need to focus on economic stability and social 
justice ( avoid social unrest)’  Wheat supply chain actors 
A positive consequence of the need to keep costs down was the 
overwhelming recognition that levels of waste should be tackled across the whole of 
the supply chain and in the home; in effect to view waste as a resource. This scenario 
provides the financial incentive for better waste practices and more integration of 
waste businesses with producers, processors and even retailers. More availability of 
capital for investment could pave the way for more investment in anaerobic 
digesters and co-operation between producers and recycling/waste processing 
companies. 
‘farmers will look for cheaper alternatives for fertiliser. The waste industry has 
the opportunity to provide these’.  
‘There could be more strategic relationships between waste companies and 
larger agri-businesses or even retailers’  Dairy processors/producers 
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In fact for producers, this scenario was seen as a potentially advantageous 
position with higher food prices generating higher profits. This would incentivise 
farmers to produce more in the UK and actors from the dairy industry thought that 
this would create possibilities to increase milk output. If the pre-longed period of 
inflation coincided with the abolition of milk quotas in 2015 , then this was seen as a 
major opportunity to increase milk production and export more milk products both 
to the EU and globally. For the dairy industry, this was predominately viewed as a 
positive scenario, with the better, more efficient farmers able to capitalise and 
improve their gross margins. It could also have the effect in delaying the exit of some 
of the lower quartile farmers, perhaps perpetuating inefficient farms.    
Pressures remain however on inputs and again, the challenge for farmers will 
be to protect their gross margins. If input costs were excessively high in this scenario, 
actors saw this as a key factor for producers to create savings and efficiencies. The 
dairy industry was split on how this would manifest itself. Either this would result in a 
switch back to more grass based systems (extensive) or it could trigger a further 
intensification of dairy farming with more use of genetics to optimise inputs and an 
increased focus on conversion rates of inputs to outputs in terms of milk yield per 
cow.   
‘…increased seasonality of milk production [though switch to grass based 
systems] with less reliance on feed to achieve optimum yield’ Dairy supply 
actors 
‘more investment at farm level leading to more intensification. This will mean 
more herds are milked three times per day’ Dairy supply actors 
The continuation of the trend for intensification, driven by higher input 
prices, was also echoed by actors in the wheat sector. Actors also saw this as an 
opening for an acceptance of GM technology, based on fears over rising prices, to 
help optimise inputs and increase wheat yields. 
‘rising input costs will see more marginal land in production, higher 
intensification including the use of GM’ Wheat supply actors 
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In this scenario, it was felt that the cost of EU/UK agri-environmental schemes 
could increase. Due to pressures to keep costs low, mainly driven by retailers, then 
any further internalising of carbon or other environmental costs would be difficult to 
bear. 
Actors from the wheat sector had specific concerns over price volatility in this 
scenario and how this would impact gross margins; it was felt that rising input prices 
would be subject to higher levels of volatility. These concerns were often framed by a 
need to develop more risk management and financial products to help producers and 
grain traders manage price volatility (hedging etc.). Processers and millers here were 
expected to use more fixed price contracts to help smooth out volatility but at the 
potential expense of higher margins.  
‘there will be a need to better understand risk in order to lock in margins. The 
rage of products offered by companies to manage risk will become more of a 
priority’ Wheat sector actors (grain traders/processors) 
Higher selling prices and profit margins were seen as a driver for increased 
investment in the farm section, in terms of infra-structure, equipment, transport and 
particularly in technology. This was felt to be the catalyst for an expansion in UK food 
production, reversing the trend of the last couple of decades. Interestingly, while 
there was felt to be more money available to invest in R&D and new technologies, 
actors referred mainly to the use of existing technologies and practices (although 
with further leading edge development).  In this scenario, there was no sense of the 
need for new technologies. However, concerns were raised as to the current level of 
investment in UK based R&D (private and government) and the need for even more 
money to be invested in this area. From wheat supply actors, there was a call for 
research to be more directed towards increased productivity/efficiency and away 
from environmental sustainability impacts. 
‘There needs to be a strategic direction of R&D away from the environmental 
to productivity. There is no present funding for wheat breeding.  This is a 
must.  Either through private companies or INNES/NIAB venture’ Wheat 
producers 
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Here, the current trend for either the commoditisation of products – cheap 
produce in high volumes – or differentiated, branded products with higher margins 
continues and becomes more marked. In effect, the drive for more branded 
differentiation could increase as a vehicle to justify any higher prices to consumers. 
This was seen as a necessary strategy for processors, as while this is a potentially 
positive scenario for producers, it is the processors or manufacturers that seem 
particularly vulnerable. In these sectors, actors felt that they would feel the pressure 
from increased input costs but would be the least able to pass on costs further up 
the chain. To counteract this, actors saw this strategy of differentiation as key to gain 
more value added revenue and therefore margin. In conjunction, actors saw the 
need for increased marketing and advertising in order to convince the consumer of 
product value. This poses some difficulty for fresh milk which is in effect a 
commodity product. 
‘[farmers would need to be ].. lowest cost producer or would have to 
differentiate. They would need brand investment to justify increase in price 
(for differentiated strategies). Dairy processors 
However, higher costs of production and higher end prices were felt to 
exacerbate the threat from cheaper imports (for dairy).  The trend for consolidation 
in the dairy industry was expected to continue in this scenario, with processors 
forced to move to large-scale, centralised and efficient sites (i.e. disinvest older 
legacy sites); thus concentrating the dairy processing sector further. Threats from 
lower cost imports could even lead to the migration of processing facilities to 
cheaper, non-UK locations (Eastern Europe was mentioned specifically). Any 
migration of UK processing would signal a threat to the dairy production base as the 
associated supply base in the UK would become redundant.   
‘more migration of investment in dairy production and processing – to Eastern 
Europe. More dairy products sourced externally to UK/EU’ Dairy supply actors 
Actors did pose an alternative to this, where processors initiated more 
cooperation with producers. This could result in the use of more exclusive and 
stringent supply contracts between farmers and processors and the development of 
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more dedicated integrated supply chains. It could also trigger different ownership 
models, such as vertical integration in the dairy sector. Actors also pointed to a 
potential shift in power to processors and producers and away from retailers if 
supplies became tighter.  
‘There would be more direct relationships with farmers e.g. Tesco herds’ Dairy 
processors 
 
‘Could be a struggle to secure relationships with farmers and processors, with 
powerbase potentially shifting to the farm-end of supply chain’ Retail actors 
 
As a response, retailers could also look to lock in prices with more contractual 
agreements with processors and manufacturers. Retailers would look to the supply 
chain to absorb the increased costs to save passing them onto the consumer; this in 
turn would put more pressure on the supply chain to focus on cost savings and 
efficiencies. 
 
Actors in the wheat sector also identified collaboration as a key strategy in 
this scenario to help counter supply uncertainty and price volatility. However it is 
interesting to note that it was horizontal collaboration with processors, rather than 
vertical. Millers and producers spoke about increasing the co-ordination and 
collaboration within their own supply echelons to assure supply and to keep costs 
lower. This is perhaps because wheat supply chains are more fragmented and 
integrated chains are not the norm. It was recognised however that current 
competition laws would create a barrier to this.   
‘More cross-industry collaboration is needed, particularly to prevent any 
escalation in crisis. Current competition laws are a barrier to horizontal 
collaboration. There would need to be a lifting of current competition law 
restrictions, recognising this as for the public good.’ Wheat sector actors 
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‘Strategic relationships will need to become stronger, driven by both the 
uncertainty of supply and the need to reduce costs’ Wheat supply actors 
Strategies to re-formulate products in the dairy sector were also seen as key – 
i.e. using less concentration of milk in cheese or other processed products to reduce 
costs. This could also trigger an increased use of non-dairy alternatives if proven to 
be cheaper. Some actors also foresaw an increase in local foods in this scenario as a 
strategy to ensure supply and to create the necessary differentiation for dairy 
products.  
‘Lower concentration of milk in processed products – reformulation, e.g. 
cheese has 9.5 times milk input rather than 10 times) Dairy processors 
 
It was very much thought that, in this scenario, the price incentives would see 
an end to the need for CAP .i.e. no set-aside payments, no single farm payments. This 
theme of less government intervention in the farming sector was fairly consistent 
theme among actors in this scenario.  
‘Higher prices would provide the opportunity for politicians to pull back from 
CAP payments’ Wheat supply actors 
5.3.2 Food inflation summary 
 
In this scenario, businesses and farms continue to become bigger and more 
concentrated, there is more collaboration up and across the system with a sense of 
more integration and dependency. Producing more with less through streamlining of 
processes and the use of technology becomes the key theme. Many considered the 
new higher price points as ‘a rational place to be’ and ‘an acceptance of a new 
normality’. This gives the sense that many of the supply chain actors felt comfortable 
with this scenario. In effect, it was viewed by them as an extrapolation of the current 
position (in 2008) and was a natural consequence of the pressures on global food 
supply and therefore prices. In this scenario, the status quo continues with the same 
systems, practices and organisational structures, albeit at higher price points. Higher 
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prices were viewed as positive, and if higher input costs could be balanced, this 
provides an opportunity for the industry to improve margins and increase 
investment. The majority of risks lay therefore at the door of the consumer and the 
government, as food could become less affordable. In this sense, as with Just a Blip, 
the risks here were known already by actors – the balance between pressures on 
cost and prices – and it re-enforced their belief in the strategies  already employed 
across the food system as being those with the highest rate of success.  
5.4. Scenario 3: Into a New Era 
 
Input prices initially stay high as per capita production falls steadily.  In response, the 
system of food production is required to shift dramatically so that increased yields are 
delivered efficiently through ‘regenerative’ rather than purely ‘extractive’ uses of 
resources. Global oil production stays flat and begins to tighten. The view spreads that ‘peak 
oil’ has arrived. The oil price rises above $150 per barrel but is held in check by reductions in 
energy consumption and the widespread deployment of energy efficiency technologies. Oil 
prices sustained at a high level support a continuing emphasis on bio-fuel production.  
The effects of climate change become starkly obvious, with weather-related losses reaching 
higher levels every year. Developed countries agree on carbon pricing, and developing 
countries sign up over time. Many countries introduce water pricing in response to serious 
drought conditions. Tougher environmental limits on pesticides and fertilizers are introduced, 
and nitrogen pricing is debated.  
Food production per person is in decline, food shortages are more frequent and prices are 
climbing. Under these conditions, it becomes clear that food production is hitting fundamental 
long-term constraints. The media refer to this as ‘peak food.’ Social values and preferences 
shift decisively towards what are broadly viewed as ‘sustainable’ methods, and wherever 
there are affluent consumers, the demand for local, seasonal, increasingly vegetarian, fairly 
traded and organic food continues to rise. 
At the same time, high food prices permit investment in new agricultural technologies aimed at 
increasing production while addressing environmental issues -  soil degradation, water 
contamination, pest resistance, biodiversity loss and greenhouse gas emissions. Over a 
period of 10 years and beyond, a new eco-technological production approach emerges that 
includes: crop rotation, cover cropping, agro-forestry, ‘green’ fertilizers derived from 
agricultural and food waste, new varieties (that have resilient, pest-resistant,  nitrogen-fixing 
qualities), more efficient use of inputs through advanced information technology, and reduced 
water use.  
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The new approach has a smaller environmental footprint, fewer synthetic inputs, better health 
outcomes, and higher yields. It starts in pockets, co-existing with the old approach, and 
gradually takes hold as more farmers adopt the new methods. The old approach gives way 
and the international food industry and trading rules gradually restructure around the new 
production paradigm, lifting the environmental and production constraints of the old system. 
Per capita food production rises as the new approach spreads and food prices finally begin to 
fall. 
Figure 5.3  Into A New Era Scenario Narrative (Ambler-Edwards et al., 2009) 
 
5.4.1 Responses to Into a New Era 
 
Food system actors found this scenario particularly challenging. They found it 
difficult to buy into the circumstances and triggers which would see a wholesale 
change in the systems, structure and behaviours described in this scenario. The only 
plausible trigger, from the supply actors’ perspective, was a significant shift in 
consumer behaviour; towards more environmentally conscious consumption and a 
radical change in priorities. This was felt to require a radical step-change in 
understanding by consumers of the environmental impact of food production. They 
felt change would not be initiated by government or from within the supply chain but 
could only be driven by consumer behaviour. 
‘Forces for change in the New Era would need to come from the consumer 
rather than from within the supply chain’ Dairy processors 
Actors’ struggled with the concept of a wholesale move away from current 
production technologies and processes. They often interpreted the new eco-
technological production methods as organic systems, which they saw as limiting 
food production volumes. The consumers’ behavioural switch would have to include 
the consumption of less meat and livestock products – these in turn become luxury 
items – along with an overall reduction in the level of food consumed in order for this 
scenario to be viable. 
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‘Organic [systems] won’t bear out in the long term due to environmental 
concerns. It is more expensive to produce and there are limitations on what 
you can produce and how much….. There would need to be a  75% reduction 
in livestock production but actually can’t see how we would get there’ Dairy 
supply actors 
‘Dairy and meat product become luxury items with more moves to vegetarian 
diets’ Dairy processors 
It was very difficult for supply system actors to envisage what would bring 
such a change in consumer purchasing patterns, although any adverse change in 
climate and associated climate change concerns was seen as the most likely trigger. 
Actors recognised that there would be a significant power shift to the consumer in 
this scenario, away from the supply chain, which would alter the dynamics in the 
whole food system. 
Any movement from the consumer base in this direction could have the 
effect of opening more opportunities for government to put through more 
environmentally led regulation, thus enforcing more sustainable behaviours from the 
supply chain. The media was identified as a powerful mechanism to help support this 
change. If this was harnessed to broadcast a unified message on the environmental 
impacts of food production then this, in conjunction with government action, would 
also provide the platform for consumer behavioural change.  
‘Demand will also need to be addressed. Government will need to implement 
consistent and well thought out policies to reduce consumption’ Dairy supply 
chain actors 
 
Actors saw this scenario triggering a reversal in the trend for intensification. 
For dairy, this would see a move back towards traditional grass fed systems, creating 
more seasonality in milk supply. This would have the effect of lower yields and a 
reduction in milk production. For wheat supply, actors saw the environmental 
measures as constraints, lowering yields and therefore constricting production. 
There was a particular concern over the potential spread of organic farming for 
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wheat production; actors here strongly felt that this would signal a radical reduction 
in yields and therefore output. 
‘Yields will go down. While yields have not decreased with current 
environmental changes, there are questions over how yields could increase in 
this future state’ Wheat producers 
 
Climate change was also seen as impacting the ability of UK farming to 
produce. In this scenario more adverse weather conditions would act to reduce both 
milk and wheat yields and output.  
As opposed to food inflation, higher input costs here were viewed more 
negatively and were seen as a disincentive for investment in agriculture. This, in 
combination with climate change, was seen as a driver for a contraction in UK 
farming and a reduction in food volumes produced. Both this contraction and the 
instigation of choice editing to improve the environmental impact of food would 
reduce the level of choice for consumers. 
‘There will be choice editing of the range of product available so that 
ultimately all consumers eat food of a certain minimum environmental 
standard’ Dairy supply chain actors 
‘Less food choice, less processed food and less protein available’ Wheat supply 
chain actors 
 
This sees the responsibility for the environmental standards of products pass 
to the retailers from the consumers, where retailers become the custodians for the 
supply chain and enforce higher environmental standards. 
Once the retailers take ownership of environmental standards (as demanded 
initially by the consumer), the standards are written into contracts [with 
suppliers] Dairy supply chain actors 
A role for government is also identified here, that of developing more 
legislation to force more transparency of environmental standards through 
130 
 
mechanisms such as product labelling etc. These actions are seen by actors as a 
consequence of both consumer preference and the retailers’ response to this 
demand. In this sense, government is viewed as a follower in this particular scenario 
rather than as a leader. 
For actors, this scenario presented the possibility of supply restrictions; either 
through a reduction in food production volume in the UK or through reduced 
availability of food imports. This again led to comments on the need for supply chain 
actors to enter into longer term contracts; to secure supply from a processor 
perspective and to counter volatility from a producer perspective. Interestingly, this 
scenario was seen as key driver for greater integration in the wheat supply chain. 
‘Less reliability of crop e.g. yields, output, availability of inputs and volatile 
prices. Producers will look to enter into long term partnerships with processors 
who want to ensure supply’ Wheat processors and producers 
 
There were positives to this scenario. Actors envisaged a rise in quality 
standards and environmental credentials of products. This included higher levels of 
traceability, better understanding of carbon emissions and water usage plus 
improved animal welfare standards. From a supply chain perspective, these higher 
levels would become standard entry requirements for suppliers in order to compete 
for retailer contracts. 
All actors would then adhere to ‘chain of custody’ fulfilling a responsibility to 
meet carbon, water and other environmental criteria’.  Wheat product 
manufacturers/retailers 
This opens the door therefore for competition based on sustainable and 
environmental credentials rather than just price.  
‘This would be a new area for competition – “The Green Competitive Edge”. 
Major companies would develop a strategy to be early exploiters of the 
opportunity to respond to the New Era and take market share from laggards.’ 
Dairy manufacturers/retailers 
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This would require significant innovation and development of new products 
to both deliver more differentiation but also to meet the new standards and create 
competitive advantage. This would also signal a shift in marketing strategies to 
emphasise environmental benefits. Again, whether capital would be available to 
allow this investment in innovation and rebranding was hotly debated.   
To achieve these higher environmental standards, actors looked to 
technology and process innovation as the principle mechanisms. It was thought there 
would need to be a significant leap in current technology to generate both cleaner 
energy but also to lower the environmental impact of farming i.e. reduction in 
carbon emissions, better resource utilisation. 
‘This would require large scale investment in technologies, particularly 
methane control – a quantum leap in technology’ Dairy sector actors 
This investment to drive innovation was seen as a major sticking point. Higher 
prices could provide some increase in the level of innovation but to generate the 
step change needed, it was felt that the investment needed to come from 
government due to the scale and level of change needed. Clean energy, which didn’t 
put extra demand on land usage (i.e. not second generation bio-fuels) was seen as a 
particular problem that would need to be solved before higher environmental 
standards could be achieved. The success, or failure, to develop technologies is seen 
by actors as absolutely vital in this scenario. This was not seen solely as a UK 
challenge and it was recognised that there was need for global co-operation to help 
share possible innovation and technologies. Again this points to a significant role for 
government to help facilitate this collaboration.  
Actors foresaw competition between different strands of technology and 
practices e.g. green fertilisers vs GM.  However, the majority of actors looked to the 
concept of ‘sustainable intensification’ as the solution to the problem rather than 
other production systems or technologies such as organics.  Sustainable 
intensification was articulated as the efficient use of inputs, using fewer resources 
such as land, water, fertiliser to produce more; e.g. higher yielding crops.  There 
were also actors within the wheat sector who saw this as a potential window for the 
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acceptance of GM, when viewed in the light of its potential to develop breeds which 
use fewer resources (e.g. water). 
‘Technologies are needed to allow effective waste conversion to N, P, K 
(fertiliser). 1% productivity per year [for wheat] and is now tailing off – 
incremental change won’t do it.  GM is a must but it will take 7 years to come 
through’ Wheat producers 
‘More intensive and environmentally friendly production methods and 
technology needs to be available to increase yields and reduce environmental 
impact’ Wheat supply actors 
 
If technologies fail and food production goes local, then economic growth will 
fall along with employment in the food sector. If new technologies take off, 
then this will mean economic growth. 
 
Actors saw the heightened concern over environmental impacts, along with 
more regional production, as prompting a move away from centralised supply 
systems to more regional or locally based facilities, driven in part by higher 
transportation costs and consumer preferences. Retailers could also trigger a switch 
to increased local (UK) and regional sourcing. This however presented a challenge for 
current supply chain structures with inbuilt investment in consolidated, centralised 
processing facilities and distribution networks.  
‘… a shift to more regional processing than centrally based assets’  Dairy 
processors 
 
‘There is an opportunity for retailers to reinvent themselves. This may mean 
developing local, independent, self-managing stores with locally sourced 
products etc.’ Retail and food manufacturing actors 
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5.4.2 Into a New Era Summary 
 
Into a New Era presented the greatest challenge for actors. Many struggled to 
buy-in to the wholesale change to the system of supply and demand towards a more 
environmentally sustainable one. While the risks associated with climate change 
were acknowledged, they rejected a revolutionary shift in consumer thinking as 
being plausible. This scenario challenged their thinking in terms of how food is 
produced; they could not accept that environmental production systems would be 
able to increase yields and allow for sufficient food production and therefore 
rejected their viability. Instead, they interpreted the imperative to reduce the 
environmental footprint of the system through the lens of current practices and 
structure – sustainable intensification. This dissonance indicates that in effect this 
scenario presents a significant threat to the status quo of the supply network 
structure.  
5.5. Scenario 4: Food in Crisis 
Multiple shocks disrupt food production and supply. Prices skyrocket as stocks 
plummet, triggering food shortages, famine and civil panic. Two serious global 
disturbances hit agriculture in short order: the rapid spread of crop/ animal disease, and 
sharply worsening water shortages. These come on top of new geopolitical disruptions that 
affect energy supply. There are also continuing problems in financial markets. The oil price 
surges to record levels, well above $200. The increase puts significant pressure on food input 
costs, and food prices are driven even higher by financial speculation. Very high gas prices 
discourage inorganic fertilizer use, further tightening the food and feed supply situation.  
Grain stocks are run down to new lows around the world in an effort to sidestep high prices, 
merely delaying the unavoidable impact of contracting supply. A succession of extreme 
weather events then reduces world harvests to well below the already lowered levels, and 
stocks are not rebuilt. Prices skyrocket as the true supply situation becomes apparent.  
Sudden and extreme food price rises prompt many more governments to introduce price 
controls, subsidies and export bans which further worsen the overall supply situation. Farmers 
are penalized by not being allowed to benefit from the high prices and food is taken off the 
world market. Other countries, particularly China, scramble to tie up bilateral food supply 
deals. In many parts of the world farming is seriously disrupted, further exacerbating the 
overall supply position.  
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Serious food shortages develop which cause universal public shock and growing political 
panic. Severe famines, for which no food aid is available, occur in the poorest and least 
resilient regions. The shortages trigger serious civil disruptions and outbreaks of conflict. 
Directly and indirectly the food shortfalls cause millions of deaths, mostly in the developing 
world.  
There is turmoil in the food industry, with some firms making vast windfall profits and others 
going to the wall. New policies enacted on an emergency basis have their own unintended 
consequences. A completely untested set of supply arrangements is forged in crisis mode. 
The struggle, even in the developed world, is to keep people fed, disregarding where 
necessary any ideas of consumer choice.  
Figure 5.4 Food In Crisis Narrative (Ambler-Edwards et al., 2009) 
 
5.5.1 Responses to Food in Crisis 
 
Supply chain actors viewed a food crisis in the UK as highly plausible. This was 
envisaged as triggered by external shock-based events; specific concerns were 
founded around the threats of climate-change led extreme weather events, or 
outbreaks of animal or crop diseases. However, participants also raised the 
possibility that a sustained period of high inflation could itself create a crisis situation 
(as highlighted in Food Inflation); one in which the supply chain is unable to continue 
to absorb inflationary pressures and food prices start to go into free rise. This 
coupled with very high energy prices and more acute global food shortages would 
create a crisis situation without any external ‘shock’. 
‘Climate change should be seen as a key driver of potential disruption. Climate 
has the greatest potential to create chaos and widespread uncertainty.’ Dairy 
Supply actors 
Other events which could exacerbate and further tip a situation into crisis 
were geo-political unilateral actions such as the imposition of export bans, reducing 
the amount of food available on the open market. This would drive increased global 
competition for resources and food. Power would increasingly reside in major food 
exporting countries and it was felt that the UK may find it increasingly difficult to 
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access some markets in this scenario. This tapped into fears over how the UK may 
already be losing out in the global market to the political force of countries such as 
China. 
‘expect to see tougher controls on imports/exports’ Wheat producers 
‘UK is potentially being out- manoeuvred by China through her use of bi-
lateral agreements. The WTO is likely not to have influence in the future and 
the UK needs to look towards bi-lateral agreements.’ Wheat supply actors 
 
Wheat supply actors were fairly confident in the face of crop disease; it was 
not envisaged that there would be a complete devastation of wheat crops across the 
board. However, even a contained outbreak would lead to drops in yields and 
therefore volumes produced, thus creating the potential for food shortages and the 
need to rely more on global markets. For the dairy sector, a widespread outbreak of 
disease (such as blue tongue or Foot and Mouth) would create a real problem for the 
industry, particularly if the disease wasn’t able to be contained.  Any significant herd 
loss would result in a mass exodus of farmers, either unable to access cash to buy 
replacement herds, or due to the shortage of replacements. The lead time to re-build 
herds can be up to 2.5 years, so any loss would be devastating for the sector. This 
reduction in herd size would severely reduce the availability of UK milk.  
‘Longer period of regeneration of dairy herd after disease. The cost of 
replacements will preclude many (in the event of cull/disease hitting stocks)’ 
Dairy producers 
‘Investment in capital declines or is diverted to regenerating the herds’ Dairy 
producers 
‘There will be a fall in wheat yield. If there are no crops then dairy would need 
to switch to grass based systems’. Wheat producers 
In an inflationary driven crisis, farming output may also fall temporarily due to 
acute costs of inputs and inability of farmers to manage the necessary increased cash 
flow requirements. Producers, to survive, would be forced to reduce the level of 
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inputs, particularly fertilizer, which may then have the knock-on effect of lower 
yields.   
‘Credit would become a key priority – it could even become as extreme as cash 
on delivery’ Wheat grain traders 
Also required would be increased labour to support production. This threat 
tapped into the issue currently facing the farming sector, that of the availability of 
unskilled labour. A food crisis which triggered even tighter immigration controls 
would severely restrict the unskilled labour pool available to the farming sector – this 
indicates the level to which the sector is reliant on low cost migrant labour. 
‘Reduced immigration and barriers to entry (as UK struggles to feed itself)  but 
in return there will be greater need for agricultural labour’. Dairy supply chain 
actors 
Actors envisaged an escalation of the crisis, where driven by higher food 
prices and threat of food shortages, panic buying is triggered as consumers look to 
stock-pile food. Driven by the very high prices, consumers would be triggered into 
lower levels of consumption. It is likely that there would be a reduction in the 
consumption of livestock products, particularly meat, and a focus on more basic, less 
processed foods along with foods perceived as ‘safe’. The ability to access food 
would become the overwhelming concern, with other values such as environmental, 
ethics and welfare becoming insignificant.  
‘There will be less concern for animal welfare and food safety. Food will 
become a utility’ Dairy supply chain actors 
Consumers could start to find their own solutions to the mounting food crisis, 
such as growing your own etc. Informal supply chains, including a rise in black market 
and ‘fake’ foods, would start to be more commonplace. This poses increased threats 
to food security and public health. 
‘There may be a move away from brands, and a loosening of quality 
standards’ Wheat processors 
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Overwhelmingly, supply actors saw the main priority for retailers and 
manufacturers as securing supplies. Protectionism would be commonplace, with the 
stockpiling of ingredients (milk and wheat) or other inputs. The management of any 
crisis would likely fall to these sectors first and the success or failure of their 
businesses will be highly dependent on their ability to secure supplies and the 
strength of their trading partnerships.  
 
 ‘Mills may buy and hold grain stocks (in effect hoard grain stocks). This may 
exacerbate the situation’ Wheat processors 
 ‘Processors need farmers and vice-versa. A crisis would bring inter-
relationship to the fore with more collaboration but also more 
mergers/acquisitions’ Dairy supply chain actors 
First responses are likely to look to protect the ongoing viability of individual 
businesses. Cash and access to credit will be crucial to securing supplies. In case of 
prolonged crisis and shortages, product ranges would be severely rationalized, with a 
focus on basic, staple foods with less processing needs.  This presents a particular 
challenge for processors; as plant loading falls, it becomes even more difficult to 
cover processing costs.  Shortages in raw materials would lead to widespread 
product reformulation, potentially with lower quality ingredients. For those UK 
processors able to continue with production, this signals a major opportunity to raise 
prices (probably through bidding wars and selling to highest bidder) and generate 
significant profits; profiteering here was highlighted as a major risk. Actors also 
identified that power base would shift back to producers who would have more 
influence on the supply system and therefore more capability to negotiate on price. 
‘Security of supply will be the priority. May need to manage ‘bidding wars’ to 
secure milk supplies. Longer term contracts will be encouraged but could see 
processing capacity running at 50% due to low milk availability’ Dairy 
processors 
‘Processors will switch to liquid milk and run down cheese stocks. Product 
ranges will reduce -reduction in complexity’ Dairy Processors 
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Retailers would also have to look to rationalize product offerings, with a focus 
more on basic food stuffs. Again the strength of relationships would determine their 
ability to access supplies. 
‘There will be less brands and more commoditization of products. May see 
more vertical integration of supply chain to ensure supply and survival’ 
Retailers 
This scenario brought tensions between supply actors into sharp relief. While 
actors recognised that a crisis situation would need greater integration and 
collaboration between supply actors, this still remains a significant issue for the 
supply network as a whole. 
‘There is some disconnect in the supply chain i.e. no real appreciation of the 
potential issues facing the food system. Supply chains need to understand 
these issues better to be able to respond. The major industry players 
(manufacturers and retailers) should drive collaboration and more integrated 
supply chains.' Dairy supply actors 
Contraction of the global market and even some difficulty in obtaining EU imports 
would change the emphasis towards UK sourcing. For wheat, there is greater reliance 
on the global market with 42% of imports originating outside of the EU, of which 31% 
from Canada is imported specifically for bread- making purposes (although this only 
accounts for around 4% of total wheat consumption in the UK). This contraction and 
any restrictions in transport fuel or consumer mobility, would present some 
challenges. One of the key questions raised by actors was how could a system of 
centralised assets move to a more regionally or locally based supply model - a similar 
question to that posed in Into a New Era. This would demand a high level of flexibility 
of processing capacity, logistics and distribution. Those supply chains with this level 
of flexibility could command significant competitive advantage in this type of 
situation. There may already be some level of ‘natural’ advantage already built into 
some systems based on the location of plants and assets. (i.e. multiple processing 
plants regionally placed rather than centralised plants or smaller, local more direct 
supply chains). This also highlighted the concern that there is over-capacity in the 
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processing and producer sectors for both wheat and dairy, restricting current profit 
opportunities. Some actors therefore saw the crisis as an opportunity for the sectors 
to re-size to more profitable levels. The operation of multi-national logistics systems 
would be difficult in this scenario and some thought that multi-national companies 
could suffer as they may be less likely to adapt to more locally based systems.  
‘There is the potential for smaller operators to be more successful’ Dairy 
processors 
The crisis could create a new equilibrium and a smaller and more profitable 
industry’ Dairy supply chain actors 
‘The model of multinational food manufacturing, in terms of global sourcing 
and location of processing, fails in a prolonged crisis’  Food manufacturers 
 
Supply chain actors expected the government to be forced to step in, 
particularly where there were any growing concerns over civil unrest and food 
shortages. However there was significant split between actors as to where and when 
the government should intervene, or not. There was an expectation that the 
government should step in to help increase UK production, especially to negotiate 
with the EU to allow some relaxation of environmental restrictions and some food 
standards. Other interventions identified were the relaxation of competition laws to 
allow increased collaboration, controls necessary to contain disease spread and the 
establishment of an emergency cash fund for farmers etc. In the face of an escalating 
or continued crisis, the initial response by government is to turn to the major 
retailers and manufacturers to help manage the supply chain. However, actors were 
particularly nervous about any temptation the government would have to take direct 
control for the supply chain or to implement rationing and/or price controls. It was 
felt that if responses are not well thought out or well-coordinated across the supply 
network as a whole, the crisis could escalate and government would end up forced to 
intervene with even more draconian measures.  
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‘Government would be tempted to intervene – which would be a disaster. 
There is a whole scale of things that they could do – e.g. competition laws, 
suspend planning laws related to food production’ Wheat supply actors 
Both sets of actors, wheat and dairy, implied that the level of understanding 
by government as to how supply chains operate is poor. This was thought a 
significant problem if the government were tempted to take control of the supply in 
a crisis situation. 
‘The government needs to understand how supply chains actually operate in 
order to develop effective policies’ Dairy supply actors 
Wheat actors in particular were nervous about the imposition of price 
controls, this was felt to limit the ability of the industry to grow and potentially 
compete in the future. 
‘A price controlled market would lead to a contraction of trading and a 
stagnation of the industry through the removal of competition’ Grain traders 
 
Again the importance of investment in R&D was a key theme with a need for 
technical innovation to help increase food production in the UK. Again the themes 
here were strongly around the use of bio-engineering, although not just GM. This 
again highlighted concerns over the lack of innovation and technological 
development in food production, particularly in the public sector. There was also a 
need to find mechanisms to speed up the translation of technology to practical 
applications and to facilitate the adoption of this technology across farms and supply 
chains. 
‘Government need to recognise that huge investment in R&D is needed. There 
has to be a clear agenda, focusing on the specific problems highlighted in the 
scenarios. Government needs to provide the incentives for long term 
investment and recognise its role as both an incubator and facilitator of R&D.’  
Wheat supply actors 
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5.5.2 Food in Crisis Summary 
 
This scenario revealed the core threats and concerns of wheat and dairy 
supply actors. In one sense it created a situation in which some of the existing 
structural difficulties in the system were exacerbated. These included the poor 
relationships across supply chains, lack of integrated chains (for wheat), over-
capacity and the capital tied into large scale, centralised assets. It also underlined the 
threats faced by the system; the vulnerability of crops and animals to disease and 
climate change, the reliance on imports especially for agricultural inputs, the need 
for free flow of cash and capital and access to technologies. 
The need for more partnership approaches is evident in this scenario, both 
within supply chain but also for government. Actors identified that supply 
relationships would be severely tested in this scenario. Those who have already 
established stronger relationships, based on trust, would potentially stand a better 
chance of surviving and potentially thriving in this scenario (if supplies could be 
secured).  This scenario also severely tests the structural assumptions currently in 
play. 
5.3 Conclusions 
The use of the scenarios prompted actors to think more systemically about 
the nature of the risks facing the UK food system. They revealed a risk profile which 
alters for each scenario – summarised in table 5.1. While these profiles differ by 
scenario, there are repeating themes; that of 
- Risks to profit margins 
- Cost pressures (from various sources) 
- Lack of R+D investment 
- Lack of capital and lack of investment funds in the food system 
- Scarcity of supplies/inputs and resultant power shifts 
- Nature of supply chain relationships 
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These risks are explored further in the next chapter. Overall, they were seen 
to exacerbate the issues that the actors were grappling with, in the context of the 
food system at that time. Three of the scenarios – Just a Blip, Food Inflation and even 
Food in Crisis, were in effect interpreted as extrapolations of the current issues 
within the food system while Into a New Era presented a completely new landscape. 
The risks articulated seem to suggest a level of myopia in mainstream food actors in 
terms of their perception of the environmental threat in comparison to those given 
by actors as part of the general interviews. The rejection of the Into a New Era 
scenario suggests that, in fact, this posed the largest risk for actors, in that they could 
not conceive of a wholesale change in how production and supply are organised. This 
suggests a level of fear in mainstream actors of such a systemic change. It highlighted 
the divide between those who believe the current system to be environmentally 
unsustainable – which came out more strongly on the general interviews – and those 
mainstream supply chain actors who buy into the current structure, albeit with more 
intensive practices. 
The workshops revealed systemic issues with the current food supply system 
– inter-firm relationships, the flexibility of the current structure, the tied-in nature of 
investment and assets, power profile, the balancing act between rising costs and the 
need to provide affordable food. Evidence here suggests that risk is also based on a 
number of factors including:- 
- The context 
- The combination of risk 
- The position of each actor in the food system 
 
Other factors also emerge from the interview evidence and suggest that there 
is an interplay between these risks and the severity of their impact on the food 
system. This starts to build a more complex interpretation of risk and vulnerability 
which is explored in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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Figure 5.1 : Risk profile by scenario 
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Chapter Six: Conceptualisations of Risk 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter discussed the types of risks articulated by mainstream 
food actors in response to the four CH scenarios. This chapter builds on these themes 
and explores further the concepts of risk, combing all the data from the interviews 
and scenario workshops. It specifically addresses the first research question:-  
RQ 1: How do actors conceptualise risk and vulnerability within the UK food system 
It does this by both presenting further primary evidence, from the supply 
chain specific interviews, and the results of analysis across all the data sets (all 
interviews and workshops). As discussed in the methodology chapter, the research 
was guided by a grounded, inductive approach and therefore no prior framework 
was imposed on the analysis. The analysis here was formed through the 
development of level 2 codes (in the dis-assembly phase as discussed in chapter 3). 
While the data revealed a complex interrelationship between risk and vulnerability, 
risk emerged as separate phenomena on its own, but at a lower level of conception. 
This chapter therefore primarily deals with these concepts. 
The supply chain specific interviews are presented here as these asked direct 
questions as to what actors in the wheat and dairy supply chains thought were the 
largest threats and vulnerabilities. These interviews were outside the context of the 
scenarios and therefore reflected the concerns that each actor had about threats 
affecting their own organisation and the industry sector within which they operated. 
The data here helped to both confirm and add evidence to the key themes emerging 
from the scenarios, it also emphasised any differences in how actors perceived risks 
relevant to their own situation or position within the supply chain.  
Due to the richness of the data, the key themes presented here are those 
related to risks and threats, while other themes, which were judged to be common 
factors or influencers on the severity of the impact and outcome of risk (i.e. 
vulnerability) are presented in the next chapter on vulnerability. 
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In line with the theory building approach, the analysis progressed to 
understanding risk at a more conceptual level. This chapter presents this analysis. 
The structure of the chapter is in four sections :- 
 Section one : Findings from the supply chain specific interviews, pertinent to risks 
and threats 
 Section two: A summary of key threats as conceptualised by each sector and groups 
of actors 
 Section three: The categories of risks that emerged from the combined data set 
 Section four :  How the risks interlink 
 
6.2 Supply Chain Actors’ perceptions of risk 
 
This section presents the data from the supply network specific interviews, 
highlighting areas which either confirmed or differed from the data gathered at the 
scenario workshops. In some cases, there was some change of emphasis from the 
scenario workshops, in that actors spoke more specifically about threats and risks 
facing their own organisations rather than their sectors as a whole. The key themes 
which arise and are dealt with in this section are:- 
- Core dependencies for organisations 
- Competitiveness of the UK food sector 
- Value adding products and higher margins 
- Regulation and sustainability 
- Power and supply relationships 
  
6.2.1 Core dependencies 
 
A range of core dependencies, which were perceived as potential threats, 
emerged as key themes for both dairy and wheat producers. Their reliance on 
fertiliser, oil and, in the case of dairy, animal feed meant that they are vulnerable to 
either inflationary pressures or any restrictions on supply. Even more significant, is 
the dependency on weather conditions; this was highlighted as a key contributor of 
cost (or of efficiency). The weather, and its relative variability, is judged as significant 
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for both wheat and dairy production, underlying the natural aspect of food product 
and its reliance on environmental factors. 
 
‘Weather is the single biggest influence on profitability – it’s crucial that we 
grow our own food to feed the herd’. Dairy farmer 
A further dependency highlighted was that of labour; both in terms of 
available workforce but also in terms of skills and capabilities. While the need for 
manual labour on farms has decreased, many farms and processors rely on sources 
of low cost labour, usually relying on immigrants from Eastern Europe. While the lack 
of labour and skills was highlighted as a threat in response to ‘Food in Crisis’, the 
interviews reflected the widespread concern about the current situation. Actors also 
expressed concern over the skills and capability of farmers and farm managers; they 
felt that both farms and processors needed more business-based competencies and 
skills (including IT skills) in order to compete. The risk here is therefore the lack of 
availability of this skilled resource. 
‘The biggest constraint is skilled labour. While casual labour for menial tasks is 
not so much of a problem to get hold of, farm managers need to be more 
skilled – have to be good business people as well being able to manage the 
herd. These people come at a price and it is challenging to get the right people 
(their skills are transferable so highly competitive)‘ Farmers representative 
The interdependencies between the location of farming and the associated 
processing facilities (dairies/mills) also emerged as a stronger theme here. 
Historically, processing facilities were established close to the source of their raw 
materials.  If processing facilities were to migrate outside of the UK, due to 
globalisation trends or for cost competitive reasons, then actors believed this 
threatened the associated UK supply base (i.e. it would also tend to migrate). 
 
‘UK may become very competitive in wheat but if the price of other 
ingredients is high or not as available here in the UK, then the food may not 
be processed or prepared here. i.e. take biscuits for example - if sugar/fats are  
147 
 
cheaper elsewhere, then may make the decision to make them where they can 
be cheaply sourced along with wheat e.g. Ukraine.’  Wheat trade association 
representative 
 
A common dependency which affected producers and processors alike was 
the ability of organisations to be able to raise capital to fund investment and access 
cash to sustain growth. There were concerns over the future availability of funding in 
the food system, particularly in light of the banking crisis [which was just unfolding at 
the time of the interviews].  
‘Processing assets need investment [in order to remain competitive] and at 
the moment there is no money for this’. UK retailer 
The ability of firms to maintain cash flow was a serious concern, particularly 
for the farm base. Producers rely on maintaining cash flow to fund the purchase of 
inputs. There is therefore a reliance on their customers to ensure that payments are 
made on time. 
A number of actors spoke about the importance of the UK’s transport 
infrastructure. This emerged as an issue for processors and retailers as they have to 
think more broadly about their ability to supply their facilities, customers and 
markets. 
 
‘But with existing infrastructure built in part around the UK’s historic role as a 
wheat exporter, the UK’s capacity to handle higher levels of grain imports is in 
doubt. In terms of dockside infrastructure, we are already hitting the 
boundaries of what we can handle.’  Grain trader 
6.2.2 Competiveness of the UK food sectors 
 
Competitiveness of the UK food network emerged as a very strong theme. 
Many of the risks and threats articulated by actors were related to their ability to 
compete. A key threat was that of cheaper imports, either from within the EU or 
from global sources and whether the different food sectors would be able to 
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compete i.e. the relative competitiveness of each of the food sectors. At the time, 
the relative competitiveness of dairy was more of a concern than for wheat. 
 
‘As this market [dairy] is going to become more international, decided [as a 
company strategy] that the UK would not be competitive in this market for the 
next 10 years. There are more competitive places to make commodity cheese 
– Ireland for example, as government supports farming more and the weather 
allows cheaper farming systems.’ Dairy processor 
This reflects serious concern over the balance of UK production versus 
imports in the future, both for wheat and for dairy. Further contraction in the 
number of dairy producers was seen as inevitable, due to over-supply and threats 
from cheaper imports. However, there were musings as to what would happen if this 
trend continued over the long term.  
 
‘Fall in producers ( 6.5% per annum) will continue for next 3-4 years. Farmers 
could lose confidence in industry and continue to leave industry – this could 
create a loss of critical mass. For example if we lost 4 billion litres of milk, this 
would be very difficult to recover from.’ Dairy producer 
The issue of production costs relative to the global market was also 
highlighted by wheat actors. 
‘UK is relatively high input/high output cost producer – but not the worst 
globally. The question is whether this is sustainable. UK may become very 
competitive in wheat but if the price of other ingredients is high or not as 
available here in the UK, then the food may not be processed or prepared 
here, take biscuits for example’ Wheat processor 
Supply actors saw the level of efficiencies within each sector, and across the 
supply chain, as a measure of their competiveness. From the producers’ perspective, 
this equated to an increase in intensification and higher yields – both for wheat and 
for dairy.  Here, the access to technology and the availability of technology were 
perceived as barriers to development of more efficient production systems. 
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‘Can’t take advantage of latest technology as there are no incentives in the 
UK. The EU allows more farmer access to technology’. Dairy producer 
‘Lack of investment in R&D into production techniques. R&D seems to be 
focused on protecting environment/wildlife’. Wheat producer 
Over-capacity in the UK processing sectors was seen as a threat to higher 
prices, driving down prices and therefore affecting profitability and the 
competitiveness of the sectors. It is interesting to note that this excess capacity or 
‘redundancy’ was perceived as a vulnerability, in that it added cost rather helped to 
absorb risk.  
‘there is too much production capacity in the UK. Most dairies are designed to 
operate at full capacity – there is therefore an incentive to fill facilities. The 
fight to retain milk volume has kept prices down’ Dairy processor 
 ‘A small amount of over capacity has a big impact on margins so achieving 
that balance is key’. Wheat processor  
6.2.3 Value-adding products and higher margins 
 
From a processing and retail perspective, there was a sense that the counter 
to low milk prices in the dairy sector was to innovate more and create higher added-
value, branded products. This would help to differentiate UK dairy products and 
generate higher margins than for commodity products. A historical lack of innovation 
with the dairy industry was seen as a threat to the future ability of the industry to 
compete and gain market share from imported products.   
‘Yoghurt demand has grown overall but yoghurt manufacturing in the UK has 
declined. UK industry missed out as it did not focus on value add products’. 
Dairy producer representative 
This is real issue for liquid milk which is viewed in the market as a commodity 
product, often where the retail price is lower than the cost of production.  
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‘Consumer’s perception of milk is as a poor man’s drink ( if you compare it to 
mineral water) – e.g. Asda has just dropped the price of milk again’ Dairy 
processor 
The issue seemed less important to wheat producers as there are no 
opportunities for them to process their own products. They also have access to the 
wider UK and global wheat markets and therefore the capability to bargain for higher 
prices.  As for processors, the pressure to innovate is not as acute in this sector – due 
to higher margins – but there was still recognition that differentiation and product 
innovation are mechanisms to generate higher profits. 
‘Increasing gap between commodity products and bespoke products. 
Previously flour for biscuits was seen as a commodity so the market was very 
competitive. This is why this business is very suited to internet auctions, based 
on lowest price. A lot of the market is still like this but there has been some 
move towards specialist flours’. Wheat processor 
6.2.4 Regulation and sustainability 
 
While environmental issues were seen as a significant threat by actors in the 
general interviews (as shown in Chapter Four), supply chain actors saw political 
intervention to implement tighter environmental regulation as an even larger threat 
(than that of the need to be sustainable).  
‘Farming is now not just about farming for food , it is also about farming for 
the environment ( i.e. land specifically left fallow for environment). It may be 
that pressures on land globally mean that the ‘environmental’ land goes back 
to growing food’ Wheat producer 
Supply chain actors had serious concerns over the trajectory of food and 
farming regulations potentially acting as constraints to both the wheat and dairy 
sectors; both in terms of the volume produced but also the associated cost burden. 
Wheat actors expressed alarm at regulations to restrict the application of certain 
fertilisers [since 2008, regulation to restrict the family of fertilisers known as 
neonicotinoids has been passed].  
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‘Range of crop protection products available. EU regulations are reducing this. 
There are problems with resistance to some insecticides and herbicides, this is 
a big issue for the industry. As regulations come in, they narrow the chemical 
range, this increases the costs dramatically. There is newer chemistry 
available, but much of this is closely licensed by the manufacturer so this 
means higher prices. This will be a significant cost driver’. Wheat producer 
 
It is not just agricultural or food based regulations but other EU environment 
laws including waste regulations, packaging regulations along with labour laws such 
as the working time directive and drivers’ hours. These were felt to add to the cost 
burden in the UK system, impacting competitiveness in comparison to the global 
market and causing more inflationary pressures on food prices for consumers. There 
was increasing concern over the capability, particularly at farm level, to comply. 
 
‘We do [farmers] want to protect farms and the environment, e.g. bird 
numbers etc. So elements do need to be regulated. But there are too many 
regulations, for example the water framework directive. The current hot 
potato is diffuse pollution – this is impossible to comply with.’ Dairy producer 
There was also a sense that, while farmers innately understand the need to 
protect the land, the need for greater compliance would place more cost burden on 
the producer. This reflected a worry as to the future direction of CAP and 
environmental scheme payments. 
‘If farmers are to continue to be the protectors of land, then surely has to be 
public purse money available to comply with this’ Wheat producer 
 
Interestingly, from a retail perspective, while the pressure to be more 
sustainable was driven in part by regulation, pressures from consumer and 
environmental groups were also a core driver (i.e. reputational pressures). This 
created a conflict between the need to promote sustainable products against the 
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widespread consumer expectation for choice and low cost food. The retailers 
therefore face the potential threat of loss of market share by taking the consumer 
too far out of their comfort zone; in effect taking too much risk in doing something 
which either is too far ahead of either consumers or competitors. 
‘On sustainability, we are trying to take the consumer along with us. [for 
example]Delisting of North Sea cod was OK, but if we tried to de-list swordfish 
at the moment, it would be a step too far – they would then go elsewhere to 
buy it. So it is about trying to bring the consumer along with you and an 
element of anticipating their next requirements.’ UK retailer 
 
6.2.5 Power and supply relationships 
 
Retail power in the UK was judged to be important by actors and the 
interviews gave a greater insight into the impact and perceived threats to the supply 
system. Retailers’ expectation for lower prices along with assured levels of quality 
and delivery is perceived to have the effect of restricting profit sharing through the 
chain. Each actor’s relative power position, with respect to the retailers, affects their 
profit margins. Farmers in particular, due to the disparate, often uncoordinated 
nature of the farm base, were felt to be most vulnerable in the face of this leverage 
of power along the chain. 
 
‘The effect of the UK retailers should not be under estimated… and we will 
continue to see an uneven sharing out of prices across supply chain with 
retailers taking their share’ Dairy processor 
Dairy producers are more susceptible to power imbalances in the chain, more 
so than wheat producers. While wheat producers have the opportunity to hoard or 
sell into diverse markets in order to achieve higher prices, dairy producers have to 
have a consistent, daily and relatively local source for their milk (as it is perishable). 
This makes it difficult for dairy producers to swap between processors. They are then 
tied into specific processor contracts (those who operate in their geographical area). 
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They are dependent on the contracts and pricing offered by these processors, and 
often have no ability to negotiate price. This situation seems to play into a sense of 
powerlessness that emerged through the interviews.  
 
‘Farmers have no control over milk once it has left the farm – so farmers are 
always bottom of the heap’ Dairy producer 
Low levels of farm-gate milk prices was (and still are) a significant threat to 
milk producers. Producers here engendered a hope that processors would recognise 
their reliance on their producer base and so would negotiate higher milk prices, with 
retailers, to ensure that farmers remain profitable. Dairy producers felt that the 
concept of ‘fair trade’ should apply equally to UK producers as well as to those from 
overseas.  
For dairy producers, the main preoccupation was therefore with processor 
contracts. While producers are locked in, often for up to a year, processors can vary 
the price at short notice.  
‘Prices can be varied on a whim while the farmer is locked into for a minimum 
of 12 months. If the farmer is looking to plan ahead then the contract does 
not give any more certainty on price.  For example, incentives for level profile 
are put in place but it takes 12/18 months for changes to be made by farmers 
to have any effect; changes to contract are made with no consideration of 
this. Often seen by farmers as ‘surrender contracts’ Dairy producer 
Consumer and producer pressure to give farmers a better deal has some 
effect and some retailers have moved to integrated, direct supply models for fresh 
milk (from specific producer pools). Single sourcing on fresh milk has given retailers 
more security of supply, control over how price increases are passed back down the 
supply chain and cost savings. 
‘There are clear cost savings by moving to single source – originally we had 
three suppliers with different cost bases, so very difficult to do cost 
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comparisons or explore cost savings. Having a single source has made the cost 
base more transparent’ Retailer 
In the wheat sector, supply chains are more disconnected – arable farms tend 
not to have direct relationships with retailers or be tied into one processor. 
Relationships along the supply chain were on a more informal, personal basis, this 
was viewed as a strength by actors (with very little usage of the type of contracts 
seen in the dairy sector). The informality of relationships within the wheat supply 
chain was seen to be under threat by some, forced by price volatility and the 
potential for increased global demand for wheat. 
‘Agreements are at best founded on good relationships – loyalty can be found 
in parts of the market, but not in other areas. There does seem to be an 
increase in relationships founded on paper and not on personal relationships – 
a key trend in a falling market.  Where there is more volatility in price, 
relationship and longer term loyalty seems more appealing. Wheat processor 
However, it was recognised that the disconnected nature of wheat supply 
chains also posed a threat, as producers were generally not focused on end-
consumer demand. More integration across chains was seen as important to reduce 
inefficiencies (and therefore counter higher costs) and to ensure wheat produced is 
matched to end-market usage. 
‘shorter supply chains would help. There are huge inefficiencies with rejected 
loads – 50/100 tonnes rejected every time [ due to wheat not meeting market 
specifications] which are very costly to deal with’ Wheat producer 
6.3 Emergence of risks categories  
 
This section presents the thematic analysis which combined findings from all 
of the primary data.  Emerging from the data were 170, level 1 codes (as discussed in 
Chapter Three).   Here, those codes that had direct connection to the 
conceptualisation of risk were extracted. These emerged as either  
 
-The main focus and concerns of actors 
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-Specific threats to their organisation (and/ or supply chain) 
-Strategies of actions undertaken to mitigate these threats 
 
Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 set outs these common concerns, threats and 
strategies expressed by the main groups of actors in the study. This analysis led to 
the development of level 2 codes. It was at this level of analysis that categories of 
risk emerged along with their linkages to the level 1 codes (threats) are shown in the 
tables.   
 
Actor 
grouping 
Types of 
Level 1 
codes 
Level One codes Level Two 
Codes - RISK 
Dairy 
producer 
Focus and 
concerns 
Margins 
Milk price vs cost of production 
Lack of power 
Dependency on processor for a regular supply outlet 
Security of income 
Tied into contracts 
 
 
Threats Over-regulation particularly environmental – both 
compliance and cost burden 
 
 
Input price pressures esp. feed and oil 
 
Unfair pricing and profit taking in supply chain 
Stability of contract price 
 
Disease (esp. TB) 
Adverse weather 
Cost and availability of herd replacements 
 
Access to capital for investment 
Availability of skilled labour 
Availability of large animal vets 
 
Cheaper commodities from global market 
Profit risk 
Compliance risk 
Cost risk 
 
Cost risk 
 
Relational risk 
Profit risk 
 
Capability and 
operational risk 
 
 
Input and 
resource risks 
 
 
Competition risk 
Strategies  Hope that greater interdependency with processor could 
deliver better contracts 
Higher yielding herds – technology/targeted feed 
systems 
Minimise input costs/increase efficiencies 
Switch to grass systems 
Exit industry 
 
Dairy 
Processors 
Focus and 
concerns 
Inherent market advantage of fresh milk 
Processed dairy products facing more competition from 
imports 
Quality and consistency of milk supply 
Need to meet retailers specifications 
Continuity of milk supply 
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Asset utilisation 
Threats Lack of investment in assets and processes 
 
 
 
 
 
Ability of producer base to meet legislative/welfare 
requirements 
 
Competition from imports 
Competiveness of commodity dairy products vs imports 
 
Milk price increases without capability of passing costs 
on 
 
 
Food safety concerns 
Health concerns over fat/salt content of dairy products 
 
Tensions between milk co-ops and smaller dairy 
companies/tensions with producers 
 
Contraction of UK dairy producers and ability to secure 
volume of milk required 
 
Over-capacity in processing  
 
Lack of innovation and investment in value-added 
products 
Input and 
resource 
risk/capability 
and operational 
risk 
 
Compliance risk 
 
 
Competition 
risk/cost risk 
 
Profit 
risk/relational 
risk 
 
Compliance risk 
Market risk 
Reputational risk 
 
Relational risk 
 
Supply 
continuity risk 
 
Structural risk 
 
Input and 
resource risk 
Strategies Direct relationships with producers ( away from co-ops) 
Direct relationships with retailers 
Provision of more security for producers/build in need 
for profitability for farmers 
Contracts to match retail demand patterns and quality 
specifications 
Internal and supply chain efficiencies 
Consolidation of companies and facilities 
Concentration in producer base 
Develop more value-add products/branding 
Provenance as brand (UK/local) 
Innovation in products/packaging 
Reformulation ( reduction in milk content/reduction in 
fat/sugar/salt) 
Use of dairy alternatives 
Health concerns as opportunity 
 
Table 6.1 Concerns, threats and strategies for the dairy sector 
 
Wheat 
producer 
Focus and 
concerns 
Cropping plan based on future market prices  
(as to whether to grow wheat or not) 
Wheat quality based on end usage 
Wheat price and profitability 
Wheat yield 
Volume of production 
Quality assurance 
 
Threats Adverse weather conditions 
Climate change 
 
Operational risk 
 
Market 
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Increase of mycotoxins/ reduction in quality 
 
Increased regulation of chemicals which could limit 
volume/yield  
Increased environmental regulation and associated 
cost burden 
 
 
Cost and availability of inputs – labour, fertiliser and oil 
Access to capital for investment 
Access to technology, breeding and process innovations 
 
 
Over-production in UK wheat 
Threat from imports 
 
Lack of co-ordination of supply chains 
risk/operational 
risk 
Capability and 
operational 
risk/compliance 
risk 
 
 
Input and 
resource 
risk/Capability 
and operational 
risk 
Competition 
risk/profit risk 
 
Governance risk 
 Strategies Bio-fuels market as opportunity  – absorbs UK surplus 
Central storage ( co-operation between farmers) to 
meet end use specifications through blending 
Increase wheat cropping area 
Marginal land put into  
production 
Efficient management of inputs (esp. fertiliser) 
Call for GM acceptance 
 
Wheat 
trader 
Focus and 
concerns 
Reliable trading partners 
Security of supply 
 
Threats Increased competition for wheat 
 
Lower wheat quality/ability to secure correct wheat 
specifications 
 
Government intervention in market 
 
Availability of cash/credit 
 
Supply continuity 
risk 
 
Compliance risk 
 
 
Profit risk 
 
Input and 
resource risk 
Strategies Risk management through financial instruments 
Strategic relationships 
 
Wheat 
milling 
and 
processing 
Focus and 
concerns 
Balance of cost of inputs/price 
Wheat quality meeting specification for customer 
Securing wheat volumes 
Transparency of price 
 
Threats Threat from imports of processed products 
 
 
Price volatility (global price) 
Fall in wheat and food prices 
 
 
Cost of inputs 
 
Access to global markets to secure wheat imports 
 
 
Lower UK wheat harvests or poor quality 
harvests/availability of wheat imports 
 
 
Cost 
risk/Competition 
risk 
Cost risk/profit 
risk 
 
 
Cost risk/profit 
risk 
Supply continuity 
risk 
 
Supply continuity 
risk 
Cost 
risk/Compliance 
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Over-capacity in processing 
 
Disconnected supply base 
 
Cash availability for investment in assets and processes 
especially to drive efficiencies 
risk 
 
Structural risk 
 
Governance risk 
 
Input and 
resource 
risk/capability 
risk 
Strategies Product reformulation 
Develop of value-add products 
Better strategic relationships 
More longer term contracts with producers 
 
Table 6.2: Concerns, threats and strategies for the wheat sector 
 
Brand 
manufactu
rers 
Focus and 
concerns 
Meeting consumer needs 
Brand competition 
Market growth 
Grow margins 
Cash for investment 
Product pricing and costs 
Supply chain efficiencies 
Sourcing of ingredients 
Strategic location of facilities 
 
Threats Pressure on costs 
 
Unable to sell value of product to consumer in time of 
higher prices 
 
Lack of money for investment 
 
 
 
 
 
Lack of traceability in up-stream supply chain 
Food safety/food fraud 
Food health concerns 
 
How to secure competitive raw materials 
 
Cost and profit 
risk 
Market 
risk/competition 
risk 
Input and 
resource 
risk/Capability 
and operational 
risk 
 
Governance 
risk/compliance 
risk 
Reputational risk 
 
Supply continuity 
risk 
Strategies Brand investment 
Reformulation of products – reduce sugar/fat 
Substitution for cheaper ingredients 
Consolidation/migration to lower cost geographies 
More supply contracts 
 
Retailers 
 
Focus and 
concerns 
Price competition with other retailers 
Supply continuity 
On-shelf availability 
Ability to compete for supplies 
Maintain acceptable product and production 
practices but increasing supply 
How to absorb/pass on increasing costs 
 
Threats Reduction in consumer demand due to price rises 
 
Price rises 
Market 
risk/Profit risk 
 
159 
 
Not being able to justify price rises to consumer 
 
 
Food safety/food fraud 
Upholding food standards in supply chain 
 
 
Food health concerns 
 
Availability of products 
Power shifts to suppliers when scarcity 
 
 
 
Shortages tipping into food crisis 
Profit 
risk/Market risk 
 
Reputational 
risk/compliance 
risk 
 
Reputational risk 
 
Market risk/ 
Supply continuity 
risk/cost and 
profit risk 
 
Governance 
risk/market risk 
 
Strategies More integration with suppliers 
Direct relationships with producers 
Investment to spread best practice 
Single sourcing 
Competition on other values rather than just price 
Bifurcation of market – more own brand/value lines 
vs value-add products 
Pressure on supplier base to reduce costs 
 
Table 6.3. Concerns, threats and strategies for the retail and manufacturing sectors 
 
Emerging here was the connection between the area of concern, the specific 
threat, and therefore risk, along with a set of strategies employed to counter the 
perceived threat. This starts to create an understanding of how risk is conceptualised 
by actors – in that it is articulated in known threats that are seen to have a direct and 
negative impact on actors’ operations. Here also there are a common set of 
strategies that echo across all of the sectors as ways of mitigating these threats. 
These are:- 
  
- Reduce usage of inputs 
- Increase process efficiencies 
- Creation of value-added or branded products 
- Product re-formulation 
- Increased use of supply contracts 
- Strategic or integrated supply relationships 
- Consolidation of facilities and assets 
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These mitigation strategies are more commonly associated with reducing cost 
and improving profit margins. This indicates that risk is conceptualised by actors’ as 
impacting predominately on their ability to compete economically. This point is 
discussed further in the subsequent sections. 
6.4 Categories of risk 
 
The process of level 2 coding revealed a set of 12 categories of risk as 
conceptualised by actors.  These are summarised in table 6.4. The next section takes 
each risk category in turn and explains how these risks were articulated and 
conceptualised by actors, at a more generalised level. 
Risk type Definition 
Cost risk Risks that impacts negatively on the cost of operations 
Profit risk Risks that negatively impact the profit margins available for 
each  organisation 
Input and 
resource risk 
Risks that limit the availability of, or restrict access to, inputs 
such as labour, skills etc. or environmental resources such as 
water and energy   
Supply 
continuity 
risk 
Risks which limited the ability of the organisation to serve 
the market through the acquisition of ongoing, constant 
supplies 
Reputational 
risk 
Risks which negatively impacts the perception of 
organisations by consumers and undermines trust and 
confidence  
Market risk Risks which impact the ability of the organisation to meet 
target consumers’ expectations of variety and price and 
therefore limits their market share and potential growth 
Capability 
and 
operational 
risks 
Risks which either limit the ability of the organisation to 
service the market, often expressed in terms of volume 
capability, or drastic changes to current production, 
processing and other methods of operation 
Competition 
risk 
Risks from alternative sources (both UK and imports) and/or 
alternative products which could steal market share and 
limit potential growth 
 
Compliance 
risk 
Risks which create difficulties for organisations to meet 
regulatory or quality standards 
Governance 
risk 
Risks arising from the control and co-ordination of supply 
chains and the system as a whole 
Structural 
risk 
Risks arising from the organisation of assets and structures 
across supply chains and the system as a whole 
Relational 
Risk 
Risks arising from the nature of relationships across the 
chain, the application of power and the fair sharing of profit, 
benefits and risk 
Table 6.4 Categories of risk 
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6.4.1 Profit risk 
 
Ongoing financial sustainability of organisations is based upon the ability of 
organisations to compete and create sufficient margins to satisfy shareholders. 
Profits are vital to provide opportunities for investment in facilities/technology in 
order to continue to compete.  Here, risks which drove higher input costs and those 
which potentially reduced profits emerged as core categories. These risks are 
interwoven as higher inputs costs were perceived as impacting profitability, 
especially where they could not be passed onto either to customers or consumers. 
The biggest threats to profitability were seen as:  
 1 – price volatility 
 2 – inflationary pressures on costs 
 3 – affordability of food and consumer expectations of cheap food 
 
Price volatility 
 
The exposure to global economic pressures underlines the market structure 
in the UK – i.e. this is an underlying dynamic of the food system in the UK, in that it 
closely relies on global pricing signals.  From a farming perspective, the decoupling of 
CAP has meant that price signals from the market are now one of the principle 
drivers of price. There is less protection or buffer between global prices and farm 
income. Price volatility, as seen in reactions to Just a Blip and Food Inflation poses a 
significant threat to all supply actors. Prolonged periods of volatility create 
uncertainty which prevents longer term planning and potential investment and has a 
tendency to reinforce short termism within the industry.   
 
Inflationary pressures and affordability of food 
 
In one sense, inflationary pressures, as in upward pressures on food prices, 
were perceived as a positive for the food system – as shown by reactions to the Food 
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Inflation scenario. This underlies the feeling that prices had been depressed for too 
long. However, the risk expressed here is the balance between upward pressures on 
input costs and the ability of the supply chain to either absorb these costs (through 
efficiency savings) or pass on the costs up the chain, ultimately to consumers. This is 
compounded by the pressures exerted by retailers on the supply chain to keep prices 
low to allow them to compete and attract consumers; therefore meeting consumers’ 
ongoing expectation of affordable food. The fierce price competition between the 
four dominant retailers reinforces a depression of prices, creating further pressure 
on the supply chain to absorb cost increases. This in turn drives strategies for 
processors/manufacturers to put pressure on suppliers – farmers – to keep prices 
low. Tensions exist therefore between the recognition of the need for affordable 
food (from a societal perspective) and the ability to charge prices high enough to 
cover the actual cost of UK food production.  If the pressure between the two 
opposing forces becomes too much, then this could become a breakpoint which tips 
the system into crisis mode; creating a social crisis in particular for those who are on 
lower incomes. This indicates a vulnerability of the system in terms of pressures on 
input costs and the ability of the end market to bear price rises to match these.  
 
Dairy producers are very vulnerable to this type of risk. The structure and 
nature of their product (perishable and requiring daily disposal) limits producers’ 
choice as to which markets they can sell to, based on transportation costs and their 
proximity to processing facilities. Their inferior power position forces them into 
contractual supply agreements (minimum a year or season) which make them 
vulnerable to competitive pricing which undercuts their actual costs of production. 
Wheat producers however, are less vulnerable in that the cost of wheat is better 
absorbed within the supply chain – both because the contribution of wheat price to 
overall end product price is less than milk and producers have more market choice.  
 
6.4.2 Cost risk 
 
Cost risks were explicitly stated by actors as threats which impacted 
negatively on their cost base. This risk emerged from supply chain specific interviews 
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but also was prominent in response to Food Inflation. Where actors’ concerns were 
focused was dependent on their position within the supply chain. Both wheat and 
dairy producers had concerns about input costs for oil, fertiliser and in particular 
labour. These costs represent the significant proportion of their cost base. Dairy has, 
in addition, a further added cost of animal feed in the case of intensive systems (i.e. 
non-grass based). Any volatility or inflationary effects therefore (as in Just a Blip or 
Food Inflation) has a direct and significant impact on their overall costs and 
ultimately profitability.  
 
Processors , both wheat and dairy, were concerned about prices of their raw 
material – wheat and milk (although this is less of an issue for wheat as it accounts 
for less than 10% of the total price of the end product). Here, as with producers, 
energy and labour costs make up a significant proportion of their cost base.  Cost of 
transport is cited by grain traders and agri-input organisations as a key driver of costs 
in the supply chain. This is linked to the oil price but also to restrictions in UK road 
infrastructure capacity and the unsuitability of the rail network (as the infrastructure 
currently stands) to help to ease pressures. Retailers, in turn, have concerns about 
the cost of their supplies; here they tend not to want to pass on these costs to the 
consumer and therefore exert pressure on their supply chain to contain or reduce 
any rises.   
 
Cost risk also was associated with the increasing regulatory system governing 
the food system. In all scenarios, this was seen as a cost burden and a threat to 
profitability. While there is recognition that regulation has helped to drive higher 
standards, particularly in food safety, it is the tightening further of this, and in 
particular environmental legislation, where actors perceive the most threat to the 
cost base.  
 
Pressures on the need to keep end prices low against a backdrop of higher 
production costs could see the UK system tied into a cycle of constant search for 
efficiencies and rationalisation in order to maintain acceptable profit margins. This 
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could drive even more concentration and consolidation and potentially more 
tensions in supply relationships. 
 
6.4.3 Input and resource risk 
 
This category of risk arose from a tendency for actors to articulate risk in 
terms of sustainable access to their businesses’ key dependencies. Food in Crisis 
presented an extreme example but it helped supply chain actors to pinpoint a set of 
inputs that are essential to the operation of their business and the food supply chain. 
This revealed a set of inputs which seemed to apply to all actors independent of their 
position in the supply chain:-  
- Cash and cash availability to trade 
- The availability and ability to secure input supplies ( e.g. fertilisers) 
- Availability of skilled and unskilled labour 
- Access to research and development/technological innovation 
The restriction of these inputs poses a threat to the food system in its normal 
functioning state. Access to these inputs therefore, at the right cost levels, can be 
dependent on the size and relative power of the organisation; smaller entities were 
thought to be more vulnerable. While a crisis situation made the scarcity of these 
resources more acute, in effect these also reflect ongoing threats to the food system 
as it is now.  
 
Farming, in general, was viewed as more vulnerable to this type of risk. 
External threats, such as extreme weather events or disease outbreaks would put 
severe and acute pressure on these resources. A disease crisis affecting dairy herds 
for example, would shut down many farms and restrict the ability of other producers 
to source replacements and therefore would severely restrict output. But in effect, 
access to these resources poses a significant threat to the ability of both sectors to 
sustain capability and the ability to compete in the marketplace. 
 
165 
 
Over the long term, threats were also posed by the availability of 
environmental resources. While constraints on global resources could see 
restrictions on the availability of commodities, direct threats to the UK were seen as 
water and the supply of clean, cheap energy. Agriculture has a key dependency on 
water and some actors, producers and processors, saw the potential for climate 
change or change in weather patterns to create some constraints on water in the 
future. All of the supply chain has a dependency on oil and its derivatives. The 
ongoing availability of relatively cheap energy underpins the cost structure of the 
whole system. The main preoccupation of direct supply actors was the rising costs of 
energy. However, actors with a more systemic, peripheral view of the system 
recognised the potential conflict between the need to reduce the carbon footprint 
and the lack of the volume supply of viable clean alternatives.  
 
6.4.4 Supply continuity risk 
 
Supply continuity risk is closely associated with input and resource risks in 
that it reflects threats which restrict supplies. However, while input/resource risks 
are concerned with the base elements and commodities that the system relies upon, 
this risk is much more focused on products and the ability of organisations to meet 
end user demand. Retailers, being at the further end of the chain, therefore express 
any potential shortages as supply continuity risk rather than in terms of raw 
materials or input/resource shortages. Any disruption to continuous supplies of 
products to the retail supply chain was seen as a threat to the ability to supply 
customers, reducing market share and therefore impacting on potential revenue 
growth. As seen in the Food in Crisis and potentially Into A New Era, where actors 
saw a tightening of supplies, this threat would trigger changes in retail and 
processor/manufacturers behaviours towards suppliers. Any significant shortages or 
the risk of shortages have the capacity to change the power dynamic of the system, 
as power shifts back down the network towards producers. This would trigger more 
integrated supply chain strategies, with retailers and/or processors co-ordinating 
their own supply chains more, using contractual agreements or even in extremis 
seeing vertically integrated chains, hence altering the structural nature of the 
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network. The dairy network has already seen some of these structural changes. In a 
sense, this risk poses an opportunity for producers to capitalise on this restricted 
market. 
 
6.4.5 Reputational risk 
 
Actors here recognised the potential damage to their market share if their 
reputation is besmirched with consumers.  Cost pressures (as in Food Inflation) or 
acute supply constraints (as in Food in Crisis) could increase the risks related to poor 
food standards and even food fraud. The core issue highlighted here was food safety; 
any food scares with media focus are acute threats to any processors and retailers as 
well as a public health issue.  
 
However, more intangible, was the potential risk to the trust built between a 
retailer and/or a manufacturer’s brand. That is where claims made about a product, 
or the way in which their business is conducted, is exposed as false or where 
consumers demand a higher standard than is currently being met. Animal welfare is 
one such case, and producers and dairy processors highlighted this as an area which 
generates risk, particularly if, through the continued need to reduce costs, there are 
moves to more intensive dairy production systems. GM also represents a threat, for 
both dairy and wheat industries due to the prevalent anti-GM sentiment in the 
media and consumer populations. As many actors stated, both the animal feed chain 
and the lengthy processed food chains are likely to contain GM ingredients, despite 
EU regulations. This issue presents a tricky tightrope for retailer and food 
manufacturers to tread, especially if they trade on a non-GM basis.  
 
This highlights specific risks for long complex chains, typical for processed 
foods, where there isn’t full traceability or visibility. Trust between supply partners is 
important here and retailers often rely on manufacturers to enforce standards 
further down the chain. However, manufacturers often only deal with their more 
significant suppliers, and even here it is impossible for companies to fully investigate 
all of their suppliers’ processes and inputs. It is interesting therefore that actors, 
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from both the dairy and wheat sector, as a conclusion to the workshop, called for a 
’chain of custody’ and a raising of standards across the whole system – in response to 
this very issue.  
 
6.4.6 Market Risk 
 
This risk arises from the dynamics of demand and the need to meet 
expectations of the consumer base.  This manifested itself in multiple ways. One of 
which was affordable food. Actors across the board highlighted the problems of 
rising food prices set against a consumer expectation of, at least affordable, if not 
cheap food. In Food Inflation, Into a New Era and Food in Crisis the potential for 
higher food prices was seen as a major risk. This obviously has wider social 
implications. However, from a supply chain perspective, some retailers or branded 
manufacturers may struggle to demonstrate value in light of price rises and 
consequently see a reduction in market share as consumers switch to lower cost 
alternatives or lower cost imports. Retailers overall may fare better as they have the 
opportunity to switch from sourcing  in the UK to elsewhere, as long as product 
quality and costs can be met. This reflects the wider market opportunity that 
retailers have, and hence their power position.  
 
It is therefore not surprising, that other supply actors look to combat this 
power by calling for better consumer education, jointly managed by government and 
industry, to educate consumers on the reasons why food prices were increasing; 
hence looking to keep the same UK based supply routes but at higher price levels. 
This indicates a level of fear within the food network of not being able to 
demonstrate clearly to consumers the value associated with UK produced food and 
so losing out to competition from cheaper, global sources. 
 
Another aspect of market risk is not responding to changes in consumer 
preferences in demand. If shifts in consumer preferences are not capitalised on, then 
organisations risk missing out on or losing market share to competitors. The UK dairy 
industry was felt by some actors to be behind the curve in development of health-
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based products (e.g. probiotic yoghurts) and therefore has become more vulnerable 
to imported sources. The wheat sector, both producers and processors, seemed to 
be less concerned about this particular aspect of market risk, which reflects their 
relative disconnection from the end consumer. There is also the opposite issue; that 
of pushing consumers too far outside their comfort zone. This seemed a significant 
issue for retailers as the risk of losing customers by radically changing products and 
pricing (e.g. to create more environmentally sustainable choices) is too high for fear 
of a consumer exodus and market share loss. Consumers and the supply system 
therefore seem locked into particular patterns of behaviours where neither can 
move position very easily or quickly. This was underlined by the reaction of actors to 
Into a New Era which represented such a shift. The concept therefore of a radical 
shift was seen as a high risk scenario – with possible high gains but also large losses. 
This gives rise to a sense of conservatism associated with the food system.  
 
6.4.7 Capability and operational risks 
 
These risks were principally articulated as threats to the capability to 
maintain or increase food production levels in the UK. At one level, this risk 
encompasses disruptive events which could impact on an organisation’s ability to 
supply. This is very pertinent to producers where adverse weather conditions and 
disease present major threats to harvests, yields or milk volumes. This therefore 
emerged strongly as a risk in Food in Crisis. 
 
However, from a wider perspective, this risk also represented the concern of 
producers as to their ongoing ability to maintain yields and volumes within current 
farming systems and processes – inherently more intensive based systems. Here, 
environmental and food safety regulations were seen as major constraints to current 
operations. The Water Framework Directive and the banning of a range of pesticides 
were cited as impacting the ability of producers to maintain yields and increase 
volumes. Any further tightening in regulation to limit carbon or the use of certain 
chemical families would present a significant challenge. This again reinforces the idea 
that there is an inbuilt stasis in the system with producers locked into their current, 
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mostly intensive, methods of production. This again was borne out by reactions to 
the alternative (Into a New Era) which was rejected as infeasible without a significant 
drop in the food volumes produced.  
 
Linked to this were wide ranging concerns over the lack of investment in 
public and private R&D.  Technology here therefore is the solution for many actors to 
counter the perception of restrictive environmental regulation. Supply actors 
therefore called for the need for investment in the development of technology to 
allow crops or animal products to be produced with fewer inputs while maintaining 
or increasing yields. In effect, sustainable intensification. This however is contested 
by those actors (NGOs especially) who believe the food system to be fundamentally 
unsustainable in its current form. 
 
6.4.8 Competition risk 
 
This risk encompasses threats from the global market and the ability of UK 
supply chains to compete. This risk emerged most prominently in the supply chain 
specific interviews but was present across all of the scenario workshops. The level of 
competition risk for each sector is dependent on a range of factors including the 
relative cost base of the sector, its level of exposure to the global market and the 
availability of competing products. It also changed depending on the position of the 
organisation in the supply chain. The main protagonist in the market is 
predominately the retailers. It is their buying decisions which dictate a switching of 
products away from a particular UK source if deemed necessary on price (and or 
quality), although brand manufacturers also have this power.  The interdependency 
between processing and food production can mean that any switching in processing 
sources will also affect the UK farm source. 
 
Some sectors are more vulnerable than others. In dairy, there is inherent 
market advantage in the supply of fresh milk, given that it is more costly (with 
current technology) to import. However, the UK is not the lowest cost producer in 
the EU and therefore there are significant threats from lower cost commodity 
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products such as basic cheeses. The wheat sector is less vulnerable; higher yields and 
good quality grains create a more competitive offering than some imports.   
 
There is a further dimension to competition risk; inter-firm competition 
within the UK. This is present in all sectors but is the main source of competition risk 
for retailers. Here the main competition is with other retailers with a UK presence 
and the risk becomes the ability to source price competitive products and/or 
differentiate on brands in relation to other retailers.  
 
6.4.9 Compliance risk 
 
Compliance risk is the ability of an organisation to meet quality and safety 
requirements for their target market along with the necessary regulatory legislative 
standards. This is linked both to operational risk (and the increasing burden of 
regulatory requirements) and to cost risk. Increasing regulation, the need to 
encompass more sustainable practices and public scrutiny of the food system creates 
the need for more investment and higher skill levels to allow organisations to 
comply.  
 
It is not just public regulation; private-led regulatory frameworks are also a 
factor. First tier suppliers into the retail chain –processors and manufacturers – are 
expected to comply with retailer-specified sets of quality and delivery standards. 
Organisations unable to meet these specifications will fail to renew supply contracts. 
It is this balance, between keeping costs low and the ability to comply with often 
increasing expectations of these standards, where there is some threat. Compliance 
is often left to trust and the ability and willingness of retailers and manufacturers to 
oversee end to end supply chains is limited.  Further cost pressures could see this 
compliance to either legal or private food standards suffer. This could have wider 
implications for public health. 
 
Into a New Era prompted a debate over the need for higher product quality 
standards specifically those associated with the environment. This included higher 
171 
 
standards of animal welfare, lower carbon emissions and more efficient use of 
resources throughout supply chains. If enforced through regulation or even through 
a move by consumers towards higher standards, under the current structures and 
processes, actors would struggle to comply.  
 
 
 
6.4.10 Governance risk 
 
Governance risk exists for actors on two levels; the control of individual 
supplies into the retail chain and the overall policy framework that governs the UK 
food network. In the main, retailers’ category management practices often only 
result in governance and control of their immediate supply chain rather than further 
down the chain.  In a stable market, actors saw the threat here predominately as the 
abuse of power by retailers, driving more cost burden down the supply chain.  There 
is, as with most supply chains, no real end-to-end governance. Where this becomes a 
specific concern is in times of heightened uncertainty, supply constraints or market 
volatility (e.g. Food in Crisis and Into a New Era are examples of this). This limited 
span of governance was therefore judged as a potential breakpoint. Wheat actors 
saw the fragmentation of supply chains in their sector as a particular threat. There is 
very little co-ordination or integration of activities between wheat processors and 
producers (supply can often be based on a spot market basis through grain traders). 
This lack of governance creates risk in terms of quality assurance, traceability and 
prevents opportunity for joint planning to manage demand, quality and to help put in 
place contingency plans to mitigate for supply availability and price volatility.  
 
Governance of the UK food network as a whole, however, was seen as a 
greater risk. Reactions to all scenarios saw actors highlighting the lack of a coherent, 
joined-up UK government policy on food supply as a major problem. There was seen 
to be a lack of co-ordination across different policy areas such as agriculture, health 
(nutrition and obesity), environment (carbon, resource management, waste, and bio-
diversity), food security, food safety, and fair trade and competition laws. The feeling 
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from actors that the government’s bias towards environmental-led interventions [at 
the time this was the Labour government of 2008] would inhibit the food supply 
chain in meeting other social and economic outcomes.  
 
6.4.11 Structural risk 
 
This risk applies at a sector and industry level and relates to how the network 
is organised. This is specifically related to the size and organisation of the asset base, 
how product flows through these to consumers and how information (demand) and 
cash flow back down to trigger supply. Investment strategies in the wheat and dairy 
sectors over the last 30 years have been driven by economies of scale and both 
sectors have seen greater centralisation and consolidation; large scale assets, large 
processing plants, fewer actors and streamlined supply networks. This is also true of 
the retail asset base and distribution networks. Investment in larger plants is based 
on the need for process efficiencies to maintain margins, which also implies the need 
for a volume outlet i.e. the size of the market that they sell onto.  Both the wheat 
and dairy processing sectors still suffer from overcapacity which continues to 
undermine the ability to maintain margins. Higher concentration, through mergers 
and acquisitions, has been the core strategy in both these sectors (especially dairy) to 
decrease oversupply and strengthen price negotiating positions with retailers. The 
highly concentrated, centralised nature of assets however were tested in Into a New 
Era where smaller organisations in more diverse supply chains and routes to market 
were thought to fare better. Food in Crisis also saw a breakdown in centralised 
systems.  This revealed a potentially hidden risk built into current structures. 
However, as actors struggled to envisage a move towards a less centralised, 
dispersed system with a smaller asset base, this suggests that there is an in-built 
stasis in the system as it is now, driven in part by the level of investment  in current 
infrastructure but also by an accepted set of strategies and behaviours.  
6.4.12 Relational risk 
 
The issues of relationships within supply chains emerged from the data time 
and time again. This was a specific concern of those in the upstream elements of the 
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supply chain – namely processors and producers. These concerns revolved around 
how the retailers wield their power with suppliers , namely how they continually look 
to squeeze cost out of the supply chain, and often look to push risk (such as 
inventory holding, increased payments days) away from their operations and back 
down the supply chain. This behaviour was seen as a major threat, creating 
unsustainable pressure on the UK food supply which could drive many organisations 
and producers out of business, thus creating more pressure on supply. There is 
linkage here to compliance risk, as discussed, with the potential to encourage 
behaviours not conducive to food safety i.e. encouraging food fraud and shortcuts to 
meet cost pressures.  
 
Antagonistic behaviours between supply chain partners were also seen as a 
threat. This was primarily a concern for those associated with the dairy industry – 
poor relationships between farmers and processors, over contracts and pricing, puts 
pressure on supply (e.g. through farmers direct action etc.). Across wheat supply 
chains, the tendency for transactional relationships and the lack of integration and 
co-ordination across chains were seen as risks in making it difficult to exchange 
information, particularly to help joint activities to manage demand, introduce new 
projects or even to co-ordinate contingency actions to mitigate risks. 
6.5 Risk profiles and interconnections 
 
Table 6.5 shows a summary of the risk profile for each of the sector groups. It 
must be noted here that where the risk is judged to be present, this is based on 
whether actors had articulated this type of risk for their sector; it may be that risks 
not articulated do exist in that sector but may not be as prominent. As can be seen, 
some risks are common across the sectors and groups – that of cost, profit risks and 
compliance risk. Actors tended to articulate threats and possible outcomes in terms 
of the impact to cost or the impact on the ability to create profit margins. Relational 
risk features for dairy producers and processors alone – this reflects the antagonism 
that exists in that dynamic – while governance risk is more pertinent to the wheat 
producer and processor dyadic. This reflects the disconnection of the upstream 
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wheat supply chain. Risks which are closely associated with the end consumer, such 
as market and reputational risks, were prominent in the downstream supply chain as 
expected.  
 
 
 
Dairy 
producers 
Wheat 
producers 
Dairy 
processors 
Wheat 
processors 
Grain 
traders 
Brand 
manufacturers Retailers 
Profit risk ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Cost risk ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Compliance risk ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Relational risk ●   ●         
Input and resource risk ● ● ● ● ●           ●    
Capability and 
operational risk ● ● ● ●   ●   
Competition risk ● ● ● ●   ●   
Market risk   
 
●     ● ● 
Reputational risk     ●     ● ● 
Supply continuity risk     ● ● ● ● ● 
Governance risk   ●   ●   ● ● 
Structural risk     ● ●       
Table 6.5 Profile of risks by actor groups 
 
While disruptive, one-off events were of concern, the majority of threats 
were articulated as ongoing pressures and continuous risk to operations. Ultimately, 
actors characterise the outcomes of potential threat through the overriding lens of 
profit and growth. While there are direct threats to profitability and market growth, 
other risks feed eventually through to both of these areas. Actors therefore think 
how a specific threat could manifest itself, what aspect of their organisation or 
supply chain it could impact and what the likely outcome would be. The threats 
expressed potentially contained an implicit comprehension of external environment 
– globally and the UK market – but were explicitly articulated as a direct impact or 
concern for their sector and organisation.   Here, actors also assess the level of 
impact.  This indicates that the constructs of risk are interwoven with the context 
within which each actor and their organisation operates and the impact on specific 
outcomes relative to their organisation.  
 
Boundaries between the risks are somewhat fuzzy and it must be 
acknowledged that these boundaries have been imposed by the author. For example, 
cost risk blends into profit risk, relational risk blends into governance risk. However, 
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the risks as a whole represent the landscape as presented by actors. Each of these 
risks therefore inter-connect, forming a complex arrangement of potential threats 
and outcomes. Risks in this sense are not conceived as isolated entities but are linked 
together to create a chain of possible cause and effect – these interlinkages are 
shown in figure 6.1. 
 
The framework demonstrates how these risks are associated with each other. 
For example, at an organisation level, if there are threats to the capability, because 
of lack of investment in the latest processing technology (input and resource risk), 
this could directly impact the cost profile of the organisation (cost risk) and impact 
the ability of the organisation to comply with the required quality or regulatory 
standards (compliance risk). This in turn creates a potential threat which could 
impact profits and market share. This analysis suggests also that the categories of 
risk arise and are dealt with at different levels of the network; for individual 
organisations, for dyadic relationships, across the supply chain or at the level of the 
network. While risks such as those affecting cost and profit can impact across supply 
chains and the network, they tended to be characterised by actors as impacting on 
individual organisations. This contrasts with relational, structural and governance 
risks which are concerned with the network structure, the co-ordination of supply 
and inter-firm relationships, therefore existing primarily at a dyadic or cross chain 
level. These interact to exacerbate or reduce the other risks within the system. 
 
From a supply network perspective, these interconnections betray further 
risk. While some risks exist and are visible at an organisational level, the 
interconnected nature of the chain and network itself means that not mitigating a 
specific risk could then see the risk impacting other members of the network. This 
demonstrates that risk is systemic. This starts to evoke questions over how well a 
network or supply chain is able to contain risk at an organisational level or whether 
the risk is vulnerable or not to the transmission across the supply chain or even 
across the network.  
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Figure 6.1: Interlinkages of risk 
 
6.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has dealt with the concepts of risk as perceived by food system 
actors. It presented prominent themes that arose from the supply chain sector 
interviews. Analysis of the combined data set revealed a set of concerns, threats and 
strategies that interacted to inform how actors conceptualised risk. Here, 12 
categories of risk emerged which directly related to an area or function of actors’ 
organisation or supply chain that could be negatively impacted. This led to the 
following main conclusions for the chapter:- 
 
- Actors tend to conceptualise risk in terms of their context, their 
strategic priorities and how it negatively (generally) impacts their 
organisation 
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- Risk is often expressed in economic terms and how it effects either 
profitability or market growth 
- How risks are perceived is highly contingent on the sector and 
position within the supply network. Risk profiles differ by each sector 
and by supply chain echelon 
- There are complex interlinkages between the different categories of 
risk, one risk can escalate to another type of risk 
- Risk is systemic. It can arise at an organisational level, at a supply 
chain or network level but is able to be transmitted across all levels 
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Chapter Seven:  Conceptions of vulnerability 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In the last chapter, actors’ perceptions of risks and their interconnections 
were explored. In this chapter, the concept of vulnerability will be examined more 
fully. This chapter is focused primarily on research question two.   
RQ2: How do the endogenous characteristics of the UK food supply system, in terms 
of its structure and dynamics, contribute to the perceived level of vulnerability in 
light of global, exogenous uncertainties.  
It also looks to address part of research question 1 not covered in the 
previous chapter – as to how do actors conceptualise vulnerability and how this 
interlinks with conceptions of risk. 
While risk was more easily identifiable in the data and emerged as a level two 
concept, the construct of vulnerability was less explicit. Elements and core categories 
related to vulnerability emerged only through the latter stages of analysis; a process 
of re-coding was employed to re-examine the data  in order to draw out and 
evidence core categories (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002).  The chapter therefore 
presents the core categories that emerged from the data that were judged important 
factors for the vulnerability of the food network. This analysis revealed vulnerability 
to be a multi-dimensional construct. The chapter also presents findings of further 
core categories, how these are connected and the associated interpretation of these 
categories (the re-assembly and interpretation processes described in Chapter 
Three). The aim here is to understand how these factors impact on, and interact, 
with vulnerability. From this analysis emerged a definition of vulnerability and a 
conceptual framework to express the dynamics at play within the food system. This 
framework also gave rise to an understanding of vulnerability in terms of outcomes – 
both at an organisational level but also a wider system level. The chapter therefore 
discusses these outcomes and how these relate to vulnerability.  
The chapter is structured as follows:- 
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- An exploration of the exogenous and endogenous factors that impact 
vulnerability 
- The conceptualisation of vulnerability 
- A discussion on the wider outcomes of the food system and why 
these are important to the concept of vulnerability 
- A discussion on the relative nature of vulnerability 
 
7.2 Exogenous and Endogenous factors on vulnerability 
 
The examination of the data in order to understand concepts of vulnerability 
was problematic. Level 2 coding did not reveal substantial understanding of the 
concept; it only started to emerge when the data was re-coded to identify the key 
factors which impacted on risk and vulnerability – as part of the process to 
understand RQ2.  However, these level two codes revealed factors which had an 
impact on each sector’s exposure to risk; hence its vulnerability. As the core 
categories started to emerge, it revealed a messy landscape of factors. To organize 
them, they were grouped into sets based on whether they were external to the food 
system network (endogenous) or internal to the food system (exogenous). They were 
further delineated as to whether they were :- 
- Global: factors, external to the UK, but have a strong influence on 
market dynamics in the UK 
- UK socio–technical: factors which were judged key elements of the 
economic and social framework within which the food system sits 
- Supply chain: factors which characterise dairy and wheat supply 
chains and are judged as influences on vulnerability 
- Behavioral factors: factors which characterise core beliefs within the 
mainstream food system 
 
These level codes and how they are grouped are shown in table 7.1. 
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Exogenous factors Global factors Global supply/demand factors 
Access to global market 
Degree of dependency on global 
market 
UK socio-technical 
factors 
Economic structure of UK 
Consumer expectations 
Societal value of food 
Political intervention and will 
Regulatory and policy framework 
Endogenous factors Supply chain factors Power 
Supply chain structure 
Level of Supply chain integration 
Sector specific 
factors 
Cost/pricing structure 
Interdependencies 
Beliefs and mind-
sets 
Perception of risk and vulnerability  
Faith in markets 
Faith in technological solutions 
Scale and efficiencies 
Trust and confidence 
Belief in environmental sustainability 
of the food system 
Actions and 
behaviours 
Strategy norms 
Table 7.1 : Exogenous and endogenous vulnerability factors 
7.2.1 Global supply and demand dynamics 
 
This code reflects the recognition by actors of pressures in the global market 
which have the capacity to impact on the UK food system. From a supply perspective, 
this encompassed uncertainties, and therefore risks, related to the availability of 
land, water and energy along with how climate change could impact agricultural 
capability. From a demand perspective, rising global population, economic growth 
and nutrition transition is creating more demand for food. One point of vulnerability 
for the UK is the effect on prices e.g. higher prices for oil and other input, commodity 
prices and/or foodstuffs. However, this could also result in restrictions or shortages 
of globally sourced items, such as soya for animal feed. The global arena could also 
act as the source of shocks and one-off disruptive events e.g. animal disease. There is 
an acknowledgement that firstly, the UK does not sit in isolation and secondly, there 
are vulnerabilities at a global level, linked to uncertainties associated with demand-
supply dynamics, which could feed through to the UK food system in the future.  
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7.2.2 Degree of dependency 
 
The level to which a food sector is exposed to global uncertainties is 
correlated with the level to which a particular sector is dependent on inputs from the 
global market. Vulnerability here then is the degree of exposure to the global 
market. Agriculture is particularly dependent on global inputs (e.g. fertiliser, 
phosphorous, soya for animal feed) and this becomes a significant factor in the 
vulnerability of the wheat and dairy farming sectors. The degree of dependency on 
oil price affects all aspects of the food system and therefore no one section of the 
system is immune to global effects. 
7.2.3 Access to global market  
 
Here, vulnerability is whether access to the global market to purchase 
necessary supplies is restricted. These constraints included political interventions (i.e. 
the imposition of export bans) and any difficulties in trading with particular countries 
(due to political tensions) or the absence of trade agreements with specific countries. 
Specific threats were seen as bi-lateral agreements which circumvented the global 
market which could shut out certain supply routes for other countries (e.g. China’s 
strategy to use bi-lateral agreements and ‘land grabs’ in Africa to secure agricultural 
inputs and foodstuffs). Access was also defined in terms of the economic capability 
to purchase, including the continued strength of sterling to compete globally. 
Vulnerability is therefore a combination of the function of global supply 
dynamics, the degree of dependency and the ability of the supply chain to purchase 
relevant inputs.  The higher the dependency and a lower level of access to market 
equates to a high level of vulnerability. Food In Crisis is an example of this.  
 
7.2.4 Economic structure of UK 
 
The food system is also inextricably linked to the wider UK economic 
environment. Aspects of this which were deemed important by actors were:-   
182 
 
- How the costing and pricing structure of the UK market is weighted and the 
level to which external costs are internalised : e.g. carbon pricing or other 
externalised costs related to environmental impact 
- Cost of labour and energy including diesel/petrol (and how taxation policy 
impacts) 
- Cost of compliance (regulation, legal requirements, supply chain imposed 
specifications) 
Also articulated was the close linkages to the general policy and regulatory 
frameworks which govern UK markets along with taxation policies. The vulnerability 
here is related to how these factors are shaped in the UK, versus the EU and other 
competing markets and whether they adversely affect the cost base and general 
competitiveness of the UK food sectors. If these factors result in high costs or the 
price of exports is driven higher, this could result in more competition from imports 
or reduce export opportunities. 
7.2.5 Regulatory and policy framework 
 
This category emerges for actors as a key shaper for the food market, as 
indicated in the previous chapter on risk. The regulatory framework (although driven 
mainly by EU law) covers all aspects of regulation that directly and indirectly impacts 
the food system. This is multi-dimensional and covers areas from the CAP 
framework, waste disposal, packaging and labelling requirements, control of 
pesticides and waste from farms through to carbon credit schemes. The shaping of 
this framework drives actors’ behaviours and impacts the economic structure of each 
sector. The vulnerability here is the level of compliance required (compliance risk) 
and whether the cost burden reduces organisations ability to compete (cost, profit 
and competition risk).  
7.2.6 Consumer expectations 
 
This category is concerned with how consumers perceive value when making 
food purchases and can be highly subjective based on the individual and their social 
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and environmental circumstances. This is then the balance between the attributes 
offered by food products across multiple dimensions including price, quality, 
availability, appearance, provenance, health, environmental credentials, production 
methods (organic etc.) and others.  How consumers make their purchasing decisions 
forms the fundamental characteristic of market demand and therefore to some 
extent drives the overall direction of the market.  Vulnerability here was 
characterised as large changes in demand which causes switching away from core 
products (e.g. switching to lower fat proteins away from cheese).  Into a New Era saw 
a massive swing in consumer expectation to more sustainable products and 
presented a huge challenge for actors.  
7.2.7 Societal value of food 
 
This category describes how, as a society, we perceive food, how we judge its 
importance and how we consume it. Actors saw a direct linkage between this 
underlying perception of food and what consumers value and therefore will pay for. 
One characteristic which featured prominently was an overall expectation of cheap 
food, and in particular, that food spend overall will not exceed a certain % of overall 
disposable income. This becomes problematic for actors in the food system if food 
prices rise significantly and challenges this expectation. This creates vulnerabilities 
for UK producers and processors; the lower the value placed on food by consumers 
(and specifically food produced in the UK) the more difficulty actors have in justifying 
UK sourced products in times of higher food prices.  
A low value placed on food, in relation to other policy priorities also creates a 
political difficulty for the UK government to justify allocation of resources, 
particularly money, and contributes to a lack of appetite for UK government to 
intervene to support the UK processing and farming base.  
7.2.8 Political Intervention and will 
 
This is the level to which the UK government feels the need to intervene in 
the food market and to what extent they employ policy levers or regulation to shape 
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it. It is highly dependent on the perception in government as to whether there is a 
need to intervene or not in the market and whether there is political or social capital 
in them doing so. Actors from the farming sector, particularly dairy, presented an 
argument for more monetary and indirect policy support for areas such as 
agricultural skills development as a counter to the erosion of the British farming 
base. Actors within the food system were both suspicious of, and against, further 
government intervention to encourage more sustainable behaviours. Actors on the 
periphery of the food system, along with NGOs, saw a more proactive role for 
government in moving the system towards more sustainable practices. This 
demonstrates this is a highly contested area with widely differing opinions as to 
whether there should be more government intervention or less. However, what was 
common was a sense that government did not have a joined up approach to food 
(from an environmental, health, economic and social aspect) and this was a potential 
vulnerability for the system. 
7.2.9 Power and fairness 
 
This is the level to which entities within specific supply chains exert influence 
or have control over the supply chain. In majority of cases, this refers to the power of 
the UK retailers in determining the operation and structure of the supply chains, at 
least at the immediate next level, and sometimes further down the chain. This power 
is manifested as the ongoing selection of suppliers from the UK or global market, the 
product range and imposition of quality and safety standards.  Action taken 
unilaterally by suppliers outside of the remit of the retailers therefore becomes 
potentially difficult and often detrimental.  Food manufacturers, particularly multi-
nationals who have well established market brands, are able to create some balance 
of power with the retailers, and in turn exert power throughout their own supply 
chains.  It is these power brokers within the supply system who have the capability 
and influence to enact change. It is also this buying power which could prompt 
switching towards global, lower cost producers and an increase in the level of 
imports, thus tipping the balance away from UK production and significantly eroding 
UK production. 
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A sense of fairness is important here and the concern is whether this power is 
abused by retailers or brand manufacturers.  Vulnerability here then is correlated to 
relational risk where there is abuse of power or where subordinate organisations are 
unable to resist any squeeze on costs or excessive demands for risk sharing (e.g. 
inventory holding and/or increased payment terms). This is a serious concern for 
producers, particular dairy, due to their smaller size and relative captive need to sell 
into local markets. This led some actors to question whether the legislative 
framework, including competition laws, creates sufficient incentives to ensure that 
smaller organisations are dealt with fairly and to prevent abuse of power.  
7.2.10 Supply chain structure 
 
This is how supply chains within the food system are organised. The elements 
which emerged as important are:- 
- The scale and number of separate entities within the chain 
- How assets are organised to facilitate the flow of physical goods and 
information 
- The inter-linkages between each organisation 
- Trends towards consolidation and centralisation.  
 
The structure of the system has an impact on the level of risk exposure and therefore 
the vulnerability of each supply chain. It also influences how reactive the system is to 
change i.e. large-scale, centralised assets may be more vulnerable to shock-based 
threats. This category also relates to ownership; whether companies are UK or 
foreign owned was perceived by actors to be potentially important, particularly in 
decisions to make further investments based in the UK or elsewhere.    
7.2.11 Level of supply chain integration 
 
This is the level to which those organisations with relative power advantages 
co-ordinate and control their suppliers and upstream supply chains. This has two 
dimensions:- 
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- Integration – the level to which there is specificity throughout the supply 
chain in terms of production and /or asset sharing 
- Co-ordination – the level to which an entity controls and polices the supply 
chain. This could be just for one echelon of the supply chain or for multiple. 
 
This is an important factor for supply chain actors; they saw more integration and/or 
co-ordination as a core strategy, for both dairy and wheat, in order to counter a 
number of risks including competition risk along with the need to assure quality and 
food safety. The lack of integration and co-ordination, particularly in wheat supply 
chains, is then perceived as a vulnerability. 
7.2.12 Interdependencies 
 
Interdependency emerged as a contributory factor to vulnerability. It relates 
primarily to supply relationships between organisations within the supply network. 
The level of interdependency is high between dairy producers and processors – dairy 
producers in particular are very dependent on a consistent market outlet for their 
milk. The level of interdependency is lower within the wheat network but is still a 
factor. While producers have more market choice for disposal of their wheat, 
processors are reliant on the UK market to provide a significant proportion of wheat 
at the right quality and specification.  
A further aspect of interdependency emerged, associated with the 
connections between different agricultural sectors. The dairy system relies on the 
beef sector for the disposal of male calves. There is a mutual interdependency 
between the wheat and dairy sectors; dairy rely on the supply of wheat for some 
animal feeds while the feed market is a significant outlet for the disposal of wheat. 
There was disagreement as to whether higher levels of interdependency led 
to greater vulnerability or not. Greater interdependency between actors or sectors 
could result in wider risk transmission and less opportunities to switch to more 
competitive sources but it could also provide opportunities for increased co-
ordination between actors to mitigate for risk. 
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7.2.13 Cost/price structure of market sector 
 
This category refers to the specific economic structure for each sector and the 
dynamics of costs and price. While this factor is heavily dependent on the economic 
structure of the UK, the regulatory and policy framework and consumer 
expectations, actors described inherent properties of each sector. This is therefore 
the ability of actors to be price-takers or price-makers within a particular market. It is 
also linked to the demand for end products, price elasticity and how well price  
relates to production costs. How well each echelon of the supply network is capable 
of, or expected to bear costs, versus the flexibility to charge higher prices has a 
bearing on the ability to generate sustainable profits, or not. This is also related to 
interdependencies within each sector and the ability of sellers or buyers to easily 
switch supply outlets. For example, price of fresh milk is fairly inelastic and there is 
no direct relation between cost of production and end price. As the producers are 
price takers in the market they have relatively little power to alter the dynamics and 
therefore often, in depressed milk markets, see farm-gate prices lower than the cost 
of production. The wheat sector is less vulnerable to end market pricing as wheat can 
contribute as little as 4% to the overall product price. 
7.2.14 Perception of risks 
 
How actors perceive risk and vulnerability has a significant impact on the 
actions and strategies taken to mitigate threats. Thinking in the industry tends to be 
shorter term so immediate threats to costs, such as changes in global pricing, are 
more likely to be considered and acted on, if possible. However, there seems to be 
considerable myopia within the mainstream supply networks. As the scenario Into a 
New Era demonstrated, greater uncertainties, with impact over the longer term such 
as environmental risks, do not appear on the radar unless prompted by regulatory or 
legal requirements.    
While one-off major disruption events have the potential for significant 
impact on the food system, it is extremely difficult to predict these events. In 
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addition, if a risk is not perceived, or not seen as likely, then it is not acted upon. This 
was clear from the risks presented in Into a New Era, which actors did not accept as 
plausible. To counter any perceived threats unilaterally was also seen as costly 
(prohibitively so) and often excessively difficult for individual organisations to do on 
their own. This raises questions over the level of contingency planning in place, how 
adequate it is across the network and the need for collaborative, co-ordinated 
planning efforts from supply actors and government.  
For supply chain actors, there are set of beliefs which seem to inform the 
thinking about risk at a fundamental level. These therefore influence the strategies 
that organisation undertake in order to mitigate any variance or risk in achieving 
their organisational goals. Emerging from the data were five specific categories which 
were:- 
- Faith in markets  
- Faith in technological solutions 
- Scale and efficiencies 
- Trust and confidence 
- Belief in the sustainability of the food system 
 
7.2.15 Faith in Markets 
 
This is the extent to which actors believe in the capability of the market to 
balance food supply, ensuring sufficient supply at affordable prices. This is a complex 
area. At some levels, many supply actors believed that markets are capable of 
functioning to achieve this goal up to a point.  However Food Inflation revealed a 
point of vulnerability; in a period of high inflation with pressures on input costs, food 
prices could rise to an unaffordable level for some consumers. This would also put 
pressures on the farming base. The conflict here then becomes the level of 
appropriate government intervention, or not, to support consumers or the UK 
farming base.  There is an inherent reluctance for government to intervene further in 
the market with the more favoured option being for government to allow the 
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markets to operate under fewer constraints – i.e. reducing the level of regulation, 
particularly environmental.    
7.2.16 Faith in technological solutions 
 
This is the belief in the ability of the application of technological innovation to 
solve the future problems of food supply. This belief was common among many food 
supply actors. It manifested itself strongly in the arguments for the adoption of GM. 
Technology was articulated strongly as the way to achieve environmental 
sustainability. This manifested itself in calls for a step change in technology to 
produce energy to create a move away from fossil fuels and the use of GM, plant 
breeding technologies to increase yields while reducing the level of inputs required 
(e.g. water usage). This underlies the sense that solutions lie through process and 
product innovation rather than any radical shift in structure or practices. Peripheral 
actors to the food system saw this narrow application of innovation as a 
vulnerability, locking in reductionist behaviours into the food system and shutting 
out other types of innovation, practices and structures which could be part of a more 
sustainable solution. 
7.2.17 Scale and efficiencies 
 
The majority of the conventional food supply system is predicated on the 
notion of efficiencies; the more efficient a supply chain is, the more competitive it is. 
Efficiency here is defined as the lowest cost process through the use of fewer 
resources for more output – more for less. From a farming perspective, yields are the 
main driver of cost effectiveness, for both dairy and for wheat.  
Associated with this are concepts of scale; economies of scale drive strategic 
thinking in the network. Efficiencies are inherently delivered through larger, more 
concentrated organisations and networks. There is some myopia here, periphery 
actors voiced concern over the sustainability of large scale systems in light of 
resource pressures. While Into a New Era exposed these potential vulnerabilities to 
concentrated, large scale systems (and to some extent this was true of Food in Crisis), 
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this structure is seen as the most effective allocation of resources rather than small 
scale, disaggregated systems. This therefore informs the current trajectory of food 
supply chain systems in the UK.  
7.2.18 Trust and confidence 
 
Actors saw consumer trust and confidence in food supply as an implicit but 
fundamental factor. Consumers expect that the food they buy is safe and that any 
claims made of products’ origins, ingredients and characteristics are authentic. Brand 
integrity for retailers and manufacturers is particularly important and sales are often 
based on them being seen as a trusted source for consumers. The horse meat 
scandal of 2013 proved that where this trust is undermined, it has a direct impact on 
sales as consumers lose their confidence and buy elsewhere. While maintaining trust 
is a core responsibility to avoid reputational risk, there still remains a lack of 
traceability through the supply chain, particularly for highly processed products with 
multiple ingredients. Actors expressed concerns that the system is vulnerable to 
dishonest practices leading to unsafe food, food adulteration and even fake foods. 
This raises questions also of governance of the chain and who is ultimately 
responsible for monitoring and enforcing food safety. Actors strongly called for the 
industry as a whole to create more integrity but also called for stronger action by the 
Food Standards Authority.  
Actors were critical of government’s role in building trust. The media were 
criticised for promoting confused messages on food to consumers, particular on 
health and environmental matters which potentially masks some of the bigger 
concerns over food.  It was a strongly held belief that government has a role to play 
in presenting clearer information to the consumer and becoming a trusted source of 
information on food matters. Actors however highlighted a lack of trust between the 
consumer and the government, and also between the consumer and the scientific 
community.  This lack of trust creates a block in opening serious debates over the use 
of science in the food system and the need for any consumer behavioural change. 
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7.2.19 Belief in the sustainability of the food system  
 
This is a highly contested area, with a range of beliefs. Actors peripheral to 
the food system (NGOS, academics and scientists) were more likely to express 
concerns over the longer term sustainability of the food system. This was in response 
to other environmental issues including carbon emissions and animal welfare but 
also wider social concerns (such as health and affordability of food). Dairy actors 
articulated awareness of the impact of livestock emissions and the need to address 
them but overall did not consider the longer sustainability of the system as a threat. 
Wheat actors were more concerned about the use of inputs – water, energy – and 
potential constraints to these resources. For producers, while there is obvious 
recognition of the reliance on nature and the need to work with it, environmental 
factors are coloured by the need for compliance to EU regulations. There is therefore 
a tendency for food supply actors to underplay the impact of environmental factors 
where the global impact is often disconnected from the impact on UK food supply 
itself. How actors perceive threats arising from environmental concern would seem 
to drive a belief as to what extent change to the system is needed and ultimately 
drives the need (or not) to act.  
7.2.20 Strategy norms 
 
The data revealed a suite of policies and strategies that were commonly 
upheld by actors as the ‘accepted way’ of mitigating cost and profit risks. The two 
core strategies were either to become the lowest cost producer or to create value 
add through product differentiation. The common suite of strategies are:-  
- Product reformulation – either to assuage consumer/government concerns 
over ingredients i.e. sugar, fat salt or to reduce costs (e.g. reduction in 
packaging size) 
- Product range reformulation – cutting down on the number of products 
- Product innovation – increase the level of differentiation and value add to 
increase price points 
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- Process efficiencies and improvement in yields 
- Concentration of assets 
 
Figure 7.1 : Conceptual framework of interlinking vulnerability factors 
 
 
7.3 Interconnection of vulnerability factors 
 
All of these factors emerged from the data as significant in light of the 
construct of vulnerability.   The conceptual framework in figure 7.1 shows the inter-
connection between these different factors and how, ultimately they combine to 
deliver a set of outcomes for the food system. The food system sits within the global 
arena but the extent to which global endogenous factors impact on the food system 
is based on each sector’s dependency and access to the global market.  This access is 
dependent on the buying power of the organisation, whether or not there are 
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political barriers (such as export restrictions or trade agreements) and whether the 
quality or specification of inputs complies with standards (e.g. non-GM soya). Of 
course, the UK does not exist as a separate eco-system outside of the global one, so 
there is direct exposure to environmental threats such as climate change. 
The economic structure of the UK and the regulatory (EU and UK) system are 
key factors in shaping the overall competitive environment of the system. They 
inform, in part, the cost base that UK organisations have to work with in order to do 
business. This plays a large part therefore in how organisations seek to make profits 
and create sustainable businesses. On the demand side, the UK food market is 
underpinned by the societal value placed on food, which in turn informs consumers’ 
expectations of food, which ultimately drives market demand. 
The food system is therefore set within this framework. Here, the structural 
elements of the supply network along with the beliefs and behavioural norms 
combine in order for actors to achieve their desired outcomes. How the supply chain 
structures itself is in principle based on how each organisation views the best way to 
service its demand base and balance the demands of the economic and regulatory 
cost framework. However, this is set within the constraints of the asset base (based 
on previous investment decisions and a set of beliefs and mind-sets) that:-  
- the economies of scale deliver lower costs and bigger profits  
- large scale trumps small scale 
- less political intervention and freer markets will deliver better value to                 
  consumers 
- technological innovation with provide solutions to many of the global  
   problems facing the food system.  
Power is a key driver; the retailers hold the majority of power and therefore 
influence the shape, structure and performance of the supply chain. Cost and pricing 
structures unique to different product types, when combined with this power, 
dictate how costs and profits are shared out among the different echelons of actors. 
Actors’ concerns over the lack of trust along supply chains highlights a tension here 
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but also indicates that behaviours and actions throughout the chain are predicated 
by this lack of trust – i.e. unwillingness perhaps to disclose true costs, or hide 
potential problems. How actors perceive risk and vulnerability, and the level to which 
they feel the food system is facing threats, leads to a set of behaviours and strategic 
responses.  Often these strategies have a common underpinning – either cost 
reduction or value-creating – which deliver a set of outcomes for each of the 
organisations in the supply chain as well as for the food network as a whole. 
7.4 Conceptualisation of Vulnerability   
 
7.4.1 Definition of vulnerability  
 
All of these factors therefore, when combined in this conceptual framework, 
describe some of the key dynamics of the UK food network. The framework 
presented here describes the core elements that were both articulated by supply 
actors, but also elements that were less explicit (such as faith in technological 
solutions) but were judged to be important by the author as impacting the overall 
concept of vulnerability. However this framework was judged to be incomplete; it 
does not describe the interlinkages with risks (as identified in the previous chapter) 
or how these factors could combine in order to create vulnerability. This led to a 
second examination of the data in order to answer the question, how do these 
factors relate to the construct of vulnerability?  
The data itself was messy and the connections between these factors and 
vulnerability complex and multi-dimensional. Vulnerability itself emerges at a higher 
level of conceptualisation. For supply actors, vulnerability was articulated through 
risks that could threaten their ability to generate profits and sustain market growth; 
i.e. their desired outcomes. The concept of ‘outcomes’ is therefore a vital element of 
the conceptualisation of vulnerability. It is therefore the variance to these desired 
outcomes that presents itself as the concern. On one level therefore vulnerability can 
be characterised as ‘the potential for variance to expected or desired outcomes’.  
Variance here therefore is dependent on how risks present themselves within the 
food system and how they interact with the system to change expected outcomes. 
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This suggests a further element of vulnerability; that not only is it the presence of 
threats or risk to the food system but it is the level of exposure to them. The 
potential for variance is therefore a function of the types of risks threatening the 
food system, their likelihood of occurrence tied up with the level of exposure which 
impacts on the outcomes of the system. This is a static definition; it suggests that 
there is a certain level of vulnerability inherent and built into the system. However, 
supply actors are not mere observers in the system, they act through strategies and 
exhibited behaviours in order to ensure they achieve their organisational objectives 
and outcomes.  Sets of strategies and behaviours are therefore designed to counter 
any perceived risks to their desired outcomes. They therefore influence the residual 
level of vulnerability in the system. In the case that the impact of a risk is not thought 
to be significant, then no action is taken to mitigate it. The resultant vulnerability in 
this case could still be high as it may be that the risk is a particular blind spot for that 
organisation. 
There is a dynamic and interactive element of vulnerability – that is actors’ 
perceptions of how risks impact on outcomes combined with actors’ will and 
capability to act to mitigate these risks.  This is the interactive element; that actors 
can intervene to change the properties of vulnerability in the system. Vulnerability is 
therefore a combination of:- 
 risk and threats to the food system, some of which are not completely known 
 the actual level of exposure to risks 
 how the level of exposure is perceived by actors 
 the capability and power to be able to act to mitigate the perceived threat 
The definition of vulnerability that emerges is therefore ‘the level of exposure 
to risk and the capability to respond to reduce variance to desired outcomes’. 
Chapter 6 explored the types of risk which could create vulnerability. 
However, there are other characteristics of risk which play in to vulnerability (see 
table 7.2). The source of the risk, its nature (whether a shock or an ongoing, 
continuous threat), the scope of the potential impact and its scale all have an impact 
on the level of vulnerability. 
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Source Nature Scope of impact Scale of impact 
Internal or external Shock, continuous 
threat 
Single organisation, 
supply chain, supply 
network 
Low, medium, high 
Table 7.2 : Characteristics of risk  
Secondly, a re-examination was undertaken to group further these factors as 
to how they contribute to vulnerability. This analysis revealed a number of groupings 
important to vulnerability as shown in table 7.3. 
Classification of 
factors 
Description Example 
Risk sources Factors which themselves 
generated risks for 
organisations 
e.g. CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS: 
expectations of cheap food was seen 
as a source of risk in time of high 
inflation 
Risk amplifiers Factors which exacerbate the 
exposure to risk 
e.g. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: 
environmental regulations (such as the 
water directive) were seen to magnify 
the exposure to cost risks for 
producers 
Risks dampeners Factors which lessen the 
exposure to risk 
e.g. SCALE: consolidation of 
processing capacity in dairy industry 
to reduce over-capacity and improve 
efficiencies 
Enablers Factors which helped 
organisations to act to mitigate 
risk 
e.g. POLICY FRAMEWORK: 
government policies to invest more in 
public R+D in efficient production 
methods was seen as supporting the 
ability to mitigate cost of inputs 
Constraints Factors which stopped or 
limited the ability of 
organisations to act to mitigate 
risk 
e.g. POLICY FRAMEWORK 
policies to limit immigration of non-
skilled workers reducing labour pool 
for producers 
7.3 Categories of vulnerability factors 
However, trying to impose a taxonomy on the factors proved difficult. A re-
evaluation of the data revealed that factors were interpreted in multiple ways; they 
exhibited pluralism. Many were simultaneously conceptualised as either sources of 
risk, dampeners or magnifiers of vulnerability or constraints and enablers to the 
capability of organisations to act. The way each of the factors is shaped, how 
important it is for sectors or supply chain echelons changes how its effect manifests 
itself on the system. This suggests a much more complex interplay with these factors 
and vulnerability. In turn, different elements of each factor may act in different ways 
on vulnerability. For example, while the majority of the regulatory framework for 
environmental sustainability was judged by supply actors as a potential constraint, 
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regulations on food safety were seen as a mechanism to reduce exposure to food 
safety risk i.e. a dampener. This plurality in the contribution of factors to vulnerability 
indicates the difficulty in conceptualising it as a whole. 
7.4.2 Dynamics of vulnerability 
 
The vulnerability factors emerged as level two constructs. While they helped 
to understand aspects of vulnerability, they did not fully explain the dynamics of how 
these factors interacted with actors’ perceptions of risk and how their actions altered 
the vulnerability profile of their supply chain, or not.  When the data was re-
examined as part of the interpretation phase of the analysis (as explained in Chapter 
Three), a number of higher level core categories emerged (Appendix G). The 
conceptual framework shown in figure 7.2 shows the theoretical relationships 
between these categories, thus forming a more holistic picture of vulnerability, both 
at a supply chain and network level. This framework emerged directly from 11 of the 
13 identified Level 3 core categories, thus integrating the emerging  concepts into a 
formulated theory (Randall and Mello, 2012). These relevant categories are listed 
below.  
 Perception of risk 
 Exposure to risk 
 Capability to respond 
 Power to act 
 Strategies 
 Enablers 
 Constraints 
 Amplifiers of risk 
 Dampeners of risk 
 Competitive outcomes 
 Wider supply network outcomes 
 
Drivers of change and innovation also were identified as core categories. 
However, these emerged as different dimensions of vulnerability, conceptualised as 
dealing with system transition at a network level and did not neatly fit into this 
framework. These are therefore dealt with separately in Chapter 8 (section 8.6)  
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The framework shows the interlinkages between risk, the level of exposure to risk, 
actions and outcomes. If actors perceive risks as having the potential to impact their 
organisation, this will trigger a response. This response is however dependent on 
whether they have the power to act and whether they have the capability and/or 
resources to act. If this is the case for both conditions, then actors will put in place 
strategies to address these vulnerabilities. However, if this is not the case then the 
outcome will remain vulnerable. For example, the wheat yields are judged vulnerable 
if neonicotinoid insecticides are banned. However, wheat actors feel they do not 
have the power to act and alternatives, in their eyes, to maintain current yields are 
not available. The outcome here of higher yields is therefore vulnerable. There is also 
significant vulnerability where the risk is unknown, where it is not well articulated or 
where there are blind spots in recognising the existence of risk. Here, again, no 
action will be taken. These circumstances could pose even greater risks as this could 
result in unpredicted variance to outcomes.  This is an important element of 
vulnerability – that there will always be unknown risks and therefore unknown 
consequences. This is an inherent property of risk, particularly when looking into the 
future. 
 
Figure 7.2: Dynamics of vulnerability 
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This framework therefore interacts with that shown earlier of the interlinking 
of vulnerability factors. These factors, related to the economic, social and political 
framework along with the structure, operation and relationships within the supply 
network, impact vulnerability in multiple and complex ways at all levels; in 
potentially being a source of risk, in amplifying or dampening exposure and in 
constraining or enabling the capability to act.  
This conceptual framework therefore suggests that the way these factors are 
shaped creates inherent properties of the food supply network and therefore a built-
in profile of vulnerability. This profile may vary dependent on the different sectors. 
The dairy sector has a different profile than that of the wheat sector as its level of 
exposure may be different based on whether the factors are shaped favourably or 
not. For example, the cost and pricing structure of dairy ultimately mean that dairy 
farmers are more exposed to reductions in the price of fresh milk; wheat farmers on 
the other hand are less vulnerable to this risk. Within this profile, changes to system 
factors will alter how risks manifest themselves but also the level of exposure of each 
sector. However, this vulnerability profile can be adjusted by actors, through their 
actions, therefore enforcing a more dynamic, interactive aspect to the conceptual 
framework. However, this action is very dependent on whether actors can see these 
risks and vulnerability and whether they can and or are capable of acting. This 
presents issues where there are levels of uncertainties surrounding risks and where 
there are blind spots. Where these risks affect longer term outcomes, such as 
environmental sustainability, or where there is need for more joined up intervention, 
vulnerabilities may go unaddressed and therefore cause unintended or unforeseen 
consequences to desired outcomes.  
At an organisational level, any blind-spots or limits to action could ultimately 
end up impacting adversely the ability to compete and ultimately maintain economic 
sustainability. However, blind-spots or a lack of ability to co-ordinate action for more 
systemic risks pose an even greater threat for the whole network. This brings into 
question what the ultimate outcomes of the UK food system are and whether these 
are also vulnerable.  
200 
 
7.5 Wider outcomes of the food system 
 
Taking a wider societal perspective it could be argued that the food system, 
at a very basic level, needs to be able to provide nutrition and calories to feed the 
population adequately and safely in order to promote economic growth and social 
stability. There are therefore a set of wider food system outcomes, outside of the 
main focus of supply actors. These were identifiable in the data primarily as :- 
- Availability of food 
- Affordability of food 
- Quality and safety of food 
 
7.5.1 Availability of food 
 
This emerged as a core outcome of the food system; the ability to provide 
sufficient food for the UK population. On a global scale, this constitutes a real 
concern and from the scenario workshops and interview evidence, the majority of 
actors see this as a significant threat that demands global focus.  The UK food system 
itself was thought by actors to be resilient in its capability to provide the volume of 
food. The range and choice of food on offer creates a certain level of resilience; if 
there are shortages of one particular food stuff, there is likely to be availability of 
alternatives. Larger-scale manufacturers or processors, based in the UK, were judged 
capable of competing globally in times of reduced food supply, with enough 
economic power to secure alternative supplies. Even with restrictions on global trade 
(e.g. Food in Crisis, Into a New Era), the strength of UK sterling was thought capable 
of maintaining its ability to purchase enough food globally. Any impact of risks to 
availability was in the choice of foods on offer rather than a lessening of the overall 
amount of food available. Only in very extreme circumstances as in Food in Crisis, 
was it thought possible that there would be any severe shortages felt by the UK on a 
wider scale. This outcome is therefore seen as vulnerable at a global level but not 
necessarily for the UK. 
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7.5.2 Affordability of food 
 
Actors consistently expressed this both as a core outcome of the UK food 
system and as a future concern. It is therefore affordability, more so than availability, 
that was seen as the potential breakpoint of the system. One of the core factors here 
is consumers’ expectation of low food prices, and pre -2008, this expectation was 
met with continuing food price deflation. This expectation remains in force, 
especially with higher inflationary pressures on household expenditures. Food 
Inflation, Into a new Era and Food In Crisis all resulted in significant pressures on this 
outcome. In a situation where there is continued inflationary pressures on food 
production and input costs, along with pressure from retailers to keep costs low, 
supply actors feared there would be insufficient flexibility in the UK system to 
continue to absorb costs. The options for retailers are therefore to either pass on 
prices or initiate a greater switch away from UK production and processing towards 
lower cost imports. This balancing act could be seen as a point of vulnerability if 
further global cost pressures are felt (and seen as a major tipping point as discussed 
in Food in Crisis).   
There is a wider societal impact that was also highlighted by actors. The 
consequence of higher prices could create a bi-furcation of the market; between 
those that can afford higher priced, value-added products and those who are reliant 
on cheaper, and potentially lower quality, volume mass-produced food-stuffs.  From 
a government perspective, there is an expectation that retail competition, especially 
with the entry of low cost retailers, will act to dampen down any inflationary effects. 
The market here is seen as the mechanism to regulate food prices, whether that is 
through efficiency within the UK production and supply or through lower cost 
imports. However, there is a sense of pressure within the market and therefore the 
food system; pressure from global inflationary effects, pressure from retailers to 
preserve their own margins, pressure on the availability of cash and investment 
capital that despite a competitive retail sector could spill over into significantly 
higher food prices and the social consequences that this would entail. This potential 
vision of a more divided society, between those who can continue to have choice and 
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eat a healthy, balanced diet and those who may struggle to buy sufficient nutrition, 
presents a significant challenge to government and UK society as a whole.   
7.5.3 Quality and safety of food 
 
One of the basic outcomes of the food system is to provide safe food. This 
outcome also includes the ability to provide a certain level of product quality as 
expected by the consumer. This is in terms of its appearance, shelf-life, taste, 
labelling and packaging. The regulatory system is important in promoting better 
safety and food quality standards across the UK system. Supplementary to this are 
farm or quality assurance schemes as specified by retailers, manufacturers and 
processors. In reality much of the auditing and monitoring of standards in the 
network is now left to the retailers and their suppliers, rather than government 
bodies. This relies on trust between consumers and retailers that they will provide 
safe food but also are honest about product attributes. The food system therefore is 
contingent on both compliance but also traceability at all stages of the network to 
ensure quality and safety standards are upheld. However, actors highlighted 
insufficient traceability across parts of the system, especially for complex long, multi-
national supply chains. This is a serious problem for processed foods and ingredients 
supply chains. Actors identified this outcome as vulnerable, impacted by threats from 
food inflationary effects (cost and profit risks). Increasing cost pressures could see 
corners being cut and lower standards within UK production and for imports. At 
worst, there could be more instances of adulteration of foods and/or food fraud, 
again with potential harmful consequences. A lack of governance across chains 
exacerbates this vulnerability.  
7.5.4 Health outcomes 
 
While availability, affordability and quality have been seen as the primary 
objectives of any food system, the linkages between food and health outcomes are 
just as important. Thus health is seen as a desirable outcome of the overall food 
system. While supply actors saw this primarily as a market opportunity (in the 
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development of ‘healthy’ styled products), there was collective concern over the 
consequences of over-consumption and unhealthy choices. There was tension as to 
how far the market on its own will deliver the outcomes desired by government and 
how much there is a need for shaping and intervention by government. Government 
looks predominately to the food industry to deliver healthier eating through social 
responsibility means rather than through policy instruments such as taxation on the 
fat, sugar and salt content of food. However, the evidence here suggests that the 
industry will only go as far as the consumer demands on this issue, and then, 
sometimes only if there is commercial benefit in doing so. This conflict of commercial 
issues against wider societal concerns is then a point of vulnerability. 
 
7.5.5 Environmental outcomes 
 
A further outcome is that of environmental sustainability. However, this is 
where significant tension and conflict exist even in terms of its definition and the 
desired goals. As with health, there is a debate as to how achievable an agreed end 
state is. From a supply actors’ perspective, there was general recognition that more 
needed to be done to make the food system more environmentally sustainable. 
However there was significant divergence as to what this actually meant. From 
supply actors’ perspective, these discussions often focused on the need to reduce 
food waste and more efficient use of inputs (fertiliser), energy and water – in effect 
better resource utilisation. Even though Into a New Era sparked recognition of the 
potential impact of climate change, there was significant disagreement as to whether 
carbon needed to be controlled and to what level. Other aspects such as bio-diversity 
were viewed as at best a side issue and at worst as something which would need to 
be sacrificed. The reactions of supply actors to Into a New Era revealed an underlying 
view that structure and operation of the current system can be made sustainable. 
This is in contrast to periphery actors who start from a polar opposite position that 
the food system, as it is structured and organised now, is fundamentally 
unsustainable. This is based on concerns over levels of carbon emissions, soil 
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degradation, animal welfare issues, erosion of bio-diversity and the over-use of 
chemicals, principally driven by intensive production methods.  
There are also conflicts between how this change should be driven; either 
through consumer choice and pressure, through self-regulation in the food industry 
or through increased government intervention in policies and regulations. Again 
there is a question over how much is achievable by private organisations and supply 
chains, in light of their primary focus on growth and profits. The full cost of resources 
used by the food system, such as land, water, energy and carbon along with any 
negative environmental actions tend to be externalised (in that supply organisations 
do not fully bear all these costs) therefore acting as limits to the extent to which 
organisations will look to drive sustainability. All of this points to a level of stasis in 
the system, between consumers’ expectations, the pressures within the supply chain 
to grow market share and profits and the government’s reluctance to directly 
intervene. Environmental sustainability then, as an outcome of the food system, 
could be said to be highly vulnerable.  
7.5.6 Secondary outcomes 
 
There also exists a set of secondary outcomes of the food system. The UK 
food system contributes to the economy as a whole through exports and through the 
generation of employment. However, there are more implicit, often hidden, 
contributions which are difficult to quantify.  The importance of farming to land 
management is one such example; how rural land is managed and cared for is 
predominately in the hands of producers. Farming is also a contributor to rural 
communities.  
Critical mass, in relation to the farming base, also emerged as an important 
outcome, for producers and UK processors at least. This refers to the erosion of a 
particular sector past a certain point prompting a complete collapse with the 
associated loss of skills and expertise. This would create significant barriers (in terms 
of cost, skills and for dairy, herd replacements) that would create difficulties in 
resurrecting that particular sector in the future. If a sector collapses, or becomes 
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niche, it poses difficulties for other sectors e.g. the collapse of the dairy sector 
impacts on the beef sector. This again highlights the interdependencies across 
farming sectors. This question of the ‘right size’ for the UK farming base provides a 
fundamental debate for UK producers and processors. While this is often couched as 
the self-sufficiency debate, no supply actors were arguing for 100% self-sufficiency 
but raising the question as to what the right balance is.  From a producer and 
processor perspective, the higher the level of UK production, the better. However, 
this is less of an issue for multi-national manufacturers and retailers. They have the 
capability to source globally, if required, to meet cost and quality demands.  This 
reinforces the schism within the network – the farming base and producers 
inherently are more vulnerable to global competition and the effects of erosion on 
their sectors than manufacturers and retailers.  
7.6 Relative vulnerability 
 
This line of argument points to a property of vulnerability; that it is relative. 
How vulnerability is conceived is dependent on the position of actors within the 
network and whether the desired outcomes are expressed in terms of individual 
organisations, their supply chains or at a network-wide level.  Dairy producers are 
more vulnerable to input costs rises as they are unable to pass on costs to 
processors, due to the embedded cost and price structure of the industry. This 
causes a further vulnerability, if erosion in their industry continues. However, from a 
retailer perspective whether this is a vulnerability or not is dictated by their ability to 
source fresh milk elsewhere at reasonable costs and quality acceptable to the 
consumer.  
Whether or not the network is judged vulnerable is also dependent on the 
perspective taken. From a retailer perspective, network vulnerability is the ability of 
the UK food system to reliably produce the required volume at competitive costs and 
at the right level of quality. Wider societal outcomes, while not ignored, are not 
retailers’ primary concern and therefore any risks related to these outcomes will not 
be considered or generally acted on. However, looking at the system from a 
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government perspective, this lack of consideration means that longer term threats 
may impact negatively on the desired outcome of a population able to access 
affordable, healthy and sustainable food supplies. The system is therefore vulnerable 
from this perspective.   
There is also the question of trade-offs between outcomes and this was a 
theme present in the data. This is based on the premise presented by actors that it 
would be impossible to achieve the desired outcomes for all aspects of the food 
system principally due to limited resources (money especially) but also due to 
inherent conflicts between some of the outcomes. For example, actors portrayed the 
consequence of pursuing environmental sustainability as resulting in higher food 
prices, thus impacting adversely on affordability.  Sacrificing bio-diversity is seen here 
by some supply actors as a necessary evil in order to ensure that the food system 
was able to continue to provide sufficient availability of food. Other trades-offs were 
characterised as the inevitable acceptance of GM (to help develop more resource 
efficient crops and increase yields), a loosening of environmental regulation, 
especially on the restriction of chemicals.    
7.7 Conclusions 
 
This discussion therefore underlines the complexity of the concepts of risk 
and vulnerability. Vulnerability emerged as a multi-dimensional construct, composed 
of an interaction with risk, and whether this risk is perceived coupled with the ability 
of actors to mitigate impact. It is defined as ‘the level of exposure to risk and the 
capability to respond to reduce variance to desired outcomes’.   
Vulnerability is a function then of risk, risk perception, the relative level of 
exposure and the capability of actors to mitigate this risk to achieve desired 
outcomes. A set of exogenous and endogenous factors have a pluralistic effect on 
vulnerability, acting as either sources of risk, amplifiers or dampeners to the 
exposure to risk and constraints or enablers to the ability to act. Any risks which are 
not either visible or understood, which do not impact their organisation directly 
and/or they do not have the capability to mitigate pose significant threats. Ultimately 
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it is the expected outcomes as perceived by each actor, which drives how 
vulnerability is conceived or acted on.   
Vulnerability is also relative, based on actors’ perspectives and the desired 
outcomes associated with this perspective. For supply actors, actions to mitigate risk 
and reduce vulnerability are typically motivated predominately by perceived risks to 
market growth or profitability. However, there are wider outcomes of the system – 
those of affordability, availability, quality, safety and environmental sustainability. 
Threats to these outcomes are not likely to be addressed by single supply actors or 
supply chains. 
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Chapter Eight: Frameworks of risk and vulnerability: Towards 
New thinking? 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter critically assesses the findings and conceptual frameworks 
presented in the previous chapters by comparing them to the body of SC risk, 
vulnerability and resilience literature. This therefore looks to address research 
question three:- 
RQ3:   How adequate are these conceptual frameworks of vulnerability, 
resilience and adaptive capacity in light of global phenomena? 
It must be re-emphasised at this point that the research itself followed a 
grounded approach, rather than following a full grounded theory framework. In 
many instances of grounded theory, researchers are advised not to familiarise 
themselves with the literature prior to the empirical data collection and analysis (NB. 
There are multiple variations of grounded theory and Strauss and Corbin (1998) take 
a less strict view on this). As explained in Chapter Three, the use of grounded theory 
was not a feasible prospect as there was no opportunity for theoretical sampling and 
the researcher had already some understanding of the literature in the SCRM field 
(as part of the CH project). That said, the analysis of the data was performed without 
an a priori framework derived from the literature and this chapter therefore looks to 
compare the findings to existing frameworks of risk and vulnerability in the fields of 
SCRM, SCV and SCRES. Comparison of case findings to the literature, in the 
interpretative tradition, helps to support the generation of theory (Gill and Johnson, 
2002).  
The chapter starts by comparing the types of risk explored in Chapter Six, 
along with the framework which shows their interrelationship. It then moves to 
examine the vulnerability factors identified in Chapter Seven with other frameworks 
as presented in the SCV and SCRES literature. The conceptual framework of 
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vulnerability presented in Chapter Seven is explored in some detail as to how each 
element contributes to the fields of SC risk, vulnerability and resilience and how well, 
overall, this framework describes the dynamics of vulnerability.  
The chapter then presents a discussion on the implications of defining SC 
vulnerability at a network level. Here, a key finding is presented on how innovation 
and adaptive capacity is enacted in the food system, emerging from both the data 
and from the field of ecological resilience. It then moves to examine how the theory 
of system transition can support a wider understanding of the concepts of system 
change in the context of SC risk and vulnerability. 
8.2 Conceptualisations of risk 
   
The thesis has uncovered a number of key findings in relation to risk within a 
supply chain or network context. Each of these findings is shown in table 8.1. The 
first finding, that risk is difficult to quantify and often the outcomes unknowable, 
gives an insight into the difficulty, and often nonsensical nature, in trying to attach 
probabilities to risk.  This finding runs counter to a significant portion of SCRM 
literature, which looks to measure risk and ascribe a level of probability. The number 
of factors at work, and how they interact with each other, complex supply chain 
structures and levels of uncertainty make measurement, and even accurate 
prediction, an almost impossible task. Despite this, there was still some propensity 
among actors to want to attribute probability and likelihood of occurrences to the 
factors; often these arbitrary attributions of numbers gave a level of certainty or not 
to the risk under examination.  However, even where there were sets of clear, known 
risks (e.g. such as animal disease), which actors seemed comfortable in articulating, 
the specific outcomes were in essence still uncertain.  This perhaps chimes with the 
work of Taleb (2008) in that there is tendency to underestimate the probability of 
particular events and their impact. Models of risk, and vulnerability, which look to 
pin down the types of risk faced by organisations and supply chains by using of lists o 
risks and their probabilities do seem to tap into actors’ need for certainties and 
therefore could be seen as a good ‘rule of thumb’ when thinking about risks. 
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However, they must be used with caution as they can skew actions and mitigation 
towards obvious, less complex risks. The findings of the thesis here therefore agree 
with Peck (2005) and Trkman and McCormack (2009) that single, threat-based 
approaches (along with a measurement of risk) do not eliminate the risk entirely, 
only that specific manifestation of the threat. 
Recent literature in the field indicates a tendency for researchers to focus on 
operational risk rather than disruptive events (Sodhi et al., 2012). However, this also 
seems true of supply actors. When not presented with scenarios, actors tended to 
think about elements or factors which would create ongoing difficulties in their day 
to day operation to supply their chosen market. This aligns with research of Vlajic et 
al. (2012), who observed this phenomenon when examining a red meat supply chain. 
From a farming perspective, there is more appreciation of disruptive events – the 
experience of TB in herds is a particular example in dairy. However, it was only in 
response to Food In Crisis that the wider set of actors were drawn to the possibility 
of event based threats and how these could impact the supply network. This backs 
up the premise that operational risk is the primary focus of actors, sometimes at the 
expense of disruptive risks. However, both categories of risks need to be considered 
for any research or framework to be viable, particularly with actors’ potential blind 
spot towards disruptive events.    
The scenarios revealed a number of risks and outcomes which had not been 
considered by some actors. Into a New Era particularly challenged actors and, though 
the risks presented here had a rational logic, they were rejected as ‘unlikely’, possibly 
because they did not fit with the world view of some supply actors. This is related to 
the thesis finding that risk is subjective.  Actors tended to ignore those risks which 
they thought implausible i.e. a wholesale shift in consumer purchasing towards green 
choices. This again highlights the difficulty in this area of research, which is that risk is 
somewhat amorphous and difficult to quantify or confirm.  However, this also seems 
to confirm the view of March and Shapira (1987) that managers only tend to 
recognise those risks associated with plausible outcomes rather than those they 
thought unlikely.  The findings also concur with Zsidsin et al.’s (2004) definition of 
risk which exists only when an event is perceived as highly likely and with an 
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associated high impact and/or cost. It confirms the view held by Khan and Burnes 
(2007) that managers are pre-occupied with the negative concepts of risk. This 
research also reinforces the argument put forward by social scientists as part of the 
Royal Society report into risk (1992) that emphasised that risk is a socially 
constructed phenomenon which does not lend itself to objective measurement. As it 
would seem that there will always be non-quantifiable risk, uncertainties and 
unknowns, there needs to be recognition that there will always be ambiguity about 
the presence of risk and therefore difficulties in mitigating against it (Ritchie and 
Brindley, 2007, Trkman and McCormack, 2009). 
Chapter Six indicated that supply actors tended to articulate risk in terms of 
outcomes, expressed as negative impacts on cost, on profits or on revenue. This 
chimes with the findings of Tang and Musa (2011) and Vlajic et al. (2012). This may 
seem an obvious finding, as the organisations in the wheat and dairy sectors are 
ultimately commercial entities which rely on being cost competitive and having 
profits to sustain longevity. However, in the SCRM literature, this connection to 
economic outcomes is not always immediately obvious. This is an important point 
when trying to understand risk in relation to supply chain actors, as it indicates that 
risk is less likely to be considered or mitigated for, unless actors can make a direct 
linkage to cost or profit outcomes.  
Supply chain actors therefore tend to conceive risk as a loss, rather than as a 
variance i.e. the range of possible outcomes. This concurs with the findings of Khan 
and Burnes (2007), Rao and Goldsby (2009), Tang and Musa (2011).  This however 
draws attention to one of the fault lines in SCRM as noted by Peck (2006), between 
the conceptualisation of risk as a loss and risk as a variance. On balance, based on 
the work of Knight (1921) and March and Shapira (1987), the nature of risk is 
variance. From an SCRM perspective, the researcher here, agrees with Juttner (2005) 
that risk is the variation in distribution of possible supply chain outcomes. However, 
the dissonance between this normative definition of risk, and the valuative one held 
by actors needs to be comprehended in SCRM and SCV research.  
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There is the implication in much of the literature that there is a linear 
connection between risk and outcome, a one to one relationship. However, the 
research here has indicated that in reality, how actors perceive risks is much more 
complex. It is the combination of risks, which create more uncertainty and 
complexity, which reflects the reality that supply chains face. Risks become even 
more uncertain when dealing with multiple factors and complexities at a system level 
rather than just for an individual organisation or supply chain. This concurs with the 
view of Peck (2005) and Zsidisin and Ellram (2003) that risk is a multi-dimensional 
construct. 
Thesis Findings Agreement with literature Disagreement with 
literature 
Risk is difficult to quantify and the 
outcomes are often unpredictable 
-SCRM literature has a tendency 
to ignore uncertainties (Peck, 
2005) (Trkman and McCormack, 
2009) 
-Probabilities attached to risk are 
often underestimated (Taleb, 
2008) 
-Risk is measurable and 
quantifiable (Lockamy 
and McCormack, 2012, 
Kull and Talluri, 2008, 
Canbolat et al., 2008) 
 
Actors tend to focus on operational 
risk rather than disruption based risk 
-Supply chain risk is characterised 
as disturbances in operational 
performance (Vlajic et al., 2012) 
 
Risk is subjective, conceptualised by 
actors only when plausible and how 
it impacts negatively on their own 
organisation 
-Risk exists when it is viewed as a 
plausible threat and is likely to 
cause an event associated with 
impact or loss (Zsidsin et al. , 
2004) 
-Risk is only perceived when 
considered plausible ( March and 
Shapira, 1987) 
-Managers are preoccupied with 
the negative aspects of risk(Khan 
and Burnes, 2007) 
-Risk is socially constructed (The 
Royal Society, 1992) 
 
Risk is conceived in economic terms 
–  negative impacts on profit and 
revenue growth 
 
-Risk is conceived in terms of 
impact to operating costs (Vlajic 
et al. (2012) 
-Risk is conceived in terms of 
economic loss (Tang and Musa, 
2011) 
 
Risk is perceived by actors in terms 
of loss 
-Managers tend to perceive risk as 
a loss and focus on mitigating 
negative outcomes (Khan and 
Burnes, 2007, Rao and Goldsby, 
2009, Tang and Musa, 2011) 
 
There are complex interconnections 
between risks themselves 
 
-Risk is a multi-dimensional 
construct (Peck, 2005 and 
(Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003) 
 
Table 8.1 : Thesis findings on risk 
213 
 
8.3 The interconnections of risk 
 
Figure 8.1: The inter-relationships between risk 
The conceptual framework of risk explored in Chapter Six, and presented 
again here in figure 8.1, shows the categories of risk as perceived by supply actors 
and how they interlink. As can be seen in table 8.2, there is significant synergy 
between the categories of risk identified in this thesis and other prominent 
frameworks for the classification of risks affecting supply chains – that of Harland et 
al. (2003), Christopher and Peck (2004) and Manuj and Mentzer (2008a).  Here it is 
only structural risk and relational risk which do not directly correspond. While risk 
arising from the structure of the supply chain is not new  (see Craighead et al., 2007), 
there is little understanding of the impact of structure at a network level. The use of  
governance instruments to manage supply relations to reduce the risk associated 
with transaction costs or switching is well understood (Pilbeam et al., 2012, Gereffi et 
al., 2005); this is in effect TCE (Williamson, 1998). However, risk arising from the 
nature of relationships within supply chains is not well articulated or understood in 
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the SCRM literature. This would indicate that structural and relational risks, for food 
networks, are important risk categories and this research has helped to highlight this.  
 
Risk categories – 
Thesis 
Harland et al (2003) Risk categories 
(Christopher and Peck, 
2004) 
Risk categories 
(Manuj and Mentzer, 
2008a) 
Input and resource, 
cost and supply 
continuity risk 
Supply risk Supply Supply 
Market risk Customer risk Demand Demand 
Reputational risk Reputation risk 
Capability and 
operational risk 
Operations risk Process Operational 
 Asset impairment risk 
Compliance, 
Governance risk 
Strategic risk Control  
Structural risk   
Relational risk    
 Financial risk, Fiscal 
risk 
Environment Macro risks 
Governance risk Regulatory risk Policy risks 
Competition Competitive risk Competitive risks 
Input and resource 
risk 
 Resource risks 
 Legal risk  
Table 8.2 : Comparison of risk categories 
These categories, emerging from actors’ conceptualisation of risk, lend weight 
to the use of these types of frameworks as viable ways of conceptualising risk and 
uncertainty and could be helpful to actors in thinking about risks to their supply 
chain. However, as there are a number of risk classification frameworks, all with 
slight variations between them (including that presented in this thesis), this perhaps 
indicates that the grouping and classification of categories can be somewhat 
arbitrary. They are also contingent on the case studies under examination (and of 
course the interpretative framework imposed by the researcher). Chapter Six 
revealed how risks become more or less prevalent in actors’ thinking, dependent on 
their position within the supply chain. The conceptual framework presented here 
therefore contributes by confirming core categorisation of risks but also by 
identifying those that are deemed important for the food supply system (at least for 
the dairy and wheat sectors). This suggests that risk frameworks, if they are to be 
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used to help organisations identify risks, need to be tailored to reflect the risk profile 
of the sector under study and the positions of actors within the chain or network.  
This understanding of the need for unique risk profiling for sectors has 
important implications for SCRM and risk identification. The findings presented here 
also indicate that actors can be blind to risks which don’t affect their own particular 
organisation. This would seem to confirm the view of Harland et al (2003) that less 
than 50% of risk is visible to individual organisations.  
The framework presented here shows a further dimension to risk, by 
indicating that interlinkages exist between the different categories. Here, for 
example, compliance risks can lead to increased costs, which can lead to profit risk 
etc. Peck (2005) , along with Ritchie and Brindley (2007), highlight the 
interconnections between nodes/organisations in the network and how this 
ultimately means that risk can be transmitted up and down the supply network. The 
finding that risks themselves are also linked is not explicitly discussed in the SCRM or 
vulnerability literature. This therefore demonstrates a different dimension to the 
concept of the systemic nature of risk and how risks can escalate. This is important to 
understand as some actors may only perceive certain types of risks, based on their 
position within the supply network. This framework could help actors to think 
through how risks could escalate, both in terms of transmission through the network 
but also how they can transform into other types of risk.   
This interconnection between different types of risks suggests there may be 
trade-offs between actions and strategies employed to mitigate a certain type of risk. 
Mitigation actions, while reducing one type of risk, could actually result in a higher 
prevalence of another risk. Juttner (2005) characterises trade-offs as balancing 
decisions of supply chain performance with that of vulnerability. However, the 
evidence here indicates that there may be more complexity. For example, moving 
from single source to multiple source suppliers may reduce risks associated with 
availability/supply continuity but may in actual effect increase compliance risk – in 
that it becomes more difficult to audit or ensure compliance for a more complex 
supply chain. This implies that decision making by actors has to both balance supply 
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chain performance with that of vulnerability, but risk mitigation strategies also need 
to take into account how actions may have displaced this risk to other areas of the 
supply chain or operations.  
The risk framework presented in this thesis does not differentiate between 
those risks internal to the organisation or those originating externally within the 
wider environment. Here the drivers of risk are not explicit, only the area or 
operational performance at risk is manifest. There is therefore no inclusion of 
variables which are driving this particular risk, i.e. the risk sources as defined by 
Juttner (2005). It is only when the construct of vulnerability is explored that the 
drivers and sources of risk and uncertainty emerge. Actors also tended to extrapolate 
from the type of risk to a direct outcome on performance; risk was then 
conceptualised in terms of cause and effect (as indicated by Peck (2005).  Again, this 
is only implied in this framework. There is therefore a more explicit interrelationship 
between threats, the source of the risks and the potential outcomes. This suggests 
that using risk categories alone creates an incomplete picture. It also indicates that it 
is difficult to separate risk from vulnerability, and resilience; in essence all need to be 
considered to understand supply chain risk. The three conceptual frameworks 
presented in the thesis – of risks to the food supply network, the system factors 
which impact on vulnerability and the dynamics of vulnerability – are all interlinked 
and need to be seen together to represent the picture of vulnerability for the food 
system.   
The tendency to focus on threats  and their direct outcomes in risk literature 
is heavily criticised by Peck (2005) and Trkman and McCormack (2009). It is 
important to note, therefore, that ‘outcomes’ here represent the area impacted, 
rather than a specific detailed, predicted event. The contribution of the thesis is 
therefore that, while the conceptualisation of risk sources rather than outcomes is 
valid, it is difficult to isolate these sources from the area of impact and there is a 
complex, mutual interaction between the sources of risk and impacts. This therefore 
needs to be taken into account when conceptualising risk within supply chains and 
networks. 
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8.4 Vulnerability factors and framework 
 
8.4.1. Comparison of frameworks 
 
Chapter Seven presented two conceptual frameworks related to SCV. The first 
presented a framework of exogenous and endogenous vulnerability factors which 
emerged from the data, the second describes the dynamics or interactions between 
these factors, risks, decision making and ultimate outcomes for the food system. The 
next section therefore explores in turn how these frameworks compare to previous 
conceptualisations of vulnerability.  
The first conceptual framework looks to align the differing factors which 
emerged from the data that impacted on actors’ thinking and how they articulated 
vulnerability. The framework includes a mix of both exogenous and endogenous 
factors, structures, behaviours, beliefs and strategies. Previous researchers have also 
presented frameworks which look to identify factors which impact on risk and 
vulnerability – namely Rao and Goldsby (2009), Ritchie and Brindley (2007), Trkman 
and McCormack (2009) and Pettit et al. (2010). This comparison of the factors 
identified in this thesis to previously defined frameworks, along with other relevant 
factors prominent in the wider SCRM and SCV literature, is shown in table 8.3. 
Vulnerability factors Ritchie 
and 
Brindley 
(2007) 
Trkman and 
McCormack 
(2009) 
Rao and 
Goldsby 
(2009) 
Pettit et 
al. (2010) 
Other references 
Global endogenous 
factors 
X X X X Christopher and 
Holweg (2011) 
Access to markets      
Degree of dependency 
(on global markets) 
X    Wagner and Bode 
(2006), Christopher et 
al. (2011) 
Economic structure of 
the UK 
X  X  (Manuj and Mentzer, 
2008b, Vlajic et al., 
2012) 
Consumer 
expectations 
 X X  Vlajic et al. (2012) 
Societal value of food    X  
Political will and 
intervention 
  X X  
Regulatory and policy 
framework 
   X  
Power      
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Level of supply chain 
integration 
    Collaboration 
Christopher and Peck 
(2004) 
Supply chain structure X   X Craighead et al. 
(2007) 
Cost and pricing 
structure 
X   X  
Interdependencies X   X Wagner and Bode 
(2006) 
Perceptions of risk 
and vulnerability 
X  X  March and Shapira 
(1987), Zsidisin et al. 
(2004) 
Faith in markets      
Faith in technological 
solutions 
     
Scale and efficiencies      
Trust and confidence  
(between partners) 
     
Belief in sustainability 
of the system 
     
Strategy norms      
Table 8.3: Comparison of factors to existing frameworks of vulnerability factors 
As can be seen from the table, there is no single framework which maps 
exactly onto the factors identified in this research. It must be noted that the 
frameworks presented in the literature tend to be generic – not industry specific. The 
research here is novel as it is the first research which looks to identify the specific 
factors which impact on vulnerability in the food supply system that have been 
grounded in the experience and perceptions of actors in the supply chain under 
study.  This is therefore an ideographic framework (Gill and Johnson, 2002) which 
presents those factors that actors perceived to have importance. In a sense, it is 
idiosyncratic to the wheat and dairy food networks, and partly to the food network 
as a whole. It is therefore not too surprising to find factors present here which have 
not been identified as part of other generic frameworks (and vice versa).   
This again underlines the somewhat messy nature of empirical research, in 
that it often doesn’t quite fit into previously developed theoretical frameworks. 
Consequently, there are also factors which are present in the literature, that are not 
present in this framework. Factors such as poor supplier performance (Vlajic et al., 
2012), product liability uncertainty (Rao and Goldsby, 2009), technological 
turbulence (Trkman and McCormack, 2009) don’t feature. This does not mean that 
these factors are definitively not sources of risk for the food system, just that they 
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did not emerge from the data as they were not deemed as important by actors. This 
raises two important points. Firstly, it demonstrates the complexity associated with 
examining risk and vulnerability and the difficulty in identifying core factors which 
drive these. It is therefore difficult to bring together comprehensive frameworks of 
factors. Secondly, while it is important to understand which factors are more 
important in particular supply networks, it may be difficult to differentiate between 
factors which are either not present or whether there is a blind spot in actors’ 
perceptions.  
However, despite this idiosyncratic nature of the conceptual framework, 
there are still notable exceptions where a particular factor is not present or explicitly 
discussed in the literature. In particular, the framework draws attention to specific 
values and mind-sets which seem to characterise, at least, some of the thinking in 
much of the mainstream food industry (for wheat and dairy). These are faith in 
markets and technological solutions, beliefs as to whether the food system is 
environmentally sustainable which all contribute to how actors perceive risk. These 
are therefore drivers of vulnerability as they are important influences on actors’ 
thinking and clearly emerged from the data. This suggests a gap in previous 
frameworks and the need to understand how inherent beliefs and norms within an 
industry can impact on risk and vulnerability. 
Often missed in conceptualisations of vulnerability are the relationship 
between power and risk, integration and the role of trust and confidence. Power is a 
core concept for SCM, as are trust and confidence (as antecedents to collaboration 
and integration) but there seems to be little or no conceptualisation of how this plays 
into SC risk and vulnerability. Power in the food network was seen as vitally 
important by supply actors and how business partners interact with each other was 
viewed either as a source of resilience or vulnerability. The perceived abuse of power 
by retailers, and the lack of trust in dealings with supply partners, is seen as a 
particular vulnerability by processors and farmers, especially in the dairy sector. How 
integration impacts on vulnerability is also not explicit in the SCRM and SCV 
literature, although Christopher and Peck (2004) along with Juttner and Maklan 
(2011) highlight collaboration as a core way to mitigate risk. Again, integration forms 
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a fundamental core of SCM but is not prominent in SCV literature. The treatment of 
integration, along with the role of power, trust and confidence in influencing 
vulnerability, is a perceived gap in the SCRM and SCV literature.  
 
8.4.2 Interaction of factors on vulnerability 
 
Chapter Seven explored the interaction of these factors with vulnerability.  
Findings revealed that the factors can interact in multiple ways on vulnerability. They 
can be sources of risk, act as dampeners or amplifiers to risk exposure or be enablers 
or constraints to the capability to mitigate risks. Dependent on how each factor is 
shaped, they can act in some circumstances as risk sources, as a dampener, as an 
amplifier or even, in some cases as constraints or enablers. This therefore revealed 
the plural characteristic of these factors. 
Again, it is difficult to directly map this finding onto previous research. No 
previous framework has classified factors in this way. Previous research has referred 
to factors as either framework factors (Rao and Goldsby, 2009), uncertainties 
(Trkman and McCormack, 2009), risk drivers (Ritchie and Brindley, 2007), drivers of 
vulnerability (Wagner and Bode, 2006) or risk sources (Juttner, 2005). While 
Juttner(2005) clearly defines risk sources as ‘variables which cannot be predicted 
with any certainty and from which disruptions can emerge’ (pg.122 Juttner, 
2005),the definition of the other classifications of factors is less clear. This suggests 
that there is ambiguity and confusion between these classifications, with each term 
used interchangeably. This is a view supported by Peck (2005).   
However, it is how each factor interacts with vulnerability that matters more. 
While Peck (2005) identified that actors do not generally distinguish between risk 
sources, risk and risk drivers, the research shows that actors do distinguish between 
the factors acting as enablers, constraints, amplifiers or dampeners of risk. Previous 
researchers have articulated how the shaping of the legal, economic landscape can 
impact the risk profile of an industry and that the operation within the supply chain 
itself will also act to increase or dampen vulnerability (Wagner and Bode, 2006, 
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Juttner and Maklan, 2011). Craighead et al. (2007) postulate how structural 
characteristics of supply chains can amplify the severity of disruptions, while better 
abilities to detect disturbance act as enablers to reduce the impacts of events. This 
demonstrates that the conceptualisation of factors acting in these ways is not new. 
However, this finding contributes to the literature by providing a clearer classification 
as to how factors can interact with both vulnerability and resilience. It also 
contributes by postulating that it is how each factor is shaped, with reference to the 
supply chain context, that results in these different interactions with vulnerability 
and resilience. Thus, each factor can exhibit a plurality of characteristics and can 
combine in unique ways to impact the relative vulnerability or resilience of a system.  
The interaction between the characteristics of factors and their effect on 
vulnerability and resilience reflects Peck’s 2005 conceptualisation of vulnerability. 
Here she characterises the complex interplay between sources, dependencies and 
drivers that ultimately result in manifestations of risk and vulnerability at multiple 
levels of the network. This research here reinforces the systemic nature of 
vulnerability, and agrees with Peck’s (2005) comment that reductionist research 
approaches to SC risk and vulnerability will struggle to encompass this complexity 
and interconnection. Only from a network perspective and from a multi-dimensional 
examination of factors can a more complete picture be drawn of the potential 
vulnerabilities of a supply chain and its wider system.  
8.5 Definitions and dynamics of vulnerability 
8.5.1 Definition of vulnerability 
 
The definition of vulnerability that emerges from the research is that it is ‘the 
level of exposure to risk and the capability to respond to reduce variance to desired 
outcomes’. That vulnerability is the exposure to risk is in agreement with the 
literature on SC vulnerability. However, the second conceptual framework presented 
in Chapter Seven and shown again in figure 8.2, demonstrates the multi-dimensional 
aspect of vulnerability. This definition also aligns with both Juttner’s 2005 definition 
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and that of Rao and Goldsby (2009) that it is also the variance in expected outcomes 
that defines vulnerability.  
In addition, the definition presented here combines concepts of resilience, in 
that it encompasses the capability of the system to respond (Ponomarov and 
Holcomb, 2009, Ponis and Koronis, 2012). While resilience is a separate concept in its 
own right, this definition indicates that there is a direct linkage between the 
response taken and the level of exposure to risk. This aligns with the 
conceptualisations of Pettit et al. (2010) as their framework directly links 
vulnerability (and factors which drive vulnerability) to capabilities (the abilities of the 
supply chain to respond i.e. resilience).  
This definition underlines the systemic linkages between vulnerability, risk 
and resilience (Peck, 2005). Here, vulnerability is bound up in the interconnections 
and complexities involved in the identification of risk and uncertainties, the level of 
exposure and the impetus to act to mitigate or control. Thus there is an inherent 
interrelationship between risk, vulnerability and resilience where each element 
cannot be isolated and examined independently of the others. This is often not taken 
into account in the literature in this field. The findings in this thesis indicate that, 
while research undertaken to further the understanding of each construct is 
important, the systemic interlinkages between the three must also be taken into 
account to support and build a more holistic understanding. 
8.5.2 The dynamics of vulnerability 
 
The conceptual framework in Chapter Seven, and presented again here in 
figure 8.2, looks to demonstrate the dynamics of risk, vulnerability and resilience. 
The core dynamics of the framework are:- 
- Exposure to risk and uncertainties 
- The agency to act 
- The capability to act 
- Variance between actual and desired outcomes 
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Exposure is a function of risk and uncertainties and how vulnerability factors 
are shaped to amplify or dampen this exposure. The agency to act is whether actors 
see the need to act. Resilience is a function of whether actors have the capability to 
act and whether the desired outcome can be achieved. Again, vulnerability factors 
could be acting at this stage to constrain or enable resilience.  
 
Figure 8.2: Dynamics of vulnerability (thesis findings) 
This conceptual framework has synergy with that of Pettit et al. (2010), 
shown in figure 8.3. Here, their framework conceptualises resilience as a function of 
both vulnerability and the capability to respond. It also reinforces the linkage 
between vulnerability, resilience and levels of outcomes, in this case supply chain 
performance and/or impact on profitability. Here, capabilities are defined as 
‘attributes that enable an enterprise to anticipate and overcome disruption’ (pg. 6 
Pettit et al., 2010). Their framework therefore emphasises the important of 
managerial capabilities in building resilience, in that resilience arises only when 
capabilities are matched to vulnerabilities. Pettit et al. (2010) view capability building 
as a direct response to resilience and therefore outcome. As the thesis’ conceptual 
framework emerged from a grounded approach, rather from a literature review, it 
provides a level of external validity for Petit et al.’s framework; in that actors’ 
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conceptualisation is aligned to this theoretical representation. However, the 
framework presented in the thesis develops a more holistic view, linking the 
likelihood of actors perceiving and acting on risk (agency) to capabilities and the 
types of actions undertaken to support resilience. The next section deals with these 
elements of the framework in turn. 
 
 Figure 8.3 : Supply chain resilience framework  (pg.8 Pettit et al., 2010) 
8.5.3 The agency to act 
 
The importance of agency on vulnerability is highlighted in this framework. 
Here it is a function of whether or not a risk is perceived both as likely and having the 
potential to significantly impact on desired outcomes, along with the control or 
power to act.  Agency in this conceptual framework is therefore a combination of:- 
- perceiving risks to have a likely, significant impact on organisation’s supply chain 
and operations 
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- a perceived clear benefit to putting in place mitigation actions or strategies to 
increase resilience 
- the power to act being within the organisation’s control 
 
Here the conceptual framework confirms a number of different aspects of agency 
which occur throughout the SCRM and vulnerability literature namely:- 
- Decision makers are hampered by the lack of information and the complexity of 
interactions between risks (Chopra and Sodhi, 2004) 
- Actors often do not have influence over risks arising from the supply chain 
(Ritchie and Brindley, 2007) 
- Actors have a tendency to extrapolate the future from past events – in that the 
future, in their thinking, looks very much like the present and past (Taleb, 2008, 
Snowden and Boone, 2007) 
- Decisions to mitigate are based on knowledge of the risk environment, rules and 
procedures of the organisation and bounded rationality of the decision makers 
(Rao and Goldsby, 2009) 
- Actors will only look to mitigate if they can see a cost-benefit in their favour or 
there is an agreed collaborative and risk-sharing agreement between supply 
partners (Bakshi and Kleindorfer, 2009) 
 
However, the data suggests that the perception of risk and therefore agency, 
is also affected by the beliefs and mind-sets within the industry e.g. belief in the 
sustainability of the system. These mind-sets seem to act as further filters to 
recognising or accepting the possibility of risk and its potential impact.  If the risk is 
not articulated, if there are significant uncertainties, or where there is disagreement 
as to the extent of the risk, organisations will not act to mitigate the risk or develop 
resilience. There is therefore a dissonance between the actual potential for loss and 
the perceived potential for loss. If these two factors are significantly out of step, then 
this creates a blind-spot. This dissonance is not widely discussed in the SCRM or SC 
vulnerability literature but could be a major contributor to these fields. 
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8.5.4 Capabilities to support resilience 
 
The core category identified as the capability to act, aligns with much of the 
literature on resilience. Here, capability to act is characterised as the strategic 
capability to deal with or mitigate for risk. These capabilities include:- 
- having a strategy to build resilience into the organisation or supply chain 
(Sheffi and Rice, 2005) 
- fostering a supply chain risk management culture  (Christopher and Peck, 
2004) 
 
However, here the data revealed further aspects to capability, namely 
whether there were sufficient skills, sufficient investment or cash and in some cases, 
access to appropriate technologies. These are acute issues for the farming base and 
smaller processing plants, but were expressed as general concerns by all actors 
across the food network. 
8.5.5 Actions to support resilience 
 
This part of the conceptual framework relates to the actions undertaken to 
either mitigate any vulnerability or to increase resilience. Here there is a high level of 
synergy in the literature as to the types of actions and strategies that organisations 
can undertake. These predominately revolve around increasing redundancy (Sheffi 
and Rice, 2005, Peck, 2005, Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005), flexibility (Juttner and 
Maklan, 2011, Christopher et al., 2011, Sheffi and Rice, 2005) visibility (Christopher 
and Peck, 2004, Juttner and Maklan, 2011) and collaboration (Juttner and Maklan, 
2011, Christopher and Peck, 2004). 
These elements seem undoubtedly important to develop resilience within a 
supply chain. Collaboration and visibility both emerged from the data as contributors 
to resilience.  Actors from the research highlighted both the need for greater 
transparency through the chain and better sharing of risk related information. They 
also called for greater co-ordination along the chain. What was not evidently present 
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in the data were the concepts of flexibility or the velocity and pace of response or 
adaptation, also missing was how quickly supply chains were able to learn from 
previous experiences in order to adapt structures. Some actors did draw attention to 
the slower cycle of response inherent in the farming process; therefore indicating a 
lack of flexibility at this end of the network. Wheat farmers operate on a yearly 
planning cycle while dairy farmers consider a longer cycle, of between 2-5 years. 
These longer planning cycles are out of step with the rest of the supply chain and 
underline the differences inherent in understanding vulnerability and resilience 
concepts at a farming level. 
As discussed in Chapter Seven, there was also significant resistance to the 
concepts of redundancy. In contrast, opposite strategies were employed to reduce 
over-capacity and further concentrate assets. These were seen as necessary to 
counter any future expected squeeze on profits and inflationary effects on costs. In 
most cases, mainstream supply chain actors called for even more concentration 
which suggests that the trajectory of the industry is to become even more 
interconnected, with less redundancy.  
Innovation emerged as a strong theme, perceived as supporting increased 
resilience within the food system. This was primarily articulated as technological 
innovation directed at either products (including the biological manipulation of seeds 
and/or animals) or agricultural and food manufacturing processes. Firstly, innovation 
to create value-adding products was seen as a core strategy to reduce the level of 
market, profit and cost risk. Secondly, innovation to reduce resource utilisation but 
increase efficiencies and output - sustainable intensification – was seen as both a 
counter to cost and profit risks but also to any potential environmental constraints 
on inputs. Innovation features as part of ecological resilience and both novelty and 
innovation are inherent properties of an adaptive system (Allen and Holling, 2010). 
However, its connection to resilience is not mentioned in the traditional SCRM, SCV 
and SCRES literature. 
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8.5.6 Wider consequences of vulnerability 
 
The findings revealed that vulnerability is in effect relative, to the position in 
the supply chain and on the perspective taken. This is coherent with the literature. 
Trkman and McCormack (2009) and Ritchie and Brindley (2007) both see risk (and 
hence vulnerability) as being contingent on the industry, the position within the 
network and on individual organisational performances. However, there is no 
comprehension in the traditional literature as to how vulnerability profiles can be 
perceived as being different, dependent on the perspective taken. Perspective, as 
defined here, has two elements. Firstly, whether vulnerability is being assessed at a 
supply chain or at a network level and secondly, related to the motives and 
intentions of actors who are assessing vulnerability.  
The conceptual framework developed here can be used at an organisational, 
a supply chain and at a network level, and from different perspectives. While this is 
potentially true of other frameworks, these levels of assessment are not explicitly 
discussed. In particular, taking a policy and network perspective of vulnerability 
radically changes the profile. Here the wider outcomes of the food system become 
important – those of availability, affordability, quality and safety of food, health, 
environmental and other secondary outcomes. This finding links to a subsequent 
finding, that the constructs of risk and vulnerability go beyond the normal economic-
technical definitions and encompasses the social and environmental dimensions of 
supply networks. This confirms the view of Peck (2006). This conceptual framework 
therefore supports both the widening of the constructs of SCV and SCRES and 
provides a conceptualisation at this level. 
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8.6 Ecological resilience, network vulnerability and adaptive capacity 
 
8.6.1 Network vulnerability and ecological resilience 
 
The thesis findings, at a network level, have synergy with models of ecological 
resilience and these provide a useful way of conceptualising issues at this level. The 
food system can be described as an ecological system. The prevalence towards 
strategies of economies of scale and concentration of assets to create larger, more 
centralised plants and distribution centres highlights the continued high level of 
accumulated capital tied up in the system, creating a more interconnected network. 
Capital in the system can also be described as the level of resources such as land, 
water and carbon, which are tied up in food production, whether the food is 
produced in the UK or elsewhere. There is also a significant level of cash and capital 
needed to fuel the system, to facilitate the flow of products to meet demand from 
farm through to retail.  These findings reveal a UK food system which is mature, 
highly inter-connected and asset rich; it therefore can be seen as in a ‘conservation 
phase’ (Allen and Holling, 2010). From an ecological sense, he UK food system, at a 
network level, can be described as brittle. This concurs with the findings of Fraser et 
al. (2005).  
The tendency for actors to have blind-spots has a significant, and potentially 
severe, implication at a network level. Highly connected flows and centralised assets 
are perceived by mainstream supply actors as necessary to maintain competiveness.  
The potential fragility associated with these structures is therefore a blind-spot, and 
as the conceptual framework in figure 8.2 demonstrates, what is not perceived as a 
risk, is not acted on.  A further blind spot is related to the schism between supply 
actors and periphery actors over the inherent environmental and social sustainability 
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of the current food system. In particular, supply actors did not perceive the extent of 
risk associated with environmental factors (the potential impacts of climate change is 
an example of this). This serves to indicate that there are potentially significant 
vulnerabilities at a network level that the field of ecological resilience can help to 
articulate.  
8.6.2 Adaptive capacity and innovation 
 
Ponomarov and Holcomb (2009) define adaptive capacity as the ability of 
supply chains to recover from major disruption by maintaining ‘continuity of 
operations at the desired level of connectedness and control over structure and 
function’ (pg. 131, Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009). This implies a need for rapid 
agility and flexibility within the supply chain. Christopher and Holweg’s concept 
(2011) of ‘structural flexibility’ suggests that there is also a need for supply chains to 
be able to re-configure operations in response to turbulence in the business 
environment.  The definition of resilience offered by Ponis and Koronis (2012), which 
deals with the adaptability of the supply network, suggests that the ideal goal for any 
network in dealing with disruption is to create competitive advantages in the post-
event state. This suggests that there is an element of proactive design and 
management to create more competitive structures and processes. These 
definitions, however, do not consider fundamental re-configuration at a network 
level.  From an ecological resilience perspective, different structures could potentially 
deliver better performance in terms of wider social and environmental outcomes 
(Gunderson, 2000). This then has implications for the concept of adaptive capacity, 
innovation and its role in supporting resilience. 
Innovation emerged as a key strategy for resilience and for adaptive capacity. 
However, innovation within the mainstream food system is narrowly interpreted as 
product or process driven. Supply actors tend to pursue strategies to innovate and 
increase efficiencies within the current framework of processes and products, rather 
than look to fundamentally change structures and process.   
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The evidence suggests, however, that this narrow interpretation of 
innovation is not sufficient to develop adaptive capacity as actors are locked into 
what are, in effect, reductionist strategies.  There is little support for 
experimentation and innovation in the way in which food can be produced and 
delivered.  For example, experimentation to change farming systems, such as organic 
systems, is dismissed by mainstream supply actors as niche; it is believed that 
organics are not able to deliver the yields needed to meet growing food demand.  
Here, the concepts of ecological resilience, in that the system could have multiple 
steady states, are not considered. Any switch towards a different end-state, with 
different organisational and behavioural properties, would be considered as a failure 
of resilience by most mainstream actors. 
This insight leads to a further significant finding of the study. There emerges, 
from both the data and the concepts of ecological resilience, a framework which 
shows how innovation interacts with adaptive capacity. This is shown in the 
conceptual framework in figure 8.4. Each axis represents an increasing level of 
change. The horizontal axis represents change at a product and process level, while 
the vertical axis indicates change in the systems and structures. This then identifies 
two core stages along each axis:- 
- adaptation – gradual evolution or minor adjustments to product/processes or 
structure  
- innovation – where there is radical change in product/processes or structures. 
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Figure 8.4: Dimensions of adaptive capacity 
To illustrate the dynamics of this, mapped onto this framework are the four 
different scenarios. Just a Blip created an environment in which there was no need 
for rapid or significant innovation, while Food Inflation demanded innovation in 
processes and products. Food in Crisis required a rapid response and triggered some 
temporary changes in the network structure. Into a New Era, however, represented 
an operating environment which required significant innovation, and therefore 
change, in both structures and processes. From an ecological resilience perspective, 
Into A New Era, represents a potentially less vulnerable and more resilient way of 
organising the food system. This is due to the focus on smaller scale organisations, 
more diversity with more producers and processors, less concentration and less 
interconnectivity between nodes.  
The blue rectangle on the graph represents the core area of focus for 
innovation in the UK food system (as identified in the data).  This has significant 
implications for adaptive capacity, and therefore resilience and there are questions 
as to the dangers of this widespread focus on one dimensional, process-orientated 
innovation. This framework suggests that adaptive capacity needs to feature both 
types of innovation to support a more resilient system. 
Innovation focus  
for food system 
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Recent research into antecedents to resilience does not cover the potential 
importance of innovation. While the concepts of adaptive capacity are still implied 
through the definitions of resilience, there is little comprehension of how innovation 
plays into this concept. Here, then the contribution of the thesis remains pertinent in 
postulating that innovation is a key component of resilience and that both structural 
and process innovation are need to support adaptive capacity. This conceptual 
framework therefore provides a way of conceptualising adaptive capacity at a 
network level and demonstrates linkages between innovation and adaptive capacity. 
This is a significant contribution to SCRES and starts to build theory as to the nature 
of innovation and its important interaction with resilience and adaptive capacity at a 
network level.    
8.7 System transition and network vulnerability 
 
An important insight from the thesis analysis is the inter-changeable nature 
between risk and change at a network level.  The data revealed that for some actors, 
global risks had the potential to trigger change. For example, if there was a 
continuation of a more volatile global market, and therefore volatile pricing, some 
actors saw this as heralding a new set of trading conditions, which would require 
organisations to employ different strategies. Shifts in consumer preferences, global 
market conditions or supply availability were also seen as potential triggers for 
change. Here, change was often conceptualised as gradual rather than as sudden and 
large-scale. This is akin to the definition of turbulence (Trkman and McCormack, 
2009) where there is an element of continuous risk and volatility, either in terms of 
marketplace, technology or in the wider environment. The data revealed an inherent 
fuzziness as to how and when risk morphs into change and whether the changes 
needed were gradual or transformational. There is also the risk that the impact of 
ongoing turbulence will trigger sudden, shock based changes to the network and 
therefore the need for regime transformation. 
The theory of system transition, as developed by Geels (2002), was found to 
be a useful way of trying to articulate these issues and generate a more systemic 
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understanding of the linkages between change and vulnerability. This theory offers a 
different way of organising the vulnerability factors, as identified in Chapter Seven, 
and their interlinkages (see table 8.4).  Here, Geels’ landscape pressures are akin to 
global factors (higher food demand and potential for global supply constraints) along 
with UK macro-economic, political (regulatory) factors, societal and consumer 
expectations (in effect the range of exogenous factors identified in Chapter Seven). 
The socio-technical regime, i.e. the food network, is shaped by the supply chain 
structure, beliefs and mind-sets including faith in markets and technological solutions 
and the set of actions and behaviours exhibited by actors. 
System transition elements Vulnerability factors 
Landscape pressures Global demand/supply factors 
Economic structure of the UK 
Consumer expectations 
Societal value of food 
Political intervention and will 
Regulatory and policy framework 
Socio-technical regime Power (esp. retail power) 
Supply chain structure 
Level of supply chain integration 
Cost/pricing structures 
Interdependencies 
Perception of risk and vulnerability 
Faith in markets 
Faith in technological solutions 
Trust and confidence 
Belief in environmental sustainability of system 
Strategy norms 
Technological niches Product/process based innovations 
( including GM and bio-technologies) 
Table 8.4: Comparison of system transition elements to vulnerability factors 
Only those technological niches seen as primarily supporting process or 
product based innovation were articulated by mainstream supply actors. GM was 
one of the most cited technological niches, along with bio-technology and 
nanotechnology (to support product innovation). However, these types of 
technological advances were not perceived as threatening, or having the ability to 
create turbulence or indeed having the capacity to trigger fundamental regime 
transformation. Instead, these niches were seen as vital as responses to concerns 
over environmental sustainability, supporting the need to produce a greater volume 
of food more efficiently with fewer inputs i.e. sustainable intensification.  
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This again supports the premise that process and product innovation is more 
prevalent in the food network. It is also an indication of actors’ confidence in the 
current arrangement of rules and structures, and how innovation at a 
process/product level, is seen as the most likely mechanism to help ease landscape 
pressures – without the need for socio-technical regime change.  This narrow 
support for process led innovation only, could pose a threat by stifling any innovation 
to find new ways to organise food supply chains. Tying this in with ecological 
definitions of resilience, there is a need for any system to be sustainable through the 
encouragement of widespread innovation and experimentation. It is often through 
the support of technological niches, as described by Geels (2002), where the 
potential for new structures and behaviours can be tested and piloted. More 
proactive support for experimentation in new structures at a niche level, could test 
any potential solutions to help with a wider transition of the mainstream regimes. If 
the system becomes inherently unsustainable, and future pressures trigger change – 
either through catastrophic changes or as a gradual decline – having a broader base 
of innovation can support a more managed, less damaging transition to new 
structures and operating models. 
While actors articulated a range of global landscape pressures, there is 
dissonance as to how they believe these will affect the UK food system. It is either 
that they do not believe that the pressures will build so much as to trigger a system 
change, or that they cannot perceive a different system to the one already in place. 
This is partly driven by a lack of an agreed vision of a sustainable food system. There 
is also a sense, therefore, of mainstream food actors’ belief in the adaptive capacity 
of the current system to cope with risks associated with this turbulence.  This is also 
perhaps linked to a natural inbuilt expectation which often expects the future to look 
similar to the past. Berkhout et al. (2004) describe this as ‘teleological’ 
transformation, informed by previous experience of change within the system.  
Whether supply actors accept the need for change, and how this change is 
conceived, is a key determiner of whether there is any transition enacted (Smith et 
al., 2005). If there is not a commonly agreed and articulated need for change, there 
will be not a co-ordinated response within the regime to adapt to landscape 
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pressures (Smith et al., 2005a).  Where there is some consensus (i.e. that global 
dynamics could result in price volatility and pressures on input costs) there is more 
impetus for actors to take action; this can be seen in the type of strategies currently 
employed (e.g. cost reduction, product innovation).  Where there is dissonance – the 
debate over climate change or the extent to which change is need to create a more 
sustainable system and the shape of this system – there is an overall lack of co-
ordinated action for change within the regime. 
Power here is a key factor. Where there are coalitions of actors who are 
technically, financially and politically powerful, they are able to influence the 
development of the regime, which in some circumstances could present a level of 
inertia against changing in the face of extreme pressures (Smith et al, 2005).  The 
retailers, along with brand manufacturers, wield power sufficient to dictate the 
operational requirements for their immediate supply chains. However, from their 
perspective resilience, and consequently vulnerability, is more about how they can 
protect their ability to trade, create profits and grow, rather than achieving the wider 
outcomes of the food network. Perceptions of risk at a network level, particularly 
those which may trigger regime change are either not seen or are not seen as 
important to act upon.  
Adaptive capacity, in relation to system transition, is conceptualised as the 
available resources at actors’ disposal in order to be able to maintain a status quo or 
enact a change (Smith et al., 2005). It could be argued that from this context, the UK 
food system has a low level of adaptive capacity; in that it has an inbuilt resistance to 
regime change, both structural and behavioural. From a wider system perspective, 
this in-built stasis creates a level of vulnerability, both in the ability of the system to 
adapt to external pressures but also in delivering the desired social, economic and 
environmental outcomes from the food system. This demonstrates that the concepts 
of socio-technical regime transition help to build a better understanding of 
vulnerability at a supply network level.  
There is no research to date that examines the cross-over points between 
supply chain vulnerability and the concepts of system transition.  The research here 
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highlights gaps in the current frameworks of conceptualising vulnerability as change, 
particularly system/regime change and the ability of the industry network to meet 
wider societal – economic, social and environmental – outcomes. This transcends the 
mainstream SCRM, SCV and SCRES literature and lives in the realm of system 
governance and policy interventions. 
8.8 Conclusions 
This chapter has explored how the key findings and conceptual frameworks 
developed as part of this thesis relate to the literature in the fields of SCRM, SCV and 
SCRES. It has identified a number of contributions to these fields, these are 
summarised in table 8.5 below. 
 
ACADEMIC 
FIELD 
FINDING AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
 
 
 
Risk 
Risk is difficult to quantify and the outcomes are often unpredictable 
 
Actors tend to focus on operational risk rather than disruption based risk. 
However, both types of risk are present in supply chains and conceptual 
frameworks need to comprehend this. 
 
Risk is subjective, conceptualised by actors only when plausible and how it 
impacts negatively on their own organisation 
 
Risk is conceived in economic terms as impacts on profit and revenue growth 
Risk is conceived by actors in terms of loss. However, the true nature of risk is 
variance to outcomes (both negative and positive).  
There are complex interconnections between the categories of risks.  
 
Risks can be transmitted through supply networks, one category of risk can morph 
or escalate into another. 
 
Strategies to mitigate one type of risk may inadvertently increase the presence of 
another type of risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vulnerability 
A framework of seven exogenous factors and eleven endogenous factors impacts 
on the vulnerability of the UK food network 
These vulnerability factors can be characterised as risk sources, risk dampeners, 
risk amplifiers, enablers or constraints. 
There is a complex interaction between vulnerability and these factors. 
 
These factors have plurality – in that some factors can be either a source of risk, 
amplifiers or dampeners of vulnerability or an enabler or constraint on resilience, 
depending on how they are shaped 
 
Vulnerability is a function of risk, the relative level of exposure to risk and the 
capability to respond.  
 
The concepts of risk, vulnerability and resilience are inter-related and cannot be 
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separated if a holistic understanding is to be reached 
 
Vulnerability is also dependent on risk perception, agency and the willingness to 
act, the capability to act, the types of mitigation strategies undertaken and 
ultimately whether desired outcomes of the supply chain are met or not.  
 
Vulnerability is a relative concept, dependent on supply chain position, on the 
perspective taken (either at a supply chain or network level) and on expected 
outcomes 
 
 
 
 
Resilience 
The importance of innovation as a key driver of resilience. This is a gap in the 
SCRES field. 
 
A conceptual framework of adaptive capacity at a network level, which is both a 
function of process and structure innovation. Both are needed to support a resilient 
network. 
 
There is very little understanding of vulnerability at a network level in the fields of 
SCV and SCRES.  
 
The field of ecological resilience helps to characterise vulnerability at this level in 
terms of level of connectivity, the accumulation of capital and the level of novelty 
and innovation.  
Vulnerability, and hence resilience, can be interpreted at a network level as the 
capacity for system change, while maintaining an acceptable level of outcomes.  
 
System transition theory provides a way of framing the concepts at this level. 
 
Table 8.5 Summary of key findings and contributions 
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Chapter Nine: Framing of the debate and implications for 
stakeholders 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the implications of the research for the stakeholders in 
the food system. It is guided by the research questions:- 
RQ4: What are the implications for stakeholders and policy makers in 
their aims to reduce vulnerability and encourage a more robust UK 
food system? 
 
RQ5: What are the implications for future research into concepts of 
vulnerability, resilience and adaptive capacity? 
 
As the thesis was conducted over a lengthy period of time, this section also 
serves to provide an update to the landscape for the food network context. For the 
food system context, as the data was collected in the 2007/2008 period the update 
here provides key changes since this time (up to April 2015) and post the 2008/2009 
food crisis.  
The chapter starts therefore with the update of the food landscape post the 
2008 food crisis, examining briefly the global context but then moves to cover key 
changes in the UK system since then. Following this update, the chapter discusses 
the implications for first policy makers, then supply actors.  
9.2 Global food security post 2009 
 
Since 2009, the issues associated with global food security have partly 
abated; this has been due to a fall in overall food prices (although not below their 
pre-2008 levels). As it stands in 2015, food production per capita continues to rise (at 
about a rate of 1% per year according to FAOSTAT, 2015). However, this is not 
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necessarily an indication that this trend will continue into the medium or longer 
term. Post the food crisis, there still remains some underlying optimism that the 
current system will be capable of meeting demand in the short term. The 2014 
OECD-FAO outlook (OECD-FAO, 2010) expects a  switch from wheat and rice towards 
more growth of animal feedstuff and grains for biofuels; this reflects an expected rise 
in demand for dairy, meat and biofuels in the next decade. Consequently, wheat 
prices are expected to fall a little, while for dairy prices are expected to stay higher 
than historical levels (i.e. pre-2008). The emergence of India as the largest milk 
producer in the world (overtaking the EU in 2013) means that supply will potentially 
be sufficient to stop higher price hikes.  However, despite these more optimistic 
trends, the World Bank point out that 33 countries are now classed as being ‘food 
insecure’ and food crises for these economies are highly likely (World Bank, 2015). 
In the longer term, global population growth is still the core concern even 
though, due to the economic downturn, rates have started to slow. While this eases 
some of the pressure on future supply, the World Resources Institute still estimate 
that production will need to increase by 69%  by 2050 (World Resources Institute, 
2013). The ability of agriculture to respond to this challenge still rests on a number of 
uncertainties. Debates still rage as to how much land is available globally for 
agricultural expansion, with water increasingly being considered the main 
constraining factor with growing concerns over water security (Wouters, 2010). 
Based on an expectation that (by 2030 at least), 20% of the required food production 
increase will come through land expansion with 80% through yields and cropping 
intensity, there is wider acceptance that there could be sufficient land to support 
agricultural production expansion (DEFRA, 2010c).  
Food production per capita growth is very dependent on a corresponding 
growth in yield and efficiencies (World Bank, 2009). Crop yields have steadily grown 
since the 1970s but over the last 10 years have started to tail-off (FAOSTAT, 2015). 
While this in itself is not a signal that current technology and practice is exhausted, 
there is recognition that proactive action is needed to invest in agricultural research, 
rural infrastructure and agricultural extension services, particularly in developing 
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countries to deliver this growth (World Bank, 2009). Much of the debate is now 
focusing on how to deliver these yield improvements across global agriculture. 
There is now greater understanding of the dependency of the food system on 
oil  – reasons for the food price spikes in 2008 have been partly attributed to the high 
oil prices of that time (FAO, 2009). The emergence of the bio-fuels market has 
created further inter-linkages between food and oil prices. Back in 2009, there was a 
growing swell of opinion that peak oil was becoming a real risk – the US Army 
warned that a shortfall in output could be conceivably reached by 2015 (JFCOM, 
2010). However, since then, the slow-down in global economy and the surge in 
extraction of shale gas in the US have seen an increase in supply, prompting a 40% 
drop in price (The Economist, 2014), in effect lessening concern over supply 
constraints. 
Recent developments and thinking therefore, reflects a more optimistic 
outlook (as of early 2015) as to the short term availability of food; albeit with more 
volatility in markets. However, there remains real concern over the longer term 
capability of agriculture to respond to greater food demand at affordable prices, 
particularly for those areas globally that are already food insecure or in vulnerable 
positions. 
9.3 UK context changes post 2009 
9.3.1 Government response 
 
On the back of the increased concern over food security and sustainability, 
DEFRA, under the Labour government at that time, published a comprehensive 
strategy for food in January 2010, known as Food 2030 (DEFRA, 2010a).  The 
document was unique in the fact that it was the first to set out a vision and strategy 
for the whole UK food system since the 1970s. The UK government formulated a 
vision of a system which focused on increasing production but in a more sustainable 
manner.  The strategy strongly articulated the convergence between sustainability 
issues and food security, voicing concerns over the ecological foot print of 
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agriculture, the need for more sustainable approaches but also the need for a cross-
government response, recognising the multi-functionality of food. 
However, this policy did not survive the transition to the Coalition 
government in 2010. Current policy aims are much narrower in focus. They state the 
need to create an efficient agricultural sector in the UK,  reducing pressure on land 
use in agriculture while continuing to adapt to and mitigate against climate change 
(DEFRA, 2015). 
As a direct result of the global food crisis, a major Foresight project was 
launched in 2009 to examine future global food security risks. The findings of the 
Foresight report – The Future of Food and Farming (Foresight, 2011)  – become one 
of the major influences on government policy and thinking. The report highlighted 
five challenges for the global food system:- 
1. Balancing supply and demand sustainably 
2. Addressing threat of future volatility in food supply 
3. Ending hunger 
4. Meeting the challenges of a low emissions world 
5. Maintaining biodiversity and ecosystem services while feeding the world 
 
This was a significant recognition of the real challenge facing food systems – 
the need to both produce more food but to do this in a more sustainable way. It also 
put agricultural production and its methods as the critical focus of attention and 
coalesced opinions among academic, scientific circles and even within the industry, 
that the current pre-dominant intensive system of agriculture is ultimately 
unsustainable (The Royal Society, 2009, Cabinet Office, 2008).  However, rather than 
creating more space for arguments for different approaches (e.g. organic), this report 
and the growing recognition of the need to globally produce more food has in fact 
added weight to proponents of intensive farming but with a new emphasis on the 
adaptation of the system to become more sustainable (DEFRA, 2010a, The Royal 
Society, 2009) i.e. sustainable intensification. Science is seen as a primary deliverer of 
this solution and this is reflected by the direction of public based research in the UK. 
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This has primarily manifested itself through the Technology Strategy Board’s new 
Sustainable Agriculture and Food programme which has £75 million to invest over 
the next 5 years. While this shows a greater commitment to agricultural investment, 
the programme is heavily weighted towards science-based solutions for carbon 
reduction and waste (TSB, 2010).  
Influenced by the Foresight report, food security issues have now been 
framed as being ‘global’ rather than specifically affecting the UK; it is felt that the UK 
is in a position to support and help the global need to produce more food rather than 
food security being a specific issue for the UK food supply system. However the issue 
of food security in the UK is still of concern to some politicians and EFRA initiated a 
new inquiry in 2014.  Their report (EFRA, 2015b) highlighted, again, the multi-
dimensional nature of food supply and security. They again highlighted the lack of co-
ordination across government on this issue. They also expressed concern over the 
resilience of supply chains, particularly for longer, complex supply chains and the lack 
of traceability and transparency. They also highlighted how UK is dependent on the 
import of animal feed and called for a strategic plan to source alternative supplies.  
Food prices in the UK have increased in real terms by 18% since 2007, 
although this has reduced in the last year to around 8.6 %  (to June 2014, DEFRA, 
2014b). Correspondingly, household spending on food rose to 11.6%, while it is 
nearer to 17% for lower income families. This pressure is manifested through the 
increased used of charitable food donations and food banks to support households 
struggling to access adequate nutrition (EFRA, 2014). The Trussell Trust (2014)  
reported a rise of 54% increase in their provision of food aid from 2012/2013 to 
2014. While a recent government review  indicated that there is not enough research 
to directly link rising food prices with the increase in food aid (FEC/Warwick 
University, 2014) - there are other factors such as access to benefit payments, 
housing and energy costs - there remains significant concern over the affordability of 
healthy food and the slide of more households into food poverty (Triggle, 2014). 
9.3.2 Regulatory landscape changes 
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2013 saw the announcement of the CAP agreement which changed the Single 
Payment Scheme previously in force. The main difference for England is the 
introduction of greening rules, in that 30% of direct payments are allocated on 
mandatory activities to preserve the environment. In practice, this means farmers 
have to maintain a percentage of land either as grassland or enforced crop 
diversification (DEFRA, 2014a) . Arable set-aside has been abolished, dairy quotas are 
due to be abolished in 2015 but some level of price intervention mechanism will 
remain for wheat, butter and skimmed milk powder. 
Further EU regulations have included an agreement to introduce stricter food 
labelling criteria from 2016, including comprehensive listings of allergens and 
mandatory listing of origins of meat and poultry ingredients (EC, 2014). More 
controversial, however, was the agreement to ban a range of pesticides 
(neonicotinoids) with plans to ban further ranges by 2020 (Heap, 2014a). 
Further government responses have been in the form of either regulatory and 
legislation action (on sustainability issues) or voluntary targets (e.g. on health).  
Particular focus has been on frameworks to support EU/UK commitments to carbon 
reduction targets. 2008 saw the UK’s legally binding commitment to at least an 80% 
reduction in carbon by 2050 (CCC, 2008). This has been followed in 2010 by the 
introduction of the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme in April 2010, a pilot in effect, for a 
full UK carbon emissions trading scheme.   
The FSA has been the main driver of policy on health and consumer choice. 
The FSA published more stringent voluntary targets in 2009 for the reduction of salt 
in products (FSA, 2009), and has announced recommendations for saturated fat 
reductions (FSA, 2010). A further voluntary scheme to unify front-of pack labelling, 
with guideline daily amounts and a ‘traffic-light’ scheme for fat, sugar and salt was 
agreed and retailers signed up to the code in 2013 (Triggle, 2012). However, there 
are questions as to whether the voluntary schemes are enough to force 
manufacturers to sufficiently reduce salt, sugar and fat content, with calls for 
legislative action such as taxes on fat and sugar (Campbell, 2012). 
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9.3.3 Retailer response 
 
The power of the UK retailers over the food system has been the subject of 
many debates but their influence cannot be overstated. The major 4 retailers had a 
market share of 77% in 2010 (DEFRA, 2014b) but have seen a slight decline to around 
74% in 2014 (IGD, 2014). This decline has been due in part to the rise in low cost 
retailers. Aldi and Lidl have a combined market share of 8.5% (DEFRA, 2014b)(Defra 
b, 2014), with market growths of 21% and 14% respectively since 2014 (IGD, 2014).  
Tesco, once one the UK’s business stars, has seen a marked fall in profits – a 6% fall 
in 2014 (BBC, 2014b) and has had to curb expansion plans and close stores to meet 
further profit challenges (Goodley, 2015).  The economic crisis and higher food prices 
created the space for Aldi and Lidl to entice shoppers with their lower prices, 
consistent value and quality messages. As with other discounters, their business 
model differs from mainstream retailers in that they carry a much limited product 
range (600-1500 SKUs as opposed to around 20,000 for a mainstream retailer) with a 
high percentage of private label products. This enables them to operate a 
streamlined supply chain system – less suppliers, bulk buying, cross docking through 
use of pallets straight from suppliers to store – plus a lower cost store model – less 
staff, less need for shelf replenishment activities etc. (CCRRC Europe, 2005).  
However, the growth of Lidl and Aldi is potentially not good news for UK based 
manufacturers and producers as sourcing tends to be from the EU or global markets 
and hence UK sectors are missing out on market share gains (Stones, 2015). 
Despite this, the four major retailers still dominate the retail market. While 
50% of the total food sales are through the food service sector, retailers exert a 
skewed influence over the farming and processing bases, with around 75% of all 
products processed in the UK destined for the retail supply chain (DEFRA, 2009b).  
The Competition Commission introduced a new code of practice for retailers 
in 2009; the Groceries Supply Code of Practice (Competition Commission, 2009). This 
code established a stronger framework for fair practice dealings within the supply 
chain, with suppliers able to raise complaints through a new independent 
adjudicator, appointed in 2013. Her current powers are limited to investigations into 
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any breaches of codes and fines. The role also only has the power to deal with direct 
suppliers to retailers and therefore does not extend back down the chain (DEFRA, 
2013). 
Concerns over price volatility and the availability of supply have driven 
retailers to forge more direct relationships with producers. The last few years has 
seen the establishment of more direct retailer-producer groups (Morrisons, 2010, 
Marks and Spencer, 2010). Retailers have started to work proactively with farmers to 
promote more sustainable practices such as a reduction in pesticides, controls of 
emission in dairy/meat farming, improvement in animal welfare standards and 
increased traceability from farm to fork.   
However, the loss of market share to discounters, along with higher overall 
food prices and the squeeze on household budgets have seen the ‘big four’ enter 
into a fierce price war throughout 2014 (Felsted and Aglionby, 2014). Retailers 
continue to exert cost pressures down the supply chain  - only around  36% of retail 
price goes to UK farmers (DEFRA, 2009a). This is prompting concern in the 
manufacturing and farming sectors that these pressures will force many food 
manufacturers to quit. Two independent reports from accountancy and insolvency 
firms have highlighted a higher rate of insolvency among food processing firms and 
more entering financial distress (BBC, 2014a, Stones, 2015).  
Accusations of bullying suppliers have been levelled at Tesco (Williams, 2015) 
and an investigation launched into potential breaches of the grocery code (Weaver, 
2015).The price war, as it stands in 2015, looks set to continue as the discounters are 
expected to see the largest growth in the next five years, forecast to double their 
market size by 2019 (IGD, 2015). This demonstrates the power and influence the 
retailers have over the food system in the UK; how the retailers respond and behave 
effectively dictates the direction of travel of a large share of the UK food system. 
In 2013, the horsemeat scandal struck, when 29 processed food products 
marketed as beef products were found to contain high levels of horsemeat (in some 
cases 100%) (Lawrence, 2013). This brought the complexity of long processed food 
chains to the public attention as the trail led back through France, Netherlands, and 
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Luxembourg and to abattoirs in Romania. It highlighted the lack of traceability and 
auditing along these long complex processing chains. It also raised questions as to 
how retailers governed these chains.  The breach was labelled as ‘ food fraud’ (HM 
Government, 2014) rather than a food safety issue and prompted the government to 
launch an investigation as to how to prevent food crime in UK food supply chains – 
the Elliot review in 2014. This review (HM Government, 2014) focused on the need to 
develop shorter supply chains and encourage local sourcing within longer term 
partnerships as key mechanisms to ensure food safety and reduce the probability of 
food crime. It identified that price pressures in the system encouraged companies to 
take short cuts and warns that this could continue unless practices are changed. It 
places responsibility for this at the door of the retailers, calling for a mind-set change 
in the industry to reward responsible procurement rather than focusing on the 
cheapest price available.  
9.3.4 Dairy Sector Changes 
 
Dairy farmers have seen a mixed picture since 2008/2009. Farm prices for 
fresh milk rose on the back of the food crisis but the market has seen huge volatility, 
reflecting variability in global demand for dairy products. 2015 have seen prices drop, 
also initiated by the retail price cutting war, played out in the reduction of the retail 
price of fresh milk (Bawden, 2015). This, combined with increased volatility, is 
accelerating the rate at which dairy farmers are exiting the industry – the number of 
farmers in England and Wales stood at  9,914 in February 2015 (AHDB, 2015). This 
has initiated again the arguments over farm gate prices and whether retailers and 
manufacturers are unfairly pressuring dairy producers (EFRA, 2015a).  
While both farms and herds have been reducing, yields per cow have been 
steadily increasing – in 2008 the yield/cow was 6900 litres, by 2014 this had 
increased to 7700 litres (DEFRA, 2014a). The level of milk production has also 
increased accordingly. Milk production in the UK in 2008 was 12.8 million litres, by 
2014, this was £13.6 million litres (DEFRA, 2014a). The outlook for milk demand 
globally is also positive. Global demand is expected to grow, therefore creating 
further export potential for processed milk products (EFRA, 2015a). 
248 
 
Continuing cost pressures and price volatility has continued the debate over 
intensive dairy farming. On the whole farms are being more intensive, with higher 
yields and larger herd sizes. 2013 saw the go-ahead for a 1000-cow ‘mega farm’ in 
Powys, Wales (BBC, 2013) prompting both environmental and welfare concerns.   
Since 2008, the dairy processing sector has seen even more concentration 
activity. In 2009, there were 465 registered processing companies in 2012. In 2015 
this reduced to 400, with only 8 firms responsible for 69% of the total milk processed 
in the UK (Milk Development Council, 2015).  The milk co-operative, Dairy Farmer of 
Britain went into receivership in 2009 (The Telegraph, 2009) and Arla Foods merged 
with Milk Link in 2012 (Scotland, 2012), leaving only one major co-operative in the 
UK – First Milk.  
9.3.5 Wheat sector changes 
 
Since the food crisis, the global wheat price has also seen a consistent fall, 
which has fed through to UK wheat prices. This period has seen a drop in wheat 
production in the UK – from a high 17M tonnes in 2008/09 to just under 12M tonnes 
in 2013/2014 (DEFRA, 2014a). In 2012 and 2013, the UK switched from a net 
exporter to being a net importer. Poor weather conditions in 2013 and 2014 have 
contributed to this, although the lower prices and switching to other crops such as 
barley have also played a role (DEFRA, 2014a).  
This, however, is not the major concern of the industry as wheat planting 
tends to fluctuate according to market factors. Wheat yields have levelled off (see 
figure 9.1) and the industry have expressed serious concerns over the EU 
moratorium on a range of pesticides (neonicotinoids), which could increase the  level 
of blight and pest and reduce cereal yields (Heap, 2014b). The debate rages as to 
whether the science around the ban, that these chemicals are harmful to bees, is 
over played. The UK government itself voted against the latest moratorium on 
neonicotinoids (McDonald-Gibson, 2013). However, there are some who welcome it, 
advocating a switch to alternative methods of insect and weed control, such as 
companion planting and alternative chemicals (Goulson, 2013).  
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Figure 9.1 UK wheat yields 2000/01 to 2013/2104 (source: 
http://data.hgca.com/archive/supply.asp) 
 
9.4 Implications for stakeholders 
9.4.1 Implications for food supply actors 
 
The research has clearly identified that the food system is facing a difficult 
future. In terms of specific threats, weather, especially climate change, remains the 
number one concern. The potential for extreme weather to impact UK production is 
high, with an expectation of extreme precipitation patterns, floods, winds and higher 
temperatures (Howard, 2015). As discussed in sections 9.3.4 and 9.3.5, food and 
commodity prices have fallen back from 2008 levels and the landscape is potentially 
becoming more turbulent economically. The recent years represent a vicious mix of 
Just a Blip – a fall in prices and a weakening of global demand – coupled with a 
version of Food Inflation where there is exerted and continuous cost pressure on the 
supply chain. The situation in 2015 represents the worst of both scenarios and 
reflects some of the worst fears of the interviewees.  
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The findings in the research show the interconnectivity between risk and  
factors which drive vulnerability or resilience. This suggests that typical single threat-
based analysis, and associated mitigation strategies, may not be sufficient. The 
research findings have shown how the combination of both exogenous and 
endogenous factors could create vulnerability for the wheat and dairy networks, and 
therefore for the food system overall.  The conceptual framework of vulnerability 
factors can be used as a guiding framework to support better decision making by 
firms within the industry. As vulnerability is both contingent and relative, the factors 
will need to be assessed and potentially broken down further into specific elements 
directly affecting each organisation and supply chain. Here, actors will need to 
understand how these elements are shaped and whether they are acting as risk 
sources, amplifiers or dampeners of vulnerability and which are enablers or 
constraints to action. This research has demonstrated the systemic qualities of risk 
and vulnerability and therefore any approaches to understanding vulnerability 
cannot look solely at direct linkages to the organisation. Risk and vulnerability can be 
sourced at any points within the network and therefore actors must consider the 
potential vulnerabilities across the supply network. This recognises that vulnerability 
may differ at different points in the network, but ultimately risks can be transmitted 
through the whole. Without this systemic thinking, mitigation strategies employed by 
one organisation – e.g. pressures on suppliers to reduce costs - may be sub-optimal 
and have a longer term negative impact on the supply chain, ultimately impacting on 
the source organisation’s ability to serve the market.  
However, the research raises a number of challenges for actors in 
undertaking better analysis of risk and vulnerability for their network. Firstly, the 
direct linkage between the perception of risk and the decision to act, along with the 
tendency for actors to underplay the likelihood and impact of effects, creates blind 
spots. This was borne out by the horsemeat scandal, where the risks associated with 
a lack of traceability were underplayed by both manufacturers and retailers. The 
scandal also demonstrated how the actual cost of impacts (when the risk is realised) 
can ultimately outweigh the costs in mitigating the risk in the first place. If actors do 
not see the need to act, then no action will be taken. Actors will also look to mitigate 
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operational risks first, as these can be linked directly to a cost impact on 
performance, while contingency planning or mitigation actions to counter disruption 
risks require a longer term view of benefit versus cost.  This, combined with the 
complexity of understanding vulnerabilities for different parts of the network, makes 
it an even more difficult task to decide when to take action. However, to help with 
this, actors would need create a process to include perspectives from across the 
network, including actors from different echelons as part of the team, as advocated 
by Christopher and Peck (2004).  
Increasing the visibility of vulnerability is only half the story. As the 
conceptual frameworks of vulnerability show, actors need to have the capability to 
act and more importantly, the control and power to act. The power rests with the 
retailers and the brand manufacturers; they have the greatest opportunity to co-
ordinate their chains more effectively to mitigate risk and vulnerability. However, the 
competition forces at a retail level have reached critical level, as shown in section 
9.3.3. This is driving producers, processors and retailers alike to search for cost-
reduction mechanisms, reinforcing a locked in level of behaviour. This makes 
decisions to effectively add cost, through the addition of redundancy and/or 
flexibility to improve resilience, virtually impossible. In addition, the ability of one 
organisation alone to co-ordinate chains is limited and at a network level, 
inconceivable. The thesis findings suggest therefore that different mechanisms of 
formal and informal governance structures need to be developed to support a 
better, and fairer, way of acting to build more resilience into the supply networks. 
The importance of relationships and fairness is a key factor here. Continued 
pressure on costs and unfair profit taking acts to create vulnerability and stifle 
actions to create resilience in the network. In addition, the perceived lack of fairness 
across the food supply chain is also recognised as a potential issue for longer term 
sustainability and profitability of smaller business and farms. Trust and confidence 
play a key role in the behaviours and actions of actors within the system. Lack of 
trust can result in the hiding of information and a lack of transparency across chains, 
and hence vulnerability. As discussed in section 9.3.4, there are still tensions in the 
dairy sector and the accusations of bullying levelled at retailers point to high levels of 
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distrust in supply relations. This continues to be a significant vulnerability for the 
sector which the appointment of the GCA, seemingly, will do little for.   
Over the longer term, the global tightening of supply to meet rising demand, 
along with social and political uncertainties, has the potential to create greater 
turbulence for UK retailers and the food system; principally in terms of price 
volatility, higher costs and increased competition for food. If the response is to drive 
more intensification and concentration of the current system, as this thesis suggests, 
then this will create an even more fragile and brittle system. The issues of 
sustainability become a concern here too, and a potential source of increased risk 
and vulnerability. As section 9.3.3 summarises, retailers have looked to implement 
some sustainable practices throughout the network. However, this is limited to 
certain types of products and only in response to the pace of change as dictated by 
consumers. Whether or not this is fast enough or the rate of change significant 
enough is the question. The stasis effect of these locked-in behaviours and the 
narrow application of innovation create even more questions as to whether the 
system can cope in light of continued landscape pressures for change.  Unless actors 
can put aside short term cost and profit concerns and start to articulate a common 
understanding of the issues then the possibility of a managed transition to a more 
sustainable network seems remote.  
The research indicates however that, using the understanding of system 
transition theory, there are opportunities to manage such a transition. The research 
highlights how innovation, both structural and process could play an important part 
in developing greater resilience for the food network. Here, though, there needs to 
be greater appreciation of the need to foster and support experimentation in 
different structures and alternative practices. Rather than seeing new approaches to 
the organisation of the network as a threat, there is a real opportunity for actors to 
create competitive advantage by testing and experimenting with new structures, 
thus paving the way to become a market leader. This harnesses then both the spirit 
of resilience as advocated by Ponomarov and Holcomb (2009) in that the system, 
post disruption, returns to a higher level of performance and also the concepts of 
ecological resilience in that a functioning system can take many forms. 
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9.4.2 Implications for policy makers 
 
At a policy level, this research raises some profound issues. Firstly, there are 
significant issues at a global level, and the food security debate here in the UK has 
clearly articulated these global challenges. The discussion has created space in policy 
thinking to see the UK agricultural base in a different light; both in its importance for 
food provision in the UK but also in the opportunity for growth to export more food. 
Government policy now reflects this. As discussed in section 9.3.1, the global agenda 
has overtaken the UK agenda in part and food security implications for the UK are 
not a prominent concern for policy makers. Instead, government policy is focused on 
technological innovation to support increased production of food (to support global 
supply concerns) and to reduce the level of input and emissions (to address 
sustainability concerns).  
However, this research shows that there are real threats to the wider 
outcomes of the UK food system. While availability of food may have some in built 
resilience through diversity of supply, there are significant pressures on affordability 
of food which present real concerns for poorer households. The rise of food banks is 
an indicator of this. However, there is no coherent view as to what can be done in 
order to address this specific concern, especially with government reluctance for 
market intervention. Section 9.3.1 shows that there continues to a significant policy 
gap on this issue.  
The research highlights the disconnect between the competitive motives of 
the retailers and the wider desired social, environmental and economic outcomes of 
the food system. For government, vulnerability can be defined as loss against these 
system outcomes, while for actors it is predominately about loss of profit or market 
share. The voluntary targets on fat, sugar and salt, discussed in Section 9.3.1, indicate 
that preferred interventions by government are by persuasion rather than regulatory 
means. However, ultimately, supply actors focus on resilience is predominately 
economic and for them, there is limited value in pursuing outcomes on health and 
the environment that either incur costs or do not chime with consumers.  
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Findings from the scenario workshops also revealed a significant disconnect 
between the articulation of the need for environmental change at a policy level and 
actual beliefs among supply chain actors. This is more acute at a farming level where 
there is little recognition that intensive farming methods could be unsustainable. 
Many in the industry (particularly the wheat sector) see a conflict between 
environmental aims and the need to grow more food (and the underlying driver for 
efficiencies and higher yield to increase profitability). The recent opposition to the 
banning of the range of pesticides is one area where this conflict is most prominent. 
The research has shown that any urgency of the need for change is not recognised 
and therefore any perceived risks and outcomes associated with potentially 
unsustainable practices and structures are not seen as either damaging or prescient. 
Policies to date have not taken into account that behaviours in the system will not 
necessarily balance economic priorities with that of health and environmental ones. 
This shows the importance of the regulatory system in shaping and limiting 
potentially damaging practices. However, with concerns over the cost burden 
associated with regulations, polices need to include more proactive levers which 
recognise the impact of behaviours and beliefs embedded in the system and look for 
ways to shift them. 
While there is some convergence of these issues, there still lacks a level of 
cohesiveness in government policy towards these wider outcomes. The shelving of 
the Food 2030 policy (DEFRA, 2010a) highlighted in section 9.3.1 shows how policy 
has gone backwards in this area.  There needs to be a more sophisticated debate 
over the wider outcomes of the food system – the need to integrate health, 
environmental, affordability, safety and environmental sustainability. This should be 
combined with more research to understand the factors which drive the behaviours 
likely to be exhibited by actors, especially those in positions of power, within the 
supply system. The transition model, combined with the findings from this research, 
could be used to give a wider understanding of the potential barriers and stasis 
within the system that prevent actors from taking actions to balance outcomes and 
create a more sustainable system. While there are increasing arguments which point 
to the need for significant change within the industry, there is no real understanding 
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from a policy makers' perspective of the barriers to this change. There seems to be 
an over-optimistic view that the retailer and brand manufacturers will be able to 
cope with steering the food system in the ‘right’ direction and coping with any 
disruption risks along the way.  In particular, the large level of inherent investment 
and the inbuilt inertia in the current system will mean that, unless these are 
countered, policy interventions will struggle to make a difference.  
The research shows how risk, vulnerability and resilience are interconnected, 
and the dangers involved in looking at any one area of the network in isolation. 
While different elements of the supply network have different vulnerability profiles, 
all need to be considered from a policy perspective. As it is, government deals with 
sections of the food chain separately and there is a divide between policies 
associated with agriculture and food production and those concerned with the 
distribution and sale of food. The main policy focus is that of agriculture. While there 
has been some research into the resilience of food chains (Peck, 2006, Grant, 2012) 
along with the recent EFRA report (EFRA, 2015), government does still not have any 
coherent policy on food chains. While there is emergent understanding that supply 
chains can be sources of vulnerability (from the report into the horsemeat scandal, 
DEFRA, 2014), there is a general lack of understanding or consideration of supply 
chains from a policymaker perspective. As the summary in section 9.3.1 of 
government policy demonstrates, there seems to be a level of complacency as to 
supply chain vulnerability and overly high levels of confidence in the ability of 
retailers to control and shape the supply chain. A lack of an overarching policy, which 
links food supply chains to production, remains a significant gap.  
The research findings show a convergence at a network level between 
vulnerability and system transition. That there could be a more productive system, 
structured in a different way with more effective use of resources and less waste, 
with better overall outcomes is not a debate that is articulated. There is instead an 
over-reliance on strategies to make existing processes more efficient. This has the 
potential effect of creating more vulnerability as more capital is squeezed into fewer 
and fewer organisations and supply chains. The research suggests that there needs 
to be more diversity in terms of supply models. However, the lack of structural 
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innovation and the significant barriers to nurturing this innovation are potential 
weaknesses. The technological strategy implemented by the government is set up to 
support process and product innovation rather than research into other more 
innovative practices or food supply structures. There may in fact be many better 
ways of managing the food system (Into a New Era just being one example). 
However, these models are often rejected, not properly tested or funded as they are 
outside of the current mainstream thinking. This is a direct area where government 
can look to support a more managed transition, by both funding and supporting 
more structural innovation projects and helping to bring together actors to generate 
clear articulation of the issues and possible solutions.  
In this context, the concepts of risk and vulnerability need to be widened to 
encompass all of the outcomes that the food system is expected to deliver. The 
findings also suggest that ultimately, system change may lay in the hands of policy 
makers to shape and drive.  The system is too complex for one set of actors to 
manage and govern and this is another area where government can step in to 
support. Any interventions will need to be made in partnership with stakeholders, 
including food supply actors and consumers, with policymakers as a strong, pro-
active part of any consortium. This is a fundamental change to the current principles 
embedded in the UK government and poses a significant challenge. It is also very 
unclear as to which interventions and mechanisms, over the longer term would enact 
the desired change – more research is needed here. However, this research points to 
an urgent need to start to examine vulnerability for the longer term from a wider 
social, environmental and economic perspective.  
9.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has presented an update of the landscape for supply actors and 
policymakers. It has discussed the implications of the research for both sets of 
stakeholder, the key points of which are summarised in table 9.2. This research has 
underlined the truth of the observation of Peck (2005) that supply network 
vulnerability transcends traditional supply chain management and extends into wider 
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policy dimensions. There still remains very little research into the convergence of 
supply network vulnerability and policy implications. The findings in this thesis, 
though originally generated from data collected back in 2008, still provide valid 
insights in the constructs of vulnerability and risk for the food supply network today. 
 
Policy makers Supply actors 
There are significant risks to the wider 
outcomes of the food system 
The need to assess vulnerability factors at an 
organisation, chain and network level 
There exists a disconnect between the 
competitive motives of supply actors and 
the need to deliver wider outcomes 
The contingency of vulnerability and 
whether factors are shaped as sources of 
risk, amplifiers or dampeners of risk and 
enables or constraints of action 
There is a disconnect between the need 
for environmental sustainability and the 
beliefs and actions of supply actors 
Actions to overcome blind-spots are needed, 
including multi-perspective approaches and 
counters to the tendency to underplay the 
impacts of risk 
Policies need to take into account how 
risks and vulnerability are perceived by 
actors 
The need for increased co-ordination across 
chains to mitigate against vulnerability 
There needs to be a more cohesive 
policy on how wider outcomes are to be 
delivered, taking into account the in-
built stasis in the system 
The need for fairness and better balance of 
power across the network to support 
resilience 
Food policies need to take a network 
perspective, joining agriculture with 
food supply chains 
The inbuilt stasis in the system and how this 
could create vulnerability in the longer term 
Government need to take a stronger, 
more proactive role in creating a 
commonly agreed understanding of the 
issues facing the food system and 
support the governance of the system to 
achieve policy objectives 
The opportunities to develop more structural 
innovation, to both increase resilience but 
also to harness competitive advantages 
Government should look to pro-actively 
support structural innovation and 
technological niches in order to foster 
experimentation and wider-based 
innovation to support greater resilience 
at a network level 
 
Table 9.2: Summary of implications for stakeholders 
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Chapter Ten: Conclusions 
10.1 Research objectives and summary of approach 
 
This research thesis was borne out of increasing concern over the 
vulnerability of the UK food supply system exposed to a more turbulent operating 
environment and increased disruptions and shocks. This thesis looked to address this 
by re-examining the data from a SCRM, SCV and SCRES perspective.  From an 
academic perspective, SCRM research has been very narrowly focused while the 
constructs of SCV and SCRES are still emerging. While SCV is characterised as the 
interdependency and interactions between organisations, there has been little 
research into how actors’ perception of risk impact on these interactions. There has 
been very little grounded, normative research in the field to understand why supply 
chains may be vulnerable to disruptions. To date, there has still been little research 
on risk, vulnerability and resilience at a food supply network level.  The overarching 
objectives of this thesis have therefore been to :- 
- undertake research which examines risk and vulnerability at a network level for 
the UK food system 
- to re-examine and provide a deeper analysis of the data collected through the 
Chatham House research project from a supply chain risk and vulnerability 
perspective 
- to understand actors’ perceptions of risks and vulnerabilities within the UK food 
supply system 
 
The research took a network perspective, using a case study framework to 
examine the wheat and dairy supply systems in the UK. Data collected as part of the 
CH project was re-examined using a grounded approach. Here, actors’ perceptions of 
risk and vulnerability were coded using a grounded analysis approach. The research 
was guided by a set of five questions which framed the analysis and the structure 
and flow of the thesis. The next section re-emphasise these findings, in relation to 
these questions. 
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10.2 Research Questions and Summary of Findings  
 
10.2.1 Research Question One 
 
Q1: How do actors conceptualise risk and vulnerability within the UK food supply 
system?   
The first research question was designed to guide the analysis of the data 
collected through the formulation of the CH scenarios and the subsequent 
workshops and interviews. Risk and vulnerability here emerged as separate concepts, 
with Chapter Six dealing with risk and Chapter Seven dealing with vulnerability.  The 
key findings for risk here included a categorization of the types of risk, as articulated 
by actors, along with their interconnections (figure 10.1).  
Figure 10.1: Interlinkages of risk 
Findings also included:-  
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 Actors tend to conceptualise risk in terms of their context and how it 
negatively (generally) impacts their organisation 
 Risk is often expressed in economic terms and how it effects either 
profitability or market growth 
 How risks are perceived is highly contingent on the sector and position within 
the supply network 
 There are complex interlinkages between the different aspects of risk; some 
arising from and impacting at an organisational level, some at a supply chain 
or network level 
 
The construct of vulnerability was found to be less explicit in the data and 
emerged as multi-dimensional. The first part of this construct identified a number of 
factors that impacted the vulnerability of the supply networks. This set of exogenous 
and endogenous factors are shown again here in table 10.1. How these impacted on 
vulnerability however, needed a higher level of analytic thinking and interpretation, 
this was therefore explored as part of research question two. 
 
 
Exogenous factors Global factors Global supply/demand factors 
Access to global market 
Degree of dependency on global market 
UK socio-technical 
factors 
Economic structure of UK 
Consumer expectations 
Societal value of food 
Political intervention and will 
Regulatory and policy framework 
Endogenous factors Supply chain factors Power 
Organisational scale 
Supply chain structure 
Level of Supply chain integration 
Sector specific factors Cost/pricing structure 
Interdependencies 
Beliefs and mindsets Perception of risk and vulnerability  
Faith in markets 
Faith in technological solutions 
Scale and efficiencies 
Trust and confidence 
Belief in environmental sustainability of 
food system 
Actions and behaviours Strategy norms 
Table 10.1: Exogenous and endogenous vulnerability factors 
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10.2.2 Research Question Two 
 
RQ2: How do the endogenous characteristics of the UK food supply system, in terms 
of its structure and dynamics, contribute to the perceived level of vulnerability in 
light of global, exogenous uncertainties? 
The second half of Chapter Seven therefore explored how the set of 
exogenous and endogenous factors interacted with vulnerability. It developed a 
conceptual framework to show how these factors link together – see figure 10.2. 
 
Figure 10.2 Conceptual framework of interlinking vulnerability 
 
The findings revealed that the factors relate to vulnerability in a complex way 
and interact either as risk sources, amplifiers or dampeners of vulnerability or 
enabler or constraints to act to mitigate against vulnerability – in effect they have 
plurality. This led to the conceptualisation of vulnerability as interconnected with risk 
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and resilience, defined as ‘the level of exposure to risk and the capability to respond 
to reduce variance to desired outcomes’.  Vulnerability here then is combination of 
- risk and threats to the food system, some of which are not completely known 
- the actual level of exposure to risks 
- how the level of exposure is perceived by actors 
- the capability and power to be able to act to mitigate the perceived threat 
Here, a conceptual framework was developed to represent how these 
elements of vulnerability fit together (the dynamics of vulnerability). This is shown 
again in figure 10.3 
 
Figure 10.3: The dynamics of vulnerability 
Vulnerability was found to be a relative construct. How it is conceived is 
dependent on the position of actors within the network and the perspective taken, 
whether for individual organisations, their supply chains or at a network-wide level. 
For food supply, at a network wide level, there are a set of wider social and 
environment outcomes that need to be considered when examining the relative 
vulnerability or resilience of the network. These are:- 
- Availability of food 
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- Affordability of food 
- Quality and safety of food 
- Health outcomes 
- Environmental outcomes 
- Secondary outcomes including employment within the food system 
 
10.3.1 Research Question Three  
 
RQ3:   How adequate are these conceptual frameworks of vulnerability, resilience 
and adaptive capacity in light of global phenomena? 
This question was principally answered in Chapter Eight. As the approach 
taken was grounded, there had been no a priori framework applied to the data; the 
conceptual frameworks emerged from the data. This question was designed to locate 
these frameworks and thesis findings in the context of the SCRM, SCV and SCRES 
literature. This is an accepted way of supporting theory building within inductive 
based research.  To do this, the conceptual frameworks and findings of the research 
were compared to key components of the SCRM, SCV and SCRES literature.  Using 
transition theory to understand vulnerability at a network level also revealed the 
importance of innovation as a component of resilience. This led to the final key 
finding of the research, that both structural and process innovation is needed to 
balance resilience. This conceptual framework is shown again in figure 10.4. 
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Figure 10.4 : Dimensions of adaptive capacity 
Key contributions of the research findings emerged, related to risk, 
vulnerability and resilience.  And these are summarised here in table 10.2. 
 
ACADEMIC FIELD FINDING AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
 
 
 
Risk 
Risk is difficult to quantify and the outcomes are often unpredictable 
 
Actors tend to focus on operational risk rather than disruption based 
risk. 
 
However, both types of risk are present in supply chains and 
conceptual frameworks need to comprehend this. 
 
Risk is subjective, conceptualised by actors only when plausible and 
how it impacts negatively on their own organisation 
 
Risk is conceived in economic terms – impacts on profit and revenue 
growth 
Risk is conceived by actors in terms of loss. However, the true nature of 
risk is variance to outcomes (both negative and positive).  
There are complex interconnections between the categories of risks.  
 
Risks can be transmitted through supply networks, one category of risk 
can morph or escalate into another. 
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Strategies to mitigate one type of risk may inadvertently increase the 
presence of another type of risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vulnerability 
A framework of seven exogenous factors and eleven endogenous 
factors impacts on the vulnerability of the UK food network 
These vulnerability factors can be characterised as risk sources, risk 
dampeners, risk amplifiers, enablers or constraints. 
There is a complex interaction between vulnerability and these factors. 
 
These factors have plurality – in that some factors can be either a 
source of risk, amplifiers or dampeners of vulnerability or an enabler or 
constraint on resilience, depending on how they are shaped 
 
Vulnerability is a function of risk, the relative level of exposure to risk 
and the capability to respond.  
 
The concepts of risk, vulnerability and resilience are inter-related and 
cannot be separated if a holistic understanding is to be reached 
 
Vulnerability is also dependent on risk perception, agency and the 
willingness to act, the capability to act, the types of mitigation 
strategies undertaken and ultimately whether desired outcomes of the 
supply chain are met or not.  
 
Vulnerability is a relative concept, dependent on supply chain position, 
on the perspective taken (either at a supply chain or network level) and 
on  expected outcomes 
 
 
 
 
Resilience 
The importance of innovation as a key driver of resilience. This is a gap 
in the SCRES field. 
 
A conceptual framework of adaptive capacity at a network level, which 
is both a function of process and structure innovation. Both are needed 
to support a resilient network. 
 
There is very little understanding of vulnerability at a network level in 
the fields of SCV and SCRES.  
 
The field of ecological resilience helps to characterise vulnerability at 
this level in terms of level of connectivity, the accumulation of capital 
and the level of novelty and innovation.  
Vulnerability, and hence resilience can be interpreted at a network 
level as the capacity for system change, while maintaining an 
acceptable level of outcomes.  
 
System transition theory provides a way of framing the concepts at this 
level. 
 
Table 10.2 Key findings and contribution of the thesis  
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10.2.4 Research Question Four 
 
RQ4: What are the implications for stakeholders and policy makers in their aims to 
reduce vulnerability and encourage a more robust UK food system? 
The long timescales associated with the PhD necessitated a re-examination of 
these contributions to understand their relevance in 2015. This was addressed in 
Chapter Nine, which gave an update of both landscape pressures for supply actors 
and policy makers. Here it was demonstrated that the research still holds relevance 
to both policy makers and supply actors. The food system is facing multiple 
challenges in the future, including more shock-based events and from a more 
turbulent operating environment. Supply actors tend to underplay risk, and to focus 
on actions to mitigate those which they perceive as impacting their economic 
outcomes. This, along with continual cost pressures driving strategies to focus on 
efficiencies, intensification and further concentration, is also driving further 
vulnerability. From a supply actors’ perspective, more analysis is needed to 
understand this at a network level – the conceptual frameworks presented here can 
support this process. Actions to counter blind spots need to be considered including 
multi-perspective approaches, the use of scenarios and purposefully over-estimating 
the potential impacts of risks.  However, issues of trust, unfair sharing of risk and 
poor co-ordination of actions across supply chains need to be addressed.  
The goals of supply actors are potentially at odds with the wider outcomes of 
the system and these wider outcomes are at risk.  However, framing of the issues 
facing the food system have continued to reside at a global level, or on single point 
issues, such as health. Policy needs to be more cohesive with a better understanding 
of vulnerability at a network level. There is a need for government to assume a 
greater role in articulating issues, encouraging greater co-ordination of actions across 
the network and creating frameworks to support higher levels of innovation, 
particularly to encourage different ways of structuring the food system. These 
implications are summarised in table 10.3. 
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Policy makers Supply actors 
There are significant risks to the wider outcomes 
of the food system 
The need to assess vulnerability factors at an 
organisation, chain and network level 
There exists a disconnect between the 
competitive motives of supply actors and the 
need to deliver wider outcomes 
The contingency of vulnerability and 
whether factors are shaped as sources of 
risk, amplifiers or dampeners of risk and 
enables or constraints of action 
There is a disconnect between the need for 
environmental sustainability and the beliefs and 
actions of supply actors 
Actions to overcome blind-spots are needed, 
including multi-perspective approaches and 
counters to the tendency to underplay the 
impacts of risk 
Policies need to take into account how risks and 
vulnerability are perceived by actors 
The need for increased co-ordination across 
chains to mitigate against vulnerability 
There needs to be a more cohesive policy on how 
wider outcomes are to be delivered, taking into 
account the in-built stasis in the system 
The need for fairness and better balance of 
power across the network to support 
resilience 
Food policies need to take a network perspective, 
joining agriculture with food supply chains 
The inbuilt stasis in the system and how this 
could create vulnerability in the longer term 
Government need to take a stronger, more 
proactive role in creating a commonly agreed 
understanding of the issues facing the food 
system and support the governance of the system 
to achieve policy objectives 
The opportunities to develop more structural 
innovation, to both increase resilience but 
also to harness competitive advantages 
Government should look to pro-actively support 
structural innovation and technological niches in 
order to foster experimentation and wider-based 
innovation to support greater resilience at a 
network level 
 
Table 10.3: Summary of implications for policymakers and actors 
10.3 Theoretical and conceptual contribution 
 
Chapter Seven presented a framework of seven exogenous and eleven 
exogenous vulnerability factors. Many of these vulnerability factors are mirrored by 
other authors. However, the framework was developed from a grounded approach, 
it is therefore ideographic and represents those factors which had a more significant 
effect on the dairy and wheat sectors, and therefore on the UK food network. This 
framework is novel, as specific factors which impact on the vulnerability of UK food 
system have not been developed before. This is a core contribution of the thesis.  
Part of this framework revealed a set of factors related to beliefs and mind-sets, 
common among mainstream supply actors. This highlights how cognitive aspects 
related to supply actors, as well as structural and other factors, impacts on 
vulnerability. It also suggests how common beliefs and mind-sets could drive locked-
in behaviours and narrowly-based strategies, which exclude potential opportunities 
for experimentation and innovation to support greater resilience. This thesis 
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contributes to the SCV and SCRES fields here by identifying that cognitive factors 
have an impact on vulnerability, either at a supply chain or network level.     
The research findings in Chapter Seven identified that these vulnerability 
factors can act on the food supply system in different ways. They can either be 
sources of risk, amplifiers or dampeners of vulnerability or constraints or enablers to 
resilience. The factors are interconnected at a system level and how they impact the 
network, is dependent on how each of the factors is shaped. Much of recent 
research has focused on isolating and defining antecedents or contributors to 
resilience. Here, the research reveals there are more complex, interconnected 
interactions between a wider set of factors and vulnerability/resilience. How each 
factor is shaped can change how they impact on vulnerability. This plurality 
characteristic of factors, along with their interconnection, is therefore an important 
contribution. It states that, while research into isolated factors is important, the 
systemic interaction between other factors may change their properties at a network 
level and these effects need to be considered. 
Chapter Seven also presents a definition of vulnerability as ‘the level of 
exposure to risk and the capability to respond to reduce variance to desired 
outcomes’. This definition validates the conceptualisation of vulnerability in terms of 
capabilities and outcomes and supports evidence that vulnerability can be 
conceptually linked to the resource based view of the firm. Here the research goes 
further by identifying additional elements that contribute to vulnerability, those of 
the roles of both agency and risk perception. Previous research has not explicitly 
considered how these two elements combine to drive responses to risk or 
vulnerability. As the research is grounded, it builds theory by reflecting the reality of 
how vulnerability factors, agency and strategies play out in the food system. This is 
important as it provides a linkage between SCV theory and supply chain practice.  
The conceptual framework of vulnerability dynamics presented in this thesis, while 
building on existing research, is the first to combine these interactions and provide a 
more unified and comprehensive conceptualisation of vulnerability. This framework 
therefore furthers the theoretical construct of SCV.  
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Academic research post-2012 has side-lined vulnerability, replaced by 
resilience, along with robustness, as the dominant research focus for SCRM. 
However, this thesis has proved that risk, vulnerability and resilience are 
interconnected constructs. Research which does not comprehend this, is failing to 
understand the systemic nature of these constructs and is in danger of sub-
optimisation. This is core contribution of this thesis, advocating the re-connection of 
vulnerability, and therefore risk, to resilience in future research.  
In Chapter Eight, innovation was shown to have a profound impact on 
resilience. Innovation as an antecedent to resilience can play a significant part in 
supporting more flexible or robust structures and processes.  The linkages between 
innovation and resilience have not previously been considered in SCV or SCRES 
literature, and therefore this finding presents a clear contribution to this field. The 
chapter also postulated a conceptual framework of adaptive capacity, as being a 
function of both structural and process based innovation. This represents a 
contribution to the SCRES field in providing a novel, grounded, theoretical framework 
which links concepts of ecological resilience with that of adaptive capacity and 
resilience. Chapter Eight provides evidence that narrowly applied innovation 
strategies could be a source of vulnerability for the UK food network. This framework 
therefore is a vital step in starting to conceptualise these issues, and provides the 
platform for future research into possible strategies and interventions to support 
greater resilience in the UK food system. 
There remains a substantial gap in research at a network level. The findings in 
this thesis therefore further understanding as to how SCV and SCRES apply at this 
level. Network level vulnerability can be interpreted as a function of capacity for 
system change. The thesis has demonstrated a convergence of SCV and SCRES, at a 
network level, with system transition theory. This contributes by expanding the 
constructs of vulnerability and resilience at a network level to encompass more 
complex questions of change and the potential for network transition or re-
organisation to support greater resilience.  Vulnerability in the food network 
transcends traditional SCRM and this thesis emphasises the need for wider scope in 
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the SCV and SCRES fields to consider and research the social, environmental and 
political implications.  
10.4 Research Validity and Limitations 
The research took a constructionist approach, principally to build theory in 
the fields of SCV and SCRES. There are a number of limitations associated with this 
approach and the research itself.  
Firstly, validity from a social constructionist standpoint relates to whether the 
study reflects the experiences of those involved in the research (Easterby-Smith et al, 
2002).  It can be argued from a relativist perspective that by including a wider range 
of perspectives, this enhances the validity of the research (Easterby-Smith et al, 
2002). On this count, however, there will always be difficulty in generating access 
and data from a wide enough audience with this type of research.   40% of 
participants were either from government organisations, support industries or 
external to the food supply system (e.g. scientists, NGOs etc.) which reflected the 
difficulties in gaining access to supply system actors. This therefore does pose some 
concerns over how well their input reflected the actual behaviours and experience of 
those who are directly involved in the supply system. However, these actors tended 
to be more critical of the food system as a whole and, having an external perspective, 
helped to counter any bias exhibited by mainstream supply actors and provided a 
useful lens as to potential blind-spots. The actors were also chosen as they had 
experience of direct intervention within the supply system e.g. (from a regulatory 
perspective, from an environmental activism stance, from a scientific research 
stance) and therefore it could be argued that each provided a unique, but equally 
valid view, on the experiences and perceptions within the food system as those 
acting within it directly. Turning to the question as to whether the study managed to 
reflect accurately the experiences of those within the area of study. The scenario 
workshops, while slightly artificial, gave the actors the ability to explore potential 
different futures, capturing their reactions and thoughts unprompted by 
interventions from the researchers and gave rise to a direct understanding of their 
perceptions. However, there is one caveat; as the data was often collected in groups, 
this may have led to the voices of less powerful actors being ignored or not 
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articulated sufficiently to register in the findings. There is therefore some reservation 
as to whether all voices have been equally captured.  
From the question of generalizability, a constructionist approach asks 
whether the concepts in the research have relevance for any other settings 
(Easterby-Smith et al, 2002). The conceptual frameworks were built from data 
derived from actors examining the UK wheat and dairy sectors and therefore can 
really only be seen to be representative of phenomena within those sectors. The 
research here has shown that while there is a level of homogeneity to some 
elements of the frameworks, some factors have more impact or significance in the 
dairy or the wheat sectors.  While the research was explicitly focused on these 
sectors, there are common factors applicable the wider food system. These 
specifically include global demand and supply pressures, UK economic and general 
agricultural policies, the structure and operation of retail supply chains and 
relationships.  The conceptual frameworks, having common elements to the food 
system, can therefore potentially reflect the dynamics in play across different sectors 
and at a network level. However, it cannot wholly be said that these conceptual 
frameworks can be generalised across the food system. 
However, proponents of case study-based inductive research are less 
concerned with the generalisability of the case but more with the quality of 
theoretical reasoning (Bryman and Bell, 2003). This is concerned with the linkage of 
data to theoretical arguments and concepts. This thesis presents a clear evidence 
trail from empirical data (shown in Chapters 4, 5 and 6) to the level 1 and 2 codes 
and core categories generated as part of this research (as presented in Chapters 6 
and 7). It also places the conceptual frameworks created in the context of the 
academic literature to further support theory building (Gill and Johnson, 2002).  
A further attribute of inductively generated theory is that it remains at a 
modest idiosyncratic level (Eisenhardt, 1989). This is the case here. In the tradition of 
grounded theory, further selection cases are required in order to reformulate the 
conceptual frameworks and test for negative cases (Mitchell, 1983, Gill and Johnson, 
2002). Further research therefore is needed to examine how this conceptual 
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framework applies, or not, for other food sectors such as the red meat sector and 
fresh produce sector. This would enable further theory building to be enacted, 
identifying any differences across the cases.  
10.5 Future Research 
RQ5: What are the implications for future research into concepts of vulnerability, 
resilience and adaptive capacity? 
This then leads to the final research question, as to what future research is 
needed to further the theory building process and validation of the concepts 
presented here but also for wider research into SCV and SCRES. 
On furthering research, cases from other food sectors need to be examined in 
order to determine if the conceptual frameworks are applicable here and for the 
wider food system. Grounded approaches again would help support linkages to the 
live experience of actors but also would support the building of theory around the 
linkages of risk, vulnerability and resilience and how these play out in the food 
system (in line with inductive theory building from cases). Specifically, research 
needs to be conducted to understand the differences in exogenous and endogenous 
vulnerability factors within each sector to support the construction of normative 
frameworks. This will be helpful from a practical sense for actors within the food 
system, to support thinking, widen the understanding of vulnerabilities across the 
system and to help build consistent articulation of the issues. 
Further research is also needed to understand how the dynamics of 
vulnerability (the interplay between risks, risk perception, agency, capabilities and 
outcomes) play out across the different sectors. Further detailed investigations are 
needed into the individual elements of the framework to unpick its components 
further (e.g. the components of agency). This could also help to map this framework 
onto previous research findings. However, the tendency for SC research to take a 
reductionist approach needs to be guarded against, as the interconnections between 
the elements mean that their properties may be difficult to isolate. While this thesis 
has looked to position this conceptual framework within the SCV and SCRES fields, 
more research is needed to delve deeper into the differences between this 
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framework and those of other frameworks.   There still is great ambiguity in this field 
and it may be that it is an impossible task to build unified, cohesive frameworks, as 
the nature of vulnerability and research is complex, systemic and by its nature partly 
uncertain. This suggest that more empirically based research is needed to test these 
conceptual frameworks but also to support the identification of areas of 
commonality between frameworks and where there are conflicts and differences. A 
clearer picture of contested elements would then aid thinking in the field and signal 
priority areas for research.     
The particular concern raised in this thesis, of the disconnection between 
vulnerability and resilience, merits attention. While the tenet that the precise nature 
of threats cannot be predicted is true, whether resilience can be cast adrift entirely 
from risk and vulnerability needs further investigation.  
More research into the nature of vulnerability and resilience at a network 
level is imperative. Supply chains are part of complex, messy connected networks 
and more is needed to understand the constructs of vulnerability and resilience at 
this level. More novel research methods for examining the constructs at this level 
may be needed.  This thesis has shown that the use of scenarios is an important 
addition to the portfolio of SCM research methodologies. Methods built around 
scenarios create a safer environment for actors to think through the possible 
consequences of current SCM activities, while exploring potential alternative 
behaviours and strategies. They have also proven effective in supporting a multi-
perspective approach across the supply network under study and also in helping 
uncover potential blind spots in actors’ thinking. They are especially powerful where 
the research is future focused and where there is significant uncertainty in the SC 
operating environment; they are able to deal with a wider range of complex variables 
than Delphi studies. The use of scenarios in this thesis, specifically for SCM research, 
is novel and more research is needed to examine how scenario-based methodologies 
can be used to support the furthering of knowledge within the SCM field.   
The research finding that vulnerability and resilience can be interpreted as 
the capacity for system change at a network level is a specific area for future 
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research.  Here, more work is needed to understand the connections between 
system transition theory, ecological resilience and SCV and SCRES and the 
implications for both theory and practice. Here also, the part that innovation plays in 
supporting resilience and system transition needs further analysis and definition. 
The issues of the food system span multiple areas and the issues of 
vulnerability and resilience merge with questions of sustainability (including 
sustainable supply chains), technological development and dispersion, resource 
management, supply network governance, and government policy. This suggests the 
need for more multi-disciplinary approaches and convergence between academic 
fields. Finally there are number of pertinent questions for supply actors and 
policymakers:-  
- What governance structures and instruments are effective at a network level in 
co-ordinating actions to improve resilience? 
- What policy instruments and interventions would be effective to support 
greater resilience within the UK food system?  
- How can greater systemic innovation and experimentation in supply chain 
structures be encouraged and nurtured?  
- How can the conflict between commercial and wider social-environmental 
outcomes be negotiated to deliver a more sustainable UK food system? 
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Appendix A: Interview schedule for general interviews 
 
 
PHASE 1: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
Profile of participant 
 
Name: 
_______________________________________ 
 
Job Title: 
_______________________________________ 
 
Brief outline of role and responsibilities: 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Interview Questions 
 
 
1. What do you see happening at the moment in the food markets? 
 
2. What is your view of this situation and why is this happening? 
 
3. What do you think is going to happen in the longer term? 
 
4. Where do you see the future challenges for the food system? 
 
5. What actions do you think need to be taken by:- 
 
- the supply network 
- policy makers 
- consumers/civil society as a whole? 
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Appendix B: Schedule for supply chain sector interviews 
 
NETWORK DYNAMICS 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
  
Profile of company/participant 
 
Name: 
_______________________________________ 
 
Job Title: 
_______________________________________ 
 
Brief outline of Role and responsibilities: 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Corporate organisation    Farm-based organisation 
Organisation Turnover :    Ha farmed :- 
(Scale)       Location :- 
Number of Employees :    Main activities :- 
(Scale)       (inc. non-farming based) 
 
 
Organisation activities 
 
What range of wheat/milk products do you grow/supply to the network? 
 
In total, how much wheat/milk, in volume terms, do you supply to your customers on 
an annual basis?  
 
What percentage of your total business does this volume equate to? 
 
Supply Network 
 
Who do you consider to be your key suppliers of raw materials, products and services 
(supporting your wheat/milk products)? Where are they based and what products or 
services do they supply to you? ( if imports, where from?) 
 
Has this network changed over the last 10 years? If so, what have been the changes 
and what were the driving forces for the change?  
 
On what basis do you do business with these suppliers? ( in brief) 
 Contractual arrangements 
 Ordering arrangements 
 Method of delivery 
 Specifications/quality control etc 
 Nature of relationship 
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Appendix B continued 
 
Have the nature of this way of doing business changed over the last 10 years? If so, 
what have been the changes and what were the driving forces for the change? 
 
 
In your opinion, what are the critical resources and activities in your upstream supply 
network which are essential to the supply of products and services to meet your 
delivery, cost and quality objectives?  
 
Focal organisation and customer network 
 
Who are your key customers and what products do you supply to them? Where are 
they based and what products or services do you supply to them? 
 
Has this part of the network changed over the last 10 years? If so, what have been the 
changes and what were the driving forces behind it? 
 
Briefly explain, on what basis do you do business with your customers? 
 Contractual arrangements 
 Ordering arrangements 
 Method of delivery 
 Specifications/quality control etc 
 Nature of relationship 
 
Have the nature of this way of doing business changed over the last 10-15 years? If 
so, what have been the changes and what were the driving forces for the change? 
 
What are your critical resources and activities which are essential to assuring supply 
to meet your customers’ delivery, quality and cost objectives?  
 
Strategic Planning Process 
 
What would you say is your organisation’s overall business strategy/objective? (in 
general terms). Has this changed from 10-15 years ago? 
 
What is your current supply chain strategy/objectives? (again, in general terms)Again 
has this changed? 
 
When setting future business or future supply chain strategy within your organisation, 
what are the main considerations, assumptions and factors which are taken into 
account?  
 
How far ahead in the future are plans in place for?  
 
How is future risk taken into account and to what extent are wider, externally 
generated trends and uncertainties taken into account? 
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Appendix B continued 
 
To what extent do you share information on/or jointly plan for these 
risks/uncertainties with your suppliers and customers? 
 
Forces for change 
 
Looking at the external environment, what factors from various political, social, 
economic, technological, legal and environmental perspectives influence are critical 
to your ongoing business success? 
In your opinion what strategic trends or uncertainties in the external environment to 
the supply chain, could, in the future, affect your future business 
success/competitiveness? 
 
Over the last 20 years what have been the significant changes within the industry as a 
whole? What have driven those changes? 
 
Looking forward, what do you think the major forces for change for the industry as a 
whole will be in the coming years? 
 
What do you think are the challenges are that lie ahead for the industry as a whole? 
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Appendix C: Templates for Initial Scenario Workshops 
 
Dairy/Wheat : Initial Scenario Workshop 
QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES 
 
 
   
Question 1  
 
Please answer the following question for all 4 scenarios 
 
‘What are your comments and feedback on the detail of the global scenarios, plus what would 
you want to add or change?’ 
 
Question 2 
 
Again, for all scenarios, please answer the following question 
 
 ‘What are the primary challenges and issues you think each global scenario presents for 
industry, government and consumers in the UK in relation to wheat supply? 
 
 
Scenario x 
Farmers 
 
 
 
 
Industry 
 
 
 
 
Consumers 
 
 
 
 
Government 
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Appendix C continued 
 
Question 3 
 
‘Who are the key actors and stakeholders we need to consider in and around the food arena 
in the UK related to wheat supply and what happens to them in each scenario? Who does 
well and who is in difficulty? 
 
Enter core stakeholders in the horizontal axis of the grid. 
Enter ‘OK’ is they are a winner 
Enter ‘X’ if they are a loser 
Enter ‘N’ if they are neutral 
 
 
Blip Food Inflation Into a New Era Food in Crisis 
 
Tables Tables Tables Tables 
Stakeholders 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
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Appendix D: Templates for Core workshops  
Appendix D:Template 1 
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Appendix D: Template 2 
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Appendix D:Template 3 
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Appendix D:Template 4 
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Appendix E : List of level one codes 
 
C : Food 
Sector:Food 
sector type = 
Wheat 
D : Food 
Sector:Food 
sector type = 
Dairy 
Q : 
Sector:Industry 
= Wheat 
R : 
Sector:Industry 
= Dairy 
1 : animal breeding 0 4 0 6 
2 : availability of labour and skills 2 4 2 8 
3 : behavioural change 2 6 3 7 
4 : bio and nano technology 1 0 1 0 
5 : bio-fuels 14 0 20 2 
6 : business as usual 5 6 5 6 
7 : CAP and agricultural policy framework 3 8 7 10 
8 : capital availability 6 3 7 8 
9 : carbon management 0 0 0 2 
10 : carbon constraints on production 0 0 0 0 
11 : carbon management 1 1 1 3 
12 : carbon measures across supply chain 2 5 3 5 
13 : carbon pricing and trading 2 1 2 2 
14 : changes in competition policy 0 1 0 3 
15 : changing geo-political power 3 0 4 0 
16 : climate change 2 0 5 1 
17 : co-location of production and processing 0 0 2 3 
18 : competition between feed, fuel and food 0 1 4 1 
19 : competition for resources 1 2 1 3 
20 : competitiveness of UK food system 7 7 12 19 
21 : concern over sustainability of food system 2 4 2 8 
22 : concerns over animal welfare 1 1 1 3 
23 : consolidation 2 8 3 15 
24 : consumer expectations 4 4 5 5 
25 : consumer preferences for value based 
purchasing 
1 2 2 4 
26 : consumer spending power 3 1 3 1 
27 : contested responsibility for change 0 5 0 6 
28 : contraction in Uk food production 6 14 6 25 
29 : contractual arrangements 0 0 0 4 
30 : dairy 0 52 0 59 
31 : dairy farming as lifestyle 0 2 0 2 
32 : deregulation of milk market 0 0 0 1 
33 : de-urbanisation 1 3 1 3 
34 : development aid for agriculture 2 0 2 0 
35 : differentiation and value-add 5 15 7 25 
36 : disease threat 0 8 1 9 
37 : environmental issues with livestock 
farming 
1 0 1 2 
38 : EU policy disparity 0 0 0 2 
39 : EU tensions 3 3 3 3 
40 : expansion in Uk food system 9 1 10 5 
41 : extent of change 0 1 0 1 
42 : fairness in trade 0 0 0 13 
43 : faith in markets 2 2 2 2 
44 : faith in technological solutions 1 1 2 1 
45 : flexibility and agility of supply chain 0 2 0 2 
46 : food culture and dietary change 12 10 13 10 
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47 : food labelling 0 0 0 0 
48 : food price deflation 1 0 1 0 
49 : food security policy 0 3 0 3 
50 : food standards 9 9 16 13 
51 : food tax 4 4 4 4 
52 : futures trading and speculation 2 2 2 2 
53 : gap between commercial and social 
environmental concerns 
0 0 1 0 
54 : general 0 0 0 0 
55 : Global environmental constraints 0 0 0 0 
56 : energy availability and peak oil 0 0 0 0 
57 : land availability 0 0 0 0 
58 : water availability 2 0 3 1 
59 : global production response can meet 
demand 
0 0 0 0 
60 : globalisation of supply chains 3 1 3 3 
61 : GM 0 0 0 0 
62 : Benefits of GM 0 0 1 0 
63 : Gm Acceptance 2 4 3 4 
64 : GM acceptance in other gobal regions 0 0 1 0 
65 : GM as technological solution to supply 
pressures 
1 3 2 4 
66 : GM authorisation 4 0 4 0 
67 : GM policy parity 2 0 2 0 
68 : GM safety concerns 0 0 0 0 
69 : GM seggregation of product 0 0 0 0 
70 : GM to reduce disease 0 1 0 1 
71 : Increase in GM production 0 0 0 0 
72 : Government policy and intervention 3 2 4 5 
73 : contested level of government intervention 14 8 14 8 
74 : government crisis management 6 6 6 6 
75 : Policy interventions to promote 
sustainability 
6 2 6 2 
76 : role of government 4 0 4 0 
77 : Uk food policy alignment and integration 3 0 4 0 
78 : growth in own label 1 0 1 0 
79 : high levels of waste in supply chain 7 10 8 13 
80 : high prices as driver for change 3 0 3 0 
81 : impact of regulatory system 4 6 9 14 
82 : impact on developing countries 0 0 1 0 
83 : impact on lower income groups 4 5 4 5 
84 : import export controls 3 0 3 0 
85 : Importance of food as political issue 4 2 6 2 
86 : importance of maintaining UK farming and 
food production 
1 0 2 3 
87 : improved seed breeding 0 0 1 1 
88 : increase in global food demand 0 0 1 1 
89 : economic growth of emerging economies 0 0 1 0 
90 : nutrition transition in emerging economies 0 0 1 1 
91 : urbanization 0 0 0 0 
92 : world population growth 0 0 1 0 
93 : increase in global free trade 1 1 6 4 
94 : increase in regional production 0 1 1 1 
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95 : increased cost of agri-environmental 
schemes 
1 1 1 1 
96 : increased profits 1 0 1 0 
97 : industry mindset 8 1 11 3 
98 : integration and co-ordination 3 9 13 28 
99 : intensification 5 12 8 18 
100 : interdependencies 1 0 1 1 
101 : lack of consumer awareness 2 4 2 5 
102 : lack of innovation 0 2 0 8 
103 : land use 7 5 7 5 
104 : local sourcing 2 4 2 6 
105 : Local systems vs global or centralralised 
systems 
1 6 1 7 
106 : lower global stocks 0 0 0 0 
107 : maintain status quo 9 4 9 4 
108 : manage uncertainty 5 1 6 1 
109 : management of fertilisers 0 0 0 0 
110 : market bifurcation 0 7 1 11 
111 : market opportunities and threats 3 4 3 7 
112 : migration of production and processing 2 4 3 4 
113 : motivation for system change 1 0 1 0 
114 : need to develop more sustainble 
practices 
1 0 2 0 
115 : no major shift in supply demand 
dynamics 
0 0 0 0 
116 : obesity and health concerns 1 0 2 4 
117 : optimism for future 0 0 0 0 
118 : polarized society 5 3 5 3 
119 : policy uncertainty 0 0 0 2 
120 : poor producer understanding of market 0 1 1 3 
121 : power balance in supply chain 2 4 2 4 
122 : price and market volatility 7 2 9 3 
123 : price as main competition point 2 8 2 10 
124 : price inflation 2 1 3 2 
125 : pricing and cost structure of market 0 2 2 6 
126 : product and product offering 
reformulation 
9 12 9 15 
127 : profiteering 2 0 2 0 
128 : protectionism 3 6 3 6 
129 : R+D development and innovation 15 12 17 13 
130 : rate of change 0 0 0 3 
131 : reduction in choice 6 1 6 1 
132 : reduction in food service revenues 5 0 5 0 
133 : reduction in intensification 6 3 6 6 
134 : reputational risk 0 0 0 0 
135 : resource efficiency 0 4 0 7 
136 : risk and crisis management 6 2 6 2 
137 : seasonal food 1 4 1 9 
138 : sharing of supply chain benefis and risks 0 3 3 12 
139 : slow speed of response 0 3 0 4 
140 : social responsibility 0 5 4 5 
141 : strategic food reserves 4 1 4 1 
142 : structural change to supply demand 
dynamics 
0 0 0 0 
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143 : supply chain absorbs increased costs 4 6 4 6 
144 : supply chain infrastructure 4 0 6 0 
145 : supply chain ownership and structure 3 9 7 12 
146 : supply chain relationships 13 8 22 20 
147 : collaboration 0 0 2 0 
148 : supply continuity 10 12 11 18 
149 : supply demand imbalances 0 0 0 2 
150 : sustainability as competitive advantage 4 6 4 6 
151 : sustainability sidelined 5 4 5 4 
152 : sustainable intensification 2 0 3 0 
153 : sustainable packaging 0 4 0 4 
154 : tension between techo and green 
solutions 
0 1 1 1 
155 : threat from imports 6 2 13 5 
156 : tightening of food supply 0 2 0 2 
157 : trade off between values 1 3 1 4 
158 : trade off between aspects of 
sustainability 
1 1 1 1 
159 : trust and confidence 0 4 0 4 
160 : UK consumption patterns 4 5 6 8 
161 : UK demographic changes 1 3 1 3 
162 : UK exposure to global prices 0 1 3 2 
163 : UK food system capacity 2 3 7 5 
164 : Uk food system resilient against global 
challenges 
0 0 0 1 
165 : UK system breakdown 17 15 17 15 
166 : Uk wheat quality 1 0 2 0 
167 : upward pressure on costs 6 5 7 10 
168 : viability of small systems vs economies of 
scale 
1 7 1 10 
169 : vision of sustainable future 0 1 0 1 
170 : weather variability 0 0 1 5 
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Appendix F: Level two codes  
(excluding specific codes related to risk) 
 
  
 
Level two codes 
In Folder Created On 
access to markets Nodes 27/08/2013 12:03 
affordability of food Nodes 27/08/2013 11:07 
business as usual Nodes 22/05/2013 16:28 
capability and skills Nodes 27/08/2013 13:48 
consumer expectations Nodes 16/01/2013 14:05 
control and regulation Nodes 27/08/2013 12:02 
environmental impact of food Nodes 27/08/2013 11:15 
externally driven sustainability agenda Nodes 27/08/2013 12:01 
faith in technological solutions Nodes 27/01/2013 14:44 
food standards (higher) Nodes 13/05/2013 17:38 
incremental change Nodes 27/08/2013 10:59 
industry mindset Nodes 29/01/2013 17:32 
inflationary pressures Nodes 27/08/2013 12:28 
integration and co-ordination Nodes 26/01/2013 14:22 
intensification Nodes 27/01/2013 16:03 
intensification\consolidation Nodes 16/01/2013 11:08 
interdependencies Nodes 10/05/2013 16:17 
polarized society Nodes 12/05/2013 16:52 
power balance in supply chain Nodes 07/05/2013 17:21 
pricing and cost structure of market Nodes 18/03/2013 15:58 
product and process innovation Nodes 27/08/2013 11:29 
profit margins Nodes 27/08/2013 11:20 
rate and extent of change Nodes 29/04/2013 16:59 
risk adverse Nodes 27/08/2013 11:02 
risk and crisis management Nodes 14/05/2013 11:16 
Scale Nodes 27/08/2013 11:04 
social impact of food Nodes 27/08/2013 11:15 
societal value of food Nodes 27/08/2013 13:08 
supply chain flexibility and agility Nodes 07/05/2013 17:29 
supply chain ownership and structure Nodes 22/03/2013 19:00 
supply chain relationships\collaboration Nodes 15/01/2013 16:49 
supply continuity Nodes 22/03/2013 16:07 
supply system governance Nodes 27/08/2013 11:42 
trade off between values Nodes 27/01/2013 18:57 
viability of UK farming and production Nodes 27/08/2013 11:20 
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Appendix G:  Level 3 codes (Core categories) 
 
Core categories (level 3) 
  1 Perception of risk 
2 Exposure to risk 
3 Capability to respond 
4 Power to act 
5 Strategies 
6 Enablers 
7 Constraints 
8 Amplifiers 
9 Dampeners 
10 Competitive outcomes 
11 Wider supply network outcomes 
12 Drivers of change 
13 Innovation 
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Appendix H:  Mapping of linkages between codes 
 
 
 
 
